DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE AND THE MOBILIZATION OF SOCIETY
FINAL REPORT

Edited by

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PREFACE

The Demos project focuses on conceptions and practices of democracy in contemporary social movements, in particular the Global Justice Movement (GJM) calling for an alternative globalization.

The Consortium

The Consortium, co-ordinated by the EUI, is based on a wide and consolidated co-operation among the participant Institutions and researchers in the field of cross-national specialized research projects on social movements and the transformation of political participation in Europe, attested to also by the publication of numerous collective and multilingual publications, books and scientific articles. Several members of the Consortium have recently participated in, or are participating in, EU-sponsored research projects that have many synergies with the Demos project. The Consortium partners are also involved in nationally funded research centred around Social Forum structures, large demonstrations promoted by the new global movements, and visions on deliberative democracy.

Members of the consortium are:

1. EUI – European University Institute (Donatella della Porta, coordinator);
2. KENT – University of Kent (Christopher Rootes);
3. WZB – Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (Dieter Rucht);
4. URB – Università di Urbino (Mario Pianta);
5. SOR – Université Paris I-La Sorbonne (Isabelle Sommier);
6. CSIC (IESA) – Instituto de Estudios Sociales Avanzados de Andalucía (Manuel Jiménez);
7. GEN – Université de Geneve (Marco Giugni).

In this final report we shall summarize the results of our research, mainly on the basis of the introductory chapters of each of the seven Work Package Reports.

Publications

A (much) revised version of the Report for Work Package 1 has been published with Donatella della Porta (ed.), The Global Justice Movement in cross-national and Transnational Perspective, Paradigm, 2007.

A volume based upon WP2, 3 and 4 is under contract with Palgrave Macmillan (provisional title ‘Democracy in movement’, delivery date September 2008); a further volume based upon WP5 is

under contract with Routledge (provisional title 'Another Europe', delivery date September 2008). More than 100 articles and chapters in collected volumes have been published or accepted for publications.

The table of content of the volume 'Democracy in Movement' (based on WP 2, WP 3, WP 4) is the following.

Democracy in movements, edited by Donatella della Porta

Chapter 1. Visions and practices of democracy in the global justice movement: An introduction

Donatella della Porta

The introductory chapter has four main aims. First, it introduces the theoretical model, locating the research in the fields of a) social movement organizations; b) debate on democracy. In addition, it presents the conceptualization of democracy, as well as the typologies that will be used along the volume. Second, it justifies the choice of the Global Justice Movement as the focus of our analysis. It addresses the issue of the plurality of the global justice movement, by looking at the ways in which the samples organizations define the GJM, as well as the issue of its "global" nature. Third, the introduction will address the methodological problems/solutions adopted in the research, presenting the three main data bases on the websites of 266 social movement organizations, the fundamental documents of 244 social movement organizations and the semi-structured interviews with representative of 210 social movement organizations. The sampling strategy as well as the coding schemes will be critically presented, with a focus upon main methodological challenges. Fourth, it will present the chapters included in the volume.

Chapter 2. Consensus in movements

Donatella della Porta

The aim of this chapter is to conceptualize the contribution of the global justice movement to the reflections upon deliberative democracy. It looks at normative theory on deliberative democracy and empirical research on deliberation in movements and singles out some rival explanations of consensus building as linked either to strong or weak identities, informal or formalized structures, lack or abundance of organizational resources. In a first part, the chapter will use qualitative materials from the analysis of the organizational documents and the interviews in order to reconstruct the emergence and development of concepts such as consensus, deliberation, and discursive democracy in the global justice movement. In particular, it will investigate the origins of consensual practices in the organizations involved in humanitarian interventions as well as in global networks. I will also look at the different meanings that similar concepts take in organizations with different historical traditions as well as involvement in different arenas (e.g. NGOs, unions, squatted centers). In a second part, the chapter singles out the organizations that most explicitly invested in the development of consensual methods, classify them according to the different meanings that consensus take, and try to explain their characteristics with attention paid to other democratic values, generational and sector belonging, organizational structure (size and professionalization) as well as territorial levels of intervention and cross- country comparison.

Chapter 3. Participation in movements

Herbert Reiter

The chapter aims at isolating and analyzing the different conceptions of internal participation advanced by the organizations active in the Global Justice Movement. The literature on political participation concentrates on the patterns of participation of citizens in general or of members of political parties or activists of social movement organizations in particular. In a first part, based on the qualitative and quantitative material collected from the analysis of documents and interviews, the chapter focuses instead on what organizations active in the global justice movement expect from their members in terms of internal participation and which channels of participation they actually provide. In a second part, the chapter discusses which factors may determine the different conceptions of internal participation (synthesized in a typology), testing different hypotheses looking at the organizational size and age, organizational main themes and action repertoires, the organizational type (party, trade union, NGO, etc.) and movement sector. A concluding part is devoted to a discussion of the congruence between the different conceptions of internal participation and the critique of existing democratic practices advanced by the movement.

Chapter 4 . Multilevel governance and the global justice movement

Donatella della Porta

The global justice movement developed in a period of challenges to the representative model of democracy. Neoliberal globalization, with its stress on market liberalization, has in fact produced a shift of competence from the nation-state to both the market and transnational institutions. This chapter will look at how social movement organizations respond to these challenges. It will draw on qualitative information as well as on the quantitative data bases on the fundamental documents of the social movement organizations (general democratic principles, relations with national and international institutions and economic actors) and interviews (on relations with public institutions; attitudes towards experiments of deliberative democracy). First, the chapter describes some general characteristics of the GJM attitudes towards democracy, such as: a) emphasis upon democracy as debate/knowledge/deliberation; b) adaptation to multilevel governance with interventions on different territorial levels but differentiated conceptions of democracy/representation/participation at the different territorial levels; c) emphasis upon experimentation and the re-invention of democracy. Second, the chapter singles out a typology of attitudes towards institutions (working upon the distinction between collaboration, critical control, and refusal) and investigate explanations for the different attitudes, with a main focus upon the interactions between conceptions of democracy of internal conception and external. The characteristics of the organizational structures (size, professionalization, structuration), as well as the organizational generation and sector of activities will be considered as control variables.

Chapter 5. Identity and Democracy in the Global Justice Movement

Marco Giugni, Marko Bandler and Alessandro Nai (University of Geneva)

Students of social movements and collective action have long stressed the importance of collective identities for the emergence and mobilization of social movements. A common vision of democracy is part of a shared understanding of the world. This chapter explores the relations between collective identity and democratic models within the global justice movement. More precisely, it looks at how the strength and type of collective identity that characterize the organizations active in the movement may affect the vision of democracy conveyed by the organizations, but also their internal democratic practices. Do collective identities within the movement vary both across countries and across movement organizations or types of organizations? And if yes, to what extent and how do such variations relate to differences in the visions and practices of democracy within the movement? Furthermore, is collective identity a precondition of a given democratic model or rather the other way around (i.e. a given vision and practice of democracy influences the processes of identity formation within the movement)? Finally, what are the relations between an organization's collective identity (e.g. in terms of identification with the movement, internal coherence and degree of inclusiveness, and degree of external transparency), on one hand, and the position the organization takes with respect to the ways internal conflicts should be handled and internal decisions taken? Using the three quantitative data base, the chapter focuses on three main dimensions of democracy and compare the findings obtained on each dimension: the degree of transparency and openness of the organizations towards the public as emerged in their websites, the visions of democracy as they appear in the discourse of the organizations, and the internal decision-making practices of the organizations. Concerning the latter two aspects, it looks in particular at two main features of decision making: the degree of delegation of power in the decision-making body (participation) and the search for consensus in the decision-making method (deliberation). The analyses will be done on four levels: at the aggregate level (overall sample), by comparing across countries (Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland), by comparing national and transnational organizations, and by comparing across different types of organizations (e.g. old left, NSMs, and radical/anarchist).

Chapter 6. Organizational resources and democratic conceptions: is big or small beautiful?

Christopher Rootes and Clare Saunders

This chapter discusses the main sociological theories on organizational structures of social movements (iron law of oligarchy / institutionalisation, tyranny of structurelessness etc.). In the light of the interview data, it focuses on resources (operating budget, staff numbers, number of volunteers / members, number of local groups) and see whether an increase in resources leads to a more oligarchic organisational structure. It would also look at how the decision-making practices and rules of the assembly vary according to the numbers attending (i.e. consensus is obviously much easier to achieve in process and practice when numbers are low). On a (very) small sample of groups in each country, in-depth interviews with staff will be used to get some qualitative material to give context to our data on decision-making processes –e.g. how content are staff members with the decision-making processes in their own organisation? How could the processes be improved? What conflicts have arisen (if any) about the way decisions are made? Has the organisation consciously addressed debates about democracy in practice?

Chapter 7. Conceptions of democracy and the repertoire of action

Dieter Rucht and Simon Teune

The chapter focuses on how conceptions of democracy impact the group-specific action repertoires. The analysis is based on different sources, including the groups' websites, key documents, and interviews conducted with group representatives. The global justice movements unite groups, networks, and organisations that embrace very different conceptions of democracy, views on how democratic change can be achieved, and beliefs as to what role social movements are to play in this process. Mainly because of these ideological differences, the interaction of global justice groups with governments, parliaments, the judiciary, parties, mass media, and other environments varies considerably, ranging from rejection to indifference to collaboration. Attempts to influence these target groups can result in direct or mediated forms of communication. We hypothesise that, in general, visions of participatory democracy are closely related to mediated forms of communication, such as raising of public awareness and protest activities, whereas visions of representative democracy tend to mainly focus on direct forms of communication, such as lobbying. However, groups also exist that do not fit into this pattern or that deliberately utilise direct and mediated forms of communication. We will show that apart from ideological concepts, intervening factors (e.g., political opportunities, mobilisation structures, and conflict cultures), also influence the groups' interaction with their environment.

Chapter 8. Mediating the movement

Lorenzo Mosca

The chapter sheds light on different strategies of communication in the Global Justice Movement. In a first part, the focus is on the use of the Internet by the Global Justice Movement Organizations belonging to different movement families and different generations of social movements. It assesses if different styles of Internet use can be explained by factors like the social movement sector, the age of the organization and other organizational characteristics. In a second part, a typology of different styles of communication will be proposed focusing especially on a sample of organizations (critical left newspapers, periodical magazines close to the movement, radios, online media, online networks of independent communication) and of activists (i.e. those belonging to alternative media) engaged on the issue of communication. The chapter will rely on data concerning web presence of the social movement organizations, data coming from interviews with leading positions of social movement organizations and data on the political use of the Internet by participants in the Athens ESF.

Chapter 9. Generations of organizations: path dependency and conceptions of democracy,

Nicolas Haering and Isabelle Sommier

This chapter focuses on organisations' practices of democracy as well as on their ideologies. Visions, practices and conceptions as emerged in documents and interviews will be analysed in relation to the "generation" to which the different organisations belong. Indeed, the GJM is considered by its actors as a *new* form of engagement, an *innovative* form of struggling – that is to say a form of collective engagement that is unprecedented. Some even describe the GJM as

being opposed to *old* forms of political struggles. However, being a "movement of movements" it gathers organisations that were created at different times. Hence this chapter aims at discussing this issue of "generation" and explore how relevant it is while addressing the issue of democracy: do *newer* movement organizations have different conceptions of democracy than *older* ones? Are their respective practices different or not? Answering these questions requires to handle the relation between organisations and time, taking into account three concepts of time: stratums, stages and isomorphism. The first one (stratum) is linked to a conception of social movements in general as an entity that evolves in time: differences between its newest components and older ones could be explained by innovations that emerge on the basis of past experiences. A second conception put the stress on the fact that there are different stages in the development of any movement. Finally, the third one addressed the relation between movements and their space (or context), looking at reciprocal influences between different social actors – social movements as well as economic actors and institutions.

Chapter 10. Transnational activism in European Social Movements

Mario Pianta, Raffaele Marchetti, and Duccio Zola

The chapter investigates the transnational activism of the global justice movements. The analysis focuses on transnational and national organisations that are active in cross-border mobilisations around themes of global justice. While much of the relevant literature has treated transnational mobilisations as simple extensions of national activism, we argue that major novelties emerge when social movement organisations become involved in cross-border activism. The move to transnational actions can be conceptualised as a broadening of the understanding of global issues, and as an evolution of political objectives and relationships to economic and political power, that leads to forms of action and organisation that largely differ from domestic activism. On the basis of the empirical evidence drawn from the interviews, an index of transnational activism is proposed combining information on participation to transnational events and linkages with transnational networks and campaigns. The results of this analysis show that key determinants affecting the degree of transnational activism of the global justice movement include global justice identity, field of activity, size, a network/campaign form of organisation, the use of demonstrations as a form of action, and national specificities.

Conclusion

In the concluding chapter, the hypotheses developed in the various chapters will be summarized in the light of the main approaches presented in the introduction. In particular, we shall reflect on the effect of globalization on social movement visions of democracy.

The table of content of the volume 'Another Europe' (based on WP5) is the following.

Another Europe: Conceptions and Practices of Democracy in the European Social Forums, edited by Donatella della Porta

Chapter 1, Why research democracy and the European Social Forum? An Introduction

Donatella della Porta

The introductory chapter justifies the focus on democracy in movements locating the research within previous analyses of democratic conceptions in political activism and in the research on activists' attitudes and behavior. Additionally, the chapter presents the European Social Forum as a crucial arena for research on changing conceptions of democracy. Finally, the methods used in the research (in particular, the activist survey and frame analysis), are critically presented.

Chapter 2, The ESF organizational process in a diachronic perspective

Nicolas Haering, Cristopher Haug, and Lorenzo Mosca

This chapter discusses the organizational dimension of social movements, through an analysis of the main tensions and decision making procedures at transnational meetings of the European Preparatory Assembly.

Chapter 3, Communicating the Forum,

Lorenzo Mosca, Dieter Rucht, Simon Teune, and Sara Lopez Martin

Chapter 3 analyses the communication within/by the forums, and relations with conceptions of democracy. It also discusses the communicative strategies used by the networks involved in the Forum as well as the (lack of) resonance of the Forum in the mainstream press.

Chapter 4, Models of democracy: how activists see democracy in the movement

Massimiliano Andretta and Donatella della Porta

Chapter 4 will focus upon the conceptions of democracy, presenting the various dimensions of our main dependent variable (in particular, a typology is built crossing two dimensions: a) majoritarian versus consensual; b) direct versus delegated).

Chapter 5, Democracy from below: activists and institutions

Donatella della Porta and Marco Giugni

Looking at how to reform existing institutions, chapter 5 addresses the activists' attitudes towards democracy, as they emerge from the analysis of the survey results as well as from internal debates/documents. The chapter focuses on attitudes towards multilevel governance—in particular the European institutions—and the emerging conception of politics.

Chapter 6, The socio-demography of global activism

Massimiliano Andretta, Marko Bandler, Nicolas Haeringer, Ilhame Hajji, Manuel Jiménez and Isabelle Sommier

Chapter 6 focuses on the socio-demography of activism, covering the gender, age, educational, and employment background of the activists, and looking at the way in which these dimensions influence the conception of democracy. The debate on the inclusiveness (and exclusion) of the ESF is also addressed.

Chapter 7, The European Social Forum and the Organizational Dimension

Clare Saunders, Massimiliano Andretta, Nicolas Haeringer, Ilhame Hajji, and Isabelle Sommier

Chapter 7 is devoted to the organizational dimension and addresses the organizational backgrounds of the activists and the Forum, as well as their (different?) democratic visions. It includes data from the survey on individual membership as well as data on the organizers of the various sessions of the Forum.

Chapter 8, How deliberative democracy (net)works

Massimiliano Andretta, Iosif Botetzagias, Moses Boudourides, Olga Kioufegi, and Mundo Yang

Chapter 8, on networking in the movement, applies network analysis to the survey data, focusing on the multiple and multilevel memberships of the activists.

Chapter 9, Protest and the Forum

Marco Giugni, Alessandro Nai, and Herbert Reiter

Protest and the forum is analyzed in Chapter 9 which addresses the repertoire of protest of the activists and their effects on conceptions of democracy. It also looks at the ESF as a form of protest and at the protests that take place within the forum (e.g. sit in and marches) and are organized by the ESF (final march) or around the Forum (e.g. direct action etc.).

Chapter 10, The European Left and the ESF

Massimiliano Andretta and Herbert Reiter

Finally, chapter 10, on the Forum and the Left, addresses the political alignments of the activists and their effects on visions of democracy. Survey data and internal debates/documents on the issue of institutional alliances are used as illustrations of the way in which institutions/the institutional left interacts with the Forum at the local, national and supranational level.

Dissemination

Specific efforts are being made to disseminate the research and policy results among European and international policy makers, institutions and civil society organizations. An extensive network of social movement and civil society organizations has been involved in discussion and consultation during the course of the project, and in the dissemination of the results. We have presented our research project as well as our results in a number of *meetings* with national and European policy makers and social actors. In many occasions, our press releases and results from our research were quoted in the press and radio broadcasts (both in Italy and in other countries). Results have been presented in dozens of scientific conferences and workshops. A joint session has been organized at the ECPR in Helsinki (2007) and a series of panels and round tables at the ECPR general conference in Pisa (2007). In both cases, our panels and round tables have been among the most attended, allowing for most efficient dissemination. Demos results have also been presented by the coordinator at the Opening Plenary Session of the European Sociological Association.

A brochure of the Demos project was distributed at scientific meetings, social movement gatherings and sent to journalists. Interviews have been given to journalists. In addition, we plan to distribute the booklet we printed from WP7 broadly to scholars and practitioners.

On our website, we have an updated list of scholars working on issues of social movement and democracy, for a total of almost 300 profiles. We have contacted these scholars, asking information about their specific research interests, selected publications, work-in-progress. Our map provides a rich data base to be used also for dissemination of our results. Aiming to disseminate the intermediate results of the project to researchers, social actors and institutions, our website includes: research reports, and reports on the national seminars; a section for works-in-progress on the research topic by members of the consortium; an open section for comments; the project email address; a bibliography. We also plan to upload soon copy-left publications by Demos collaborators.

As part of the IConnectEU collaborative project we are developing instruments for improving accessibility of our data as well as preparing documents specifically aiming at dissemination towards institutions and social partners.

CHAPTER 1. THE DEMOS RESEARCH DESIGN

1.1. The research on democracy and social movements

Recognizing the importance of social movements in and for democracy, social movement research has traditionally focused more on the external than on the internal dimension, and more on the effects of representative democracy on social movement characteristics than vice-versa. Especially since the 1980s, with the increasing interest in social movements by political scientists, European scholars started to use the concept of political opportunities, central in the so-called political process approach developed by American scholars, in cross-country research projects. Alexis de Tocqueville's famous contrast between a 'weak' American government and a 'strong' French one is usually an implicit or explicit starting point for analyses linking institutional factors—or 'regimes' in Tilly's definition (1978)—with social movement development (Kriesi 2004: 71). The idea that the strength or weakness of states influences social movement strategies remains central to the literature on collective action in general, and on revolutions in particular. These and other similar concepts have been used within several cross-national comparative projects that have facilitated interaction among European scholars. One of the reasons for the spread of the political opportunity approach in Europe may have been the interest, well developed in European political science and sociology, in cross-European comparison. Especially in the nineties, this interest produced large comparative research projects, singling out and exploiting different dimensions of comparison among European countries such as centralization versus decentralization of power (Rucht 1994: 303-12; Kriesi et al. 1995) and relatively stable characteristics of national political cultures (Kitschelt 1985; Kriesi et al. 1995); the influence of a country's democratic history (Flam 1994; della Porta and Reiter 1998); the prevailing model of industrial relations (Joppke 1993, Tarrow 1989, della Porta 1996) and the alliance of the parties of the Left (della Porta, Valiente and Kousis forthcoming). Only few attempts were made in addressing instead the effects of social movements on representative democracies, and these attempts mainly focused on macro-dimensions (see Giugni et al. 1998; Giugni et al. 1999; Giugni 2004).

With few remarkable exceptions (in particular, Lichterman 1996; Polletta 2002), the issue of internal democracy remained marginal in social movement research. It was mainly addressed within the debate on organizational forms of movements, often returning to the traditional cleavage between those who praised organizations as effective instruments of mobilization (Gamson 1990; McCarthy and Zald 1987b) and those who feared an iron law of bureaucratization (Piven and Cloward 1979). Although different forms and trends of organizational structures and developments have been singled out (for instance, Kriesi 1996, Rucht 1996, della Porta 2003c), and the typical network form of movements has been stressed (Gerlach and Hine 1970; Diani 1995; see della Porta and Diani 2006 for a review), an instrumental vision tended to prevail. As Clemens and Minkoff (2004, 156) have recently noticed, with the development of a resource mobilization perspective "Attention to organization appeared antithetical to analysis of culture and interaction. As organizations were understood instrumentally, the cultural content of organizing and the meanings signaled by organizational forms were marginalized as topic for inquiry". Moreover, empirical research often singled out the limits of direct forms of democracy, in particular the "tyranny of the majority", the

closedness of small groups to newcomers, the risks of a "hidden" leadership (among others, Freeman 1974; Breines 1989).

The main (although not the only) questions asked in the last decades have therefore focused on macro-causes for movements, and the instrumental role of movement organizations in mobilizing environmental resources. These relevant questions will remain central also for contemporary movements. However, the emergence of contemporary movements also led to the perception of the need to re-focus our attention from social movements as dependent variables to social movements as independent and conscious actors, producing changes not only in the outside world, but also inside themselves. Internal communication and democratic practices are all relevant angles for addressing a movement that is innovative and plural. In this sense, we want to move attention towards what we can define as the emergent properties of protest. In his call for an "eventful temporality", Sewell (1996) suggests to consider the capacity of some events to interrupt or challenge the existing structures. Research on the GJM started in fact to recognize some of the emerging characteristics of collective action. Action-campaigns and the networking structure of the globalization movement produce a situation of intense interaction between various individuals and organizations. This creates a process of cross-fertilization ("contamination" in the Italian neologism) in action through mechanisms of multiplication of individual belonging and organizational networking, which in turn facilitates frame-bridging, the transformation of identities and the creation of informal links (della Porta and Mosca 2006c).

1.2. The research design

The central concerns of our research project are the conceptions and practices of democracy that have developed in the GJM, with reference to both the *internal organization of social movements* and *public decision-making*. The different conceptions and practices and the ensuing debate on democracy are particularly relevant both for the development of a transnational civic society, and for the legitimisation of political institutions at the local, national and supranational level. Representative models of democracy are in fact challenged by crises of legitimacy as well as efficiency: decline in conventional forms of democratic participation is accompanied by perceptions of poor performances of government. Other models of democracy (re)emerge as possible correctives to the malfunctioning of representative democracy. In fact, experiments in participatory and deliberative forms of democracy are underway not only inside social movements but also in political institutions.

Focusing on six European countries (France, Germany, Britain, Italy, Spain and Switzerland), and the transnational level we analysed conceptions and practices of democracy in the GJM's interaction with institutional politics, the organizations involved with the GJM, and the individual activists. The single parts of our research design consisted in the analysis of:

- the development of the GJM and of the political opportunities and environmental resources available to it, on the basis of published sources and secondary material;
- the impact of modern communication technology on social movement dynamics emerging from the websites of selected social movement organizations (SMOs) involved in the GJM;
- the organizational ideology and the visions of democracy of the sampled SMOs contained

in formal documents produced by them;

- the implementation of principles of horizontal participation and consensual decision-making, and the extent and type of interaction with authorities emerging from semi-structured interviews with representatives of the sampled SMOs;
- the patterns of political activism and the democratic visions and practices of GJM activists on the basis of a survey conducted at the European Social Forum in Athens in 2006;
- the practices of deliberative democracy registered in the course of participant observation of the activities of movement groups and in particular of their experiences with participatory and/or deliberative decision-making.

CHAPTER 2. THE GLOBAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT: AN INTRODUCTION[1]

2.1. The Global Justice Movement in Context

2.1.1. The emergence of a new protest cycle

When some fifty thousand demonstrators protested the third World Trade Organization (WTO) conference in Seattle in November 1999, social scientists still focused on explaining the institutionalization of social movements. Only gradually did intense international mobilization (starting already before Seattle)—in counter-summits, Global Days of Action, European Marches against Unemployment, Intergalactic Meetings of the Zapatistas, and World Social Forums—start to build awareness of and interest in the emergence of a new cycle of protest. Hundreds of thousands, in fact, marched against the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank meetings in Washington and Prague in 2000 and 2001 and against the European Union (EU) summits in Amsterdam in 1997, in Nice in 2000, and in Gothenburg in 2001. They protested the World Economic Forum in yearly demonstrations in Davos, the G8 summit in Genoa in 2001 and in Evian in 2003, and (following a call issued by the first European Social Forum) the Iraq war in hundreds of cities around the world on February 15, 2003.

That cycles of protest emerge unexpectedly is certainly not new. On the eve of 1968, social scientists and politicians alike lamented the "end of ideologies," the institutionalization of the labor movement and consumption society, and, above all, the decline of interest in politics, in particular of the young generations. At the turn of the millennium, the debate focused on the disappearance of a sense of community, the institutionalization of the "new" social movements, and the antipolitical stance of new generations. Surely, the emergence of a new protest cycle testifies to a rupture in the prevailing forms of collective action and organizational strategy as well as collective identities. In this sense, the perception of a sudden break reflects the challenges that cycles of protest pose to existing repertoires of collective action. During protest cycles, new organizational structures emerge with new styles of activism (Tarrow 1989; della Porta 2005a). What seemed established is once again in movement.

Waves of protest, however, do not emerge from nowhere. In the sociology of social movements, various concepts have been used to depict movement survival beyond protest mobilization: Melucci (1996) described the alternate stages of visibility and latency; Verta Taylor (1989) analyzed the functioning of organizations in periods of movement "doldrums." It was observed that, even in low ebbs, social movement organizations do not invariably transform themselves into interest groups or charities (della Porta 2003a and 2003b). Social movement organizations from previous waves of mobilization often participate in the rise of new cycles of protest, ensuring continuity with the past.

Although often unexpected, the emergence of a protest cycle is not as sudden as it appears. Protest requires existing organizational structures able to mobilize resources, as well as

[1] This chapter is based upon the introductory and concluding chapters, authored by Donatella della Porta, of the volume *The Global Justice Movement in Cross-National and Comparative Perspective* (Paradigm, 2007) edited by Donatella della Porta. This volume is a (much) revised version of the Demos WP1 Report (della Porta and Reiter 2005). It includes country chapters written by Herbert Reiter, with the collaboration of Massimiliano Andretta, Donatella della Porta and Lorenzo Mosca (Italy), Manuel Jiménez and Angel Calle (Spain), Isabelle Sommier and Hélène Combes (France), Christopher Rootes and Clare Saunders (Great Britain), Dieter Rucht, Simon Teune, and Mundo Yang (Germany), Nina Eggert and Marco Giugni (Switzerland), Jennifer Hadden and Sidney Tarrow (USA).

less visible processes of networking and construction of justifications for collective action. Protest involves institutional actors and arenas: For instance, in some countries, the 1968 movements also developed inside student unions as well as in party structures (Tarrow 1989). The emerging movements are often influenced by the characteristics of the organizations that "host" them in their infancy, and their evolution is the product of a mix of traditions and challenges to those traditions. The perception of a sudden rupture is in part an outcome of the natural conformism in the social sciences. The confirmation of general trends (such as the bureaucratization of labor unions or the institutionalization of social movement organizations) is in fact often facilitated by the choice of some objects of study (such as the union leadership or the more visible and better structured NGOs [nongovernmental organizations]) and not others. Conversely, the singling out of countertrends seems to be discouraged by their lack of visibility or relevance within the dominant paradigm.

In this chapter, we pay attention to the way in which the protest on global justice developed, singling out the less visible steps of "remobilization," as well as the innovations introduced in the action repertories, structures, and frames during the protest cycle.

The protests we have just mentioned developed from a number of campaigns that networked existing organizations against the North American Free Trade Agreements (NAFTA); against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment; for the cancellation of poor countries' foreign debt (in the Jubilee 2000 campaign); or for a more social Europe (in the European Marches against Unemployment and Exclusion).[1] Within these campaigns, new frames of action developed, symbolically constructing a global self, but also producing structural effects in the form of new movement networks. After some preliminary experiences in the1980s, counter-summits multiplied over the succeeding decade, simultaneous with large-scale UN Conferences (Pianta 2001a and b) and supported by frenetic activity of Transnational Social Movement Organizations and NGOs that claimed to represent not only their hundreds of thousands of members, but more generally the interests of millions of citizens without a public voice. Mobilizations at the transnational level have also been linked to (more traditional) local and national protests such as the mobilization of the "have-nots" in France, the anti-road protests in the UK, the labor action of critical, grassroots unions in Italy, and the environmental campaigns against large infrastructures in Spain. Local and national organizations interact transnationally, reacting to supranational institutions of governance, but they are also embedded in national traditions and opportunities.

Although the Global Justice Movement (GJM) acquired notoriety in Seattle, United States, it seems to have had a larger impact in Europe. Although September 11 and, especially, the Iraq war did in fact bring about a redomestication of activism in the United States (or, as Jennifer Hadden and Sidney Tarrow (2007) argue, a process of internalization), in Europe transnational protest remains very dynamic. The process of the Europeanization of social movements not only intensified with the building of Europe-wide networks and campaigns, but it is also spreading to Eastern Europe and Turkey.

On the Old Continent, the extraordinary capacity of transnational networking in the GJM is visible in the European Social Forum (ESF), the regional version of the World Social Forum, which provides an arena for encounters and debates to large numbers of organizations and

[1] On transnational campaigns, see among others, Clark 2003a; Cohen and Rai 2000; Edwards and Gaventa 2001; Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002.

activists from different countries. The first ESF, held in Florence in 2002, involved 60.000 participants—more than three times the expected number—taking part in the 30 plenary conferences, 160 seminars, and 180 workshops as well as 75 cultural events in various parts of the city. More than 20.000 delegates of 426 associations arrived from 105 countries, and about one million took part in the march that closed the forum. Although the number of registered participants declined in the two following meetings (about 40.000 in Paris in 2003 and 20.000 in London the succeeding year), the capacity of the events to involve activists from heterogeneous backgrounds and different countries remained high. In fact, the effects of increasingly broader networking were even more visible in the fourth ESF in Athens in May 2006, where the number of registered participants again almost doubled (36.000), and the event attracted numerous delegations from Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean area.

Additionally, if social movements are usually carriers of minoritarian challenges, the GJM seems to be an exception: According to a Eurobarometer Survey concluded in 2003, as many as 51% of citizens in France, 47% in Spain, 41% in the UK, 36% in Germany, and 33% in Italy claim to trust the movement. In addition, many citizens think that the GJM should have more influence on the process of globalization: 61% of respondents in Italy, 55% in Spain, 48% in Germany, 47% in France (but only 36% in the UK) state, in fact, that the GJM does not have enough influence on globalization. More than 70% of citizens in each country think that the GJM raises points that deserve to be debated; more than 60% (except for the Spanish: 49%) believe that it raises awareness of certain aspects of globalization, whereas between 47% (France) and 32% (Italy) think that it proposes concrete solutions to globalization. Additionally, between 41% (France) and 29% (Spain) believe that the GJM is successful in influencing national political decision makers, and more than 31% of citizens in all countries even see it as successful in slowing down the process of globalization.

Addressing the analysis of this cycle of protest at the turn of the millennium, we want to describe the emergence and evolution of the GJM, with its blending of tradition and innovation, national roots and cosmopolitan visions in six European countries and at the supranational level. As we will see, the mobilizations on global justice issues in France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland have much in common. Not only do they remobilize people on the street, but they cast a broad net that covers organizations and groupings active on different issues and with heterogeneous initial concerns. They all focus attention on issues of global justice and "globalization from below." They link local, national, and global issues, as well as local, national, and global organizational structures, mobilizing against a multilevel system of governance. If heterogeneity is a characteristic common to all national contexts (with groups animated by moderate and radical repertoires and frames competing with each other), we also stress national specificities in our cross-national comparison—different densities in the networks of protest, different blends of protest repertoires, and different master frames—that are forged by national opportunities and movement traditions.

This chapter introduces this comparative endeavor by proposing, first of all, a definition of our object of analysis (section 2), and then by singling out common characteristics as well as different typologies in the movement networks (section 3), action strategies (section 4) and frames of action (section 5). Furthermore, we present some possible explanations for the emergence of the movement and its various national characteristics (section 6).

2.1.2. Defining the Global Justice Movement

Our research focuses on contemporary social movements, in particular on the mobilizations on issues of global justice and a "globalization from below." The first question we want to address in this chapter refers to the definition of our object of research: the Global Justice Movement. We can consider *social movements* as interactions of mainly informal networks based on common beliefs and solidarity, which mobilize on conflictual issues by frequent recourse to various forms of protest (della Porta and Diani 2006, chap. 1). In Sidney Tarrow's definition (2001, 11), *transnational* social movements are "socially mobilised groups with constituents in at least two states, engaged in sustained contentious interactions with power-holders in at least one state other than their own, or against an international institution, or a multinational economic actor." *Global* social movements can be defined as transnational networks of actors that define their causes as global and organize protest campaigns and other forms of action that target more than one state and/or international governmental organization (IGO).

Whereas these are analytic definitions, useful for identifying abstract concepts, we want to focus on an empirical actor, the *global justice movement*. We define the GJM as the loose network of organizations (with varying degrees of formality and even including political parties) and other actors engaged in collective action of various kinds, on the basis of the shared goal of advancing the cause of justice (economic, social, political, and environmental) among and between peoples across the globe. This means that we focus on an empirical form of transnational activism, without implying that this covers all the existing manifestations of that abstract concept. We operationalize our definition by looking at collective identity, nonconventional action repertoires, and organizational networks.

A fundamental characteristic of a social movement is its ability to develop a *common interpretation of reality* able to nurture solidarity and collective identifications, as well as a collective attempt to change or resist changes in the external environment. Outside the political routine, the movements develop visions of the world alternative to the dominant ones. New conflicts emerge on new values. In particular, from the 1970s onward, "new social movements" began to be seen as actors in new conflicts, in contrast to the "old" workers' movement that was by then perceived as not only institutionalized, but also focusing on materialistic issues. Gender difference, defense of the environment, and cohabitation among different cultures are some of the issues around which social movements have formed. The establishment of a global movement requires the development of a discourse that identifies both a *common identity — the "us" — and the target of the protest — the "other" — at the transnational level*. As far as the framing of the action is concerned, we are interested in those groups/individual activists who frame their action in terms of *global identity and concerns*: They identify themselves as part of a "global movement", targeting "global enemies" within a global *enjeu*/field of action. Operationally, we focus on groups/activists that have been identified, in different countries, as alter-global, no global, new global, global justice, *Globalisierungskritiker*, *altermondialists*, globalizers from below, and so on.

Social movements are characterized by the use of *protest* as a means of pressure on institutions (e.g., Rucht 1994). Those who protest address the public even before they approach elected representatives or public bureaucracy. Just as with the creation of the nation-state protest actions were concentrated at the national level, globalization may be expected to generate protest at the transnational level against international actors. In our operational definition, we consider

organizations and individuals who have participated in contentious actions organized by groups/activists with a global concern, as defined above. In parallel to past research that focused on those groups/actors taking part in protest activities, we look at organizations and individuals taking part in protest campaigns focusing on poverty in the South, taxation of capital, debt relief, fair trade, global rights, and reform of international governmental organizations (IGOs). We shall discuss to what extent mobilizations on these various issues have been linked in a common wave of protest.

Social movements are *informal networks* linking a plurality of individuals and groups, more or less structured from an organizational point of view. Whereas parties or pressure groups have well-defined organizational boundaries, with participation normally verified by a membership card, social movements are instead composed of loose, weakly linked networks of individuals who feel part of a collective effort. Although there are organizations that refer back to movements, movements are not organizations but rather nets, linking various actors who encompass organizations (also but not only) with a formal structure. One distinctive characteristic of a social movement is the possibility of belonging and feeling involved in collective action without necessarily being a member of a specific organization. It follows, therefore, that a global movement should involve organizational networks active in different countries. Operationally, with our focus on the Global Justice Movement, we are interested in the individuals, groups, and organizations in each country that have built and/or participated in one or more networks on the global issues mentioned previously and acted via protest. Especially since we are dealing with movement(s) that address different specific issues (labor rights, genetically modified organisms [GMOs], women's liberation, etc.), their belonging to networks that address these issues within global frames has a relevant, discriminating value. Participation in European social forums (or national/local social forums) and/or similar/parallel events or umbrella organizations is covered by our operational definition. In our research, we shall indeed address the role (frequency and importance) of participation in transnational events for local and national social movement organizations.

To summarize, we aim to analyze the presence of a social movement, defined as networks of individuals, groups, and organizations that, based on common beliefs and a collective identity, seek to change society (or resist such a change) mainly by the use of protest (Rucht 1994, 77; della Porta and Diani 1999, 16). We focus in particular on networks participating in protest campaigns on the issue of global justice. For our movement, the ultimate frame of reference is indeed the globe: Although specific actions often have a narrower scope, solutions are sought at the global level, and/or specific claims are embedded in visions of global change. Within these global dimensions, the main aim of the GJM is the struggle for *justice*—a general term that encompasses more specific domains of intervention such as human rights, citizens' rights, social rights, peace, the environment, and similar concerns. Our empirical research will also address the issue of the degree of transnationalization in the movement discourse and the degree to which a scale shift (Tarrow 2005) has occurred.

2.1.3. The Movement as a Network—and Network Types

According to our definition, we are interested in organizations acting within transnational networks. Social scientists have emphasized the growing number of transnational organizations linked to social movements (often "global" not in the sense of covering the whole globe, but of

involving membership from various countries) (Sikkink and Smith 2002), a trend that is particularly vigorous in the South of the world (see also Smith and Johnston 2002). The greater influence wielded by these organizations is beyond doubt, but opinions vary on the extent to which they are able to engage in stable networks (e.g., Fox and Brown 1998; on immigration, see Guiraudon 2002). The highly flexible organizational structure, with demonstrations organized via the Internet by ad hoc coordination committees, is seen by some as the best solution for adapting to global trends, by others as a sign of the inability to build a durable organization.

Our research addresses the network of the GJM by looking at the linkages among transnational, national, and local groups that have mobilized on global issues. The new cycle of protest has mobilized in each country a plurality of networks active on various issues. Differently from the socially homogeneous labor movement, but also from many social movements that followed it—which tended to have a homogeneous basis in terms of generation (the student movement), gender (the women's or gay liberation movements), or social position (chiefly involving the middle classes)—the global justice movement, as we will see, is instead heterogeneous under many aspects, while seeking to help diverse, distant national cultures to communicate. More than in recent movements, the presence of a large number of organizations compensates for the weakness in terms of categorical homogeneity. Membership in a movement is favored by incorporation into informal networks of individuals sharing an interest in particular causes: It is through these links that potential activists develop their worldview and acquire mobilization skills (della Porta and Diani 1999, chap. 5).

The inclusive structure already typical of other movements (especially the women's and peace movements) appears in the global justice movement in a more highly networked version. The new communication technologies—primarily the Internet—have not only steadily reduced the costs of mobilization, allowing slim, flexible structures, but also facilitated transversal interaction among different areas and movements (della Porta and Mosca 2005a). Trans-issue as well as transnational attention constitutes a novelty in a panorama that seemed typified by specialization in single-issue movements (from women to the environment, from peace to AIDS).

In all the countries we cover, organizations from different movements have converged in a series of roundtables, nets, and coalitions that were very often not limited to one national state. *Netzwerke*, *reti*, *redes*, *coordinadoras*, *tavoli*, *nets, forums,* even *movements* are all terms that we shall find in the following chapters in the names of new organizations that usually allowed not only for overlapping membership by individual activists, but also for the convergence of collective members. The local social forums, in all their variations, represent an attempt to create open spaces for the interactions of different individuals and groups.

In the individual countries, as well as at the transnational level, the density of the network, as well as its format, tends to vary. At the transnational level, vertical and horizontal networks adapt their strategies to the characteristics of the international governmental organizations they target. There are loose, rank-and-file movement networks involving mainly grassroots groups, and there are movement coalitions with larger influence by more structured associations.

At the national level, variations abound with (softer or harder) tensions between rank-and-file, grassroots, direct-action groupings and well-structured and institutionalized unions and large associations. In Germany, there is a tension between the more institutionalized human

rights and development NGOs allied with environmental associations and unions, on the one hand, with the net of autonomous and antiracist groups on the other. Local forums vary significantly in the composition of the actors involved, with participation mainly of grassroots-oriented activists with previous experiences in new social movements, religious groups, unions, and also the more radical Left (e.g., in Berlin or Cologne). The constellations of subnetworks is similar in Switzerland, with an institutional branch composed of formalized ecological, solidarity, and labor associations, on the one hand, and autonomous, anarchist, and squatters' groups on the other. In the UK, the movement sees the (difficult) coexistence of a well-established coalition of aid, trade, and development NGOs, environmental movement organizations, religious groups, and unions alongside informal nets of anarchists, squatters, and radical ecologists supporting direct action. Similar tensions exist also in other countries, but they seem to have been less disruptive in terms of competition within the movement. In Spain, decentralized and grassroots tendencies dominate, resonating with libertarian traditions as well as with the mobilization of ethnic and national territorial minorities. In Italy, the three main nodes present in the global justice movement—the ecopacifists, the anti-neoliberals and the (inheritor of the) Disobedients—have interacted in the local social forums that flowered before and after the anti-G8 protest in Genoa. Even after the demise of most of them, occasions for collaboration have been frequent. In France, tensions around the conception of internal democracy have punctuated the story of Attac, although they have not polarized the movement.

Summarizing, national movement networks show different formats (cliqued in France, Italy, and Spain; polarized in Germany and Switzerland and, to a lesser extent, in the UK) and different organizational structures (more horizontal in the first group of countries, vertical in the second) seem to prevail.

2.1.4. Protest Campaigns and Multiple Repertoires

Our definition includes a focus on mobilization targeting multilevel governance. Protest event research has stressed the rarity of transnational protest. Protests—at least those that get national press coverage—still mainly target the state or substate level of government (Imig and Tarrow 2002; Rucht 2002a and b), as has been confirmed for various types of movements from environmental (Rootes 2003a, b, and c) to antiracist (Giugni and Passy 2002). Furthermore, it has often been emphasized that organizations active at the transnational level adopt conventional types of action oriented more toward discreet lobbying than street protest. On that basis, some have suggested that mobilizations such as Seattle or Genoa are to be considered as episodic events, with collective action still firmly anchored at the national level and dominated by increasingly institutionalized NGOs and "normalized" action repertoires. In our research we shall first stress the extremely relevant effects of transnational events. Even if few in numbers, transnational protests further the development of new networks and frames.

In the last decade transnational protest events have intensified over time in terms of numbers of events, organizations, and activists involved. They have also become more cross-issue and autonomous from political institutions. In the 1990s, the end of the Cold War opened opportunities for movements in the form of UN-sponsored conferences but also autonomous networking, especially against the war in Iraq and former Yugoslavia, and in solidarity with the Zapatista movement. The tactics of confrontational counter-summits also developed with the contestation of IGOs such as the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO, the G8, and even the EU. In

the first decade of the new millennium, counter-summits were accompanied by global days of action, as well as world and macro-regional social forums as autonomous spaces for a growing global civil society.

Additionally, transnational events reverberate at the local and national levels with protest campaigns that simultaneously address several territorial levels of governance (Diani 2005; Rootes 2005; della Porta and Mosca 2005b). Our research indicates that transnational events increased in frequency, in the forms of both the transnational convergence of protesters in a symbolic place and global days of action with large demonstrations staged at the same time in dozens of cities all around the world. They have also constituted founding events for a new cycle of protest that has developed at the national and subnational levels on the issue of global justice.

Transnational protest has reflected transnational links and also fueled them. Research in the 1980s and 1990s described a progressive institutionalization of social movements, at least in Western democracies (della Porta 2003a). Some movement organizations had become better structured at the national or even the transnational level, had acquired substantial material resources and a certain public recognition, had set up paid staffs thanks to mass membership drives, and tended to replace protest by lobbying or contentious actions. They had become interest groups, albeit of a public interest type. The process of contracting out social services involved other groups that had entered the third sector, acquiring professionalism and often administering public resources, again with little recourse to unconventional political action. Protest had in the meantime become the domain of local campaigns and citizen committees, often fragmented down to the street or neighborhood level, with the pragmatic objective of protecting limited territories. Even the social centers (autonomous youth centers in occupied buildings), at least in some countries, seemed caught between commercialization in administering spaces for alternative culture and radicalization of forms of action.

If the GJM (re)mobilized disillusioned activists who had used (and often continued to use) lobbying and consultation tactics, it also brought about a return of *direct action*—rehabilitating protest, as German authors frame it. Although the movement became visible with the Black Bloc smashing windows in Seattle, violence is criticized within the movement on both ethical and instrumental grounds (della Porta et al. 2006). Direct nonviolent action and civil disobedience are instead welcomed as forms of action capable of simultaneously drawing the attention of public opinion and testifying to the activists' commitment.

In addition, such types of repertoire aim at combining conflict and consensus on the example of the Zapatista movement. The symbolic penetration of no-go areas for demonstrators (red zones) represented a widespread tactic during counter-summits. The destruction of transgenetic fields as well as the "demontage" of McDonald's belong to the early story of the French GJM. Nonviolent roadblocks (or street reclaiming) migrated from the British anti-road protests to other European countries and then to Seattle, together with the "spectacularization" of marches in ways that emphasized individual creativity (carnivals, critical mass). In Italy, the Disobedients but also Catholic groups supported the blockades of trains transporting arms for the Iraq war. In the more radical wing of the movement, squatting for housing as well as for the development of "free space" is quite widespread. Symbolic forms of free-consumption or price-reduction also spread to protests against precarious jobs and cuts in the welfare state. In Switzerland, harsh confrontations with the police in Geneva in 1998 as well as in Davos testify to an increasing use of disruptive tactics in a country otherwise characterized by moderation of

action repertoires. “Ecotage” had developed already before the GJM in the (traditionally moderate) British environmental movement.

The Seattle demonstrations also started a new wave of “politics on the street,” with large marches that had seemed just a memory of the past. *Mass demonstrations* are in fact often organized during counter-summits, defined as arenas of international-level initiatives during official summits and on the same issues but from a critical standpoint, heightening awareness through protest and information with or without contacts with the official version (Pianta 2001b and 2003). Millions of people joined the international day of protest against the Iraq war on February 15, 2003 (della Porta and Diani 2004; Walgrave and Rucht 2008).

In each of the countries we have analyzed, some of these counter-summits and global days of action represented the founding events (or at least a symbolic reference) for the emerging protest: in Germany, especially the protest against the IMF and World Bank summit in Berlin in 1988, followed by those (less successful) against the G7 and EU summit in 1992 in Munich and then against the EU in Cologne; in France, the European Marches against Unemployment and Exclusion; in Switzerland, the 1998 summit against the WTO in Geneva and the subsequent anti-World Economic Forum demonstrations; in Italy, the demonstration against the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) meeting on new technology in Naples in 2001 and later the same year the Genoa anti-G8 protest; in Spain, the protests in Madrid during the “50 years are enough” campaign in 1994, and then in Barcelona against the World Bank (2001), as well as the campaign against the Spanish presidency of the EU; in the UK the anti-G8 protest in Birmingham in 1998.

During counter-summits, however, protest is also linked to the construction and exchange of knowledge. In its strategies, the global justice movement attaches high value to alternative knowledge and skills, aiming to build up a global public sphere. The relevance of communication is further confirmed by the importance assumed not only by the Internet, but also by issues connected with it, from copyright to censorship of telecommunications. Professional skills and counter-expertise are important characteristics of many more formal German associations and also of the French movement’s think tanks and alternative media. Everywhere, a leading organization of the global justice movement such as Attac presents itself as a movement for people’s self-education oriented to action—and the relevant role of scientific committees and thematic groups testifies to this attention to alternative knowledge.

The spread of information is also central in actions that seek to mobilize, in addition to the citizen, the consumer (through boycotts and political consumerism) or the saver (through ethical banks). Transnational campaigns against multinational corporations such as De Beers, Microsoft, Monsanto, and Nike favored transnational networking and the building of global frames of action. The underlying logic of many movement campaigns is the “naming and shaming,” which, especially when conducted against multinationals, aims at increasing public awareness of particularly glaring cases of human rights violations—spreading detailed information and often asking people to punish the companies involved by boycotting their products. The boycotts, producing direct damage to the targeted economic enterprises, adapt action repertoire to a situation in which multinational companies have growing power (according to the activists, even more power than many nation-states). They also exploit the particular need for a “clean image” of corporations that rely more on their logo than on the quality of their products.

The global justice movement in fact developed actions oriented to sensitize citizens to *alternative* values and culture. This logic is especially expressed in the *consumer activism* that "challenges our sense that money and morality cannot be mixed" (Micheletti 2003, 3). Presenting consumption as a potential political act, ethical consumerism stresses the central role of individuals in taking responsibility for the common goods in their everyday life. Boycotts of bad products, but also *buy*cotts of fair ones (environmental-friendly and solidaristic) as well as socially responsible investment are ways not only of resocializing wrongdoers and changing business activities, but also of practicing certain values (Follesdal 2004). Fair trade is indeed mentioned in all our cases as an innovation on protest repertoires: Although it predated the global justice movement, it spread widely after Seattle.

Our research confirms that cycles of protest not only revitalize street action, but also make changes in protest repertoires. The campaigns against land mines or NAFTA and the MAI, the UN-sponsored world conferences, and Jubilee 2000 emerge as main occasions for organizational networking, aggregating the more institutionalized organizations: development and human rights NGOs, religious and nonreligious charities, labor unions and large environmental associations that had already collaborated, among others, in the previous waves of pacifist mobilization. On the other hand, the European Marches against Unemployment and Exclusion (Chabanet 2002), the actions in solidarity with the Zapatistas and the Intergalactic meetings (in 1996 in Chiapas and 1997 in Spain), as well as later on the demonstrations in Prague against the IMF and WB (World Bank) and in Nice and Gothenburg against the EU, constituted moments of interaction among the more radical groups as well as the critical unions.

In all our countries as well as at the transnational level, protest campaigns facilitated (and were facilitated by) organizational networking. Large associations frustrated by ineffective lobbying and unions in search of new mobilization models met with rank-and-file, decentralized groupings of squatters, contaminating one another's repertoires (della Porta and Mosca 2005b). Here, again, we can also note cross-national differences, with more radical and mass-oriented repertoires dominating in some countries, more moderate and communication-oriented ones in others. In Italy and Spain (and to some extent France), direct action became more central, in the form of both mass demonstrations and civil disobedience. In Germany, Switzerland, and the UK, more radical sectors advocating direct action competed with associations much more resourceful in terms of channels for lobbying and access to public decision-making as well as contacts in the institutional mass media.

2.1.5. How Much Justice, and What Type of Democracy?

We mentioned the development of global issues as a definitional characteristic of global movements. On the understanding of "global issues," however, observers' opinions differ: Some see the beginnings of global identities, whereas others speak of an (almost opportunistic) adjustment by mainly national actors to territorially multilevel governance. If the symbolic reference to the globe is considered by some as nothing really new—referencing the traditional internationalism of the workers' movement or the transnational campaigns against slavery—others instead stress the centrality of the global dimension today (for a discussion of these definitional issues, see della Porta 2005b; Rucht 2005). If for some the mobilization on globalization is a leftover from the past, for others it is the movement of the future.

In our research, we addressed these topics, describing the processes of connection (or frame bridging) at both the transnational and the "trans-issue" levels (Gerhards and Rucht 1992; Andretta 2005a). In the 1980s, social movements had undergone a process of specialization on single issues. Not only did new social movements seem to develop apart from the labor movement, but, notwithstanding some mentioned countertrends, organizations also seemed to specialize within these "new social movements," developing specific knowledge and competences on particular sub-issues.

In all countries under study the multi-issue nature of the GJM emerged. Concerns with the environment, women's rights, peace, and social inequalities remain as characteristics of subgroups or networks in the mobilization on globalization. The definition of the GJM as a "movement of movements" stresses the survival of these specific concerns and the non-subordination of one conflict to another: If in the socialist ideology women's emancipation was subordinated to workers' emancipation, most GJM organizations deny a hierarchy of conflicts. The multiplicity of reference bases in terms of class, gender, generation, race, and religion seems to have developed in the direction of not weak, but certainly composite identities.

In different countries the various concerns of different movements were bridged in a lengthy, although not very visible, process of mobilization. The GJM developed from protest campaigns around "broker issues" that tied together concerns of different movements and organizations. In Switzerland, the campaign against the WTO brought together squatters, human rights activists, and labor unionists. In France, the struggle against General Mills (GM) food linked peasants and ecologists; the *mouvements de sans* linked the critical unions with organizations of the unemployed, sans-papiers, and homeless. Jubilee 2000 linked development NGOs with rank-and-file religious groups. In the anti-Maastricht movement in Spain (and later in the "50 years are enough" campaign), ecologists and pacifists met with critical unionists. In Great Britain, opposition to the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act was perceived as a catalyst for the interaction of travelers, squatters, "ravers", and environmentalists (and in the campaign against dismissals, dockers encountered—even if occasionally—the Reclaim the Street direct action network).

In all these campaigns, to different degrees, fragments of diverse cultures—secular and religious, radical and reformist, younger and older generations—have been linked to a broader discourse with the theme of social (and global) injustice as an adhesive, while still leaving broad margins for separate developments. At the transnational level, local and global concerns were linked around values such as equality, justice, human rights, and environmental protection. Platforms, forums, coalitions, and networks allowed for reciprocal knowledge and often understanding among diverse cultures. Although emphasizing pluralism and diversity, in the discourse of the movement a common master frame developed, based upon a definition of the self around a global dimension.

In parallel, the enemy is singled out as neoliberal globalization, which activists perceive as characterizing not only the policies of the international financial organizations (WB, IMF, and WTO), but also the policy choices of national right-wing and even some center-left governments. These policies are considered to be responsible for growing social injustice and its negative effects on women, the environment, the South, and other groups. Alongside social justice, the meta-discourse of the search for new forms of democracy has emerged as a common basis. The traditional legitimation of democracy through electoral accountability was challenged by the development of global governance and also by the perceived decline in state intervention faced

with the increasing influence of (private) global economic actors. The various demonstrations solidified a strong demand for political participation to which parties no longer seemed able to respond. As in subsequent mobilizations, protest not only developed outside the parties, but also expressed strong criticism of the existing forms of representative democracy. In this process, an action frame was created around the belief that "another world is possible."

Also on identities, however, we shall see a new emphasis on rather different frames, both within and across countries. The definitions of global issues vary: Some groups target poverty and others capitalism; some advocate social justice, others socialism or anarchism; some are mainly concerned with workers' rights, others with environmental disasters. As for the definition of the problem, solidarity frames can be distinguished from anti-neoliberal (or even anticapitalist) ones. On the other hand, on the issue of democracy, more radical proposals of participatory democracy can be distinguished from associational ones, with some conceptions that resonate more in some transnational networks and countries than in others.

2.2. Social Movement Theory: Explaining the Global Justice Movement

The mobilizations on global justice issues seem to be taking on many features typical of the preceding generations of social movements, but also new ones, above all a further marked supranational dimension. They express a conflict defined as "global," allowing new collective identities to emerge; they employ protest repertoires in international campaigns innovating on the margins of forms already widespread in the past; and they construct transnational networks. In this sense, they impel a rethinking of some concepts and hypotheses present in research on political participation. The concepts and approaches of social movement studies provide useful insights for understanding the movements of the new millennium; they should, however, be adapted and specified to account for emerging phenomena.

2.2.1. Which Resources for the Global Justice Movement?

Until the 1960s, studies in social movements had been dominated by a functionalist approach interpreting them as responses to systemic dysfunctions (Smelser 1962). Against this representation, during the 1970s a trend of studies developed that regarded them as part of the normal political process, concentrating the analysis on the mobilization of resources needed for collective action. According to this approach, social movements act in a rational, proactive, organized fashion. Protest actions are the outcome of a cost-benefit calculation influenced by the presence not only of conflicts, but also of resources necessary for mobilizing these conflicts. In a historical situation where deprivation, contrasts, clashes of interest, and conflicting ideologies seem ever present, the rise of collective action cannot be explained by these factors alone. It is not enough to discover the existence of clashing interests; it is also necessary to study the conditions that allow the transformation of discontent into action. In fact, the movement organizations investigated using this approach in the 1980s and 1990s proved rather rich in both symbolic and material resources, and were often invested in creating more or less powerful movement organizations active on such single issues as defending the environment or women's liberation. Accordingly, the analysis focused on the resources available to relatively well-endowed groups, to the exclusion of more marginal groups regarded as incapable of mobilization. Additionally, the moral motivations of the protest remained hidden (but see Rootes 1980; Jasper 1997).

The important role of organizational networks in mobilizing resources is confirmed in our research, underlining the relevance of the remobilization of previously existing networks (or movements) with (often long) historical traditions in the global protest campaigns of the 1990s and the early 2000s. Global (or at least transnational) resources emerge as more and more relevant, and not only for movements in poor and nondemocratic countries. In this process, the symbolic work oriented to the building of common master frames between different cultures is increasingly important (Andretta 2005a).

In the mobilization of the protest, national (cultural and structural) movement traditions play an important role. Organizations with different characteristics, strategies, and ideologies interact with the emerging movement and are challenged by the new waves of protest, but also contribute with their histories to the new mobilization. The specific dynamics—the richness but also the tensions—of these "movements of movements", however, still need to be investigated. In some countries the social capital for the movement includes wide nets of associations with large memberships, in others a more scattered basis with more militant propensity; in some cases unions are well connected and influential, but less prone to ally with movements; in others, less powerful unions more closely linked with their social bases are capable of mobilizing activism through overlapping membership (Moody 1997; Silver 2003; della Porta and Mosca 2005b).

2.2.2. Which Opportunities for the Global Justice Movement?

Another challenge for the literature on social movements comes from the interactions between the global movement and national and transnational political opportunities. Social movement studies have traditionally focused on the analysis of the nation-state and representative democracy; they therefore need to address challenges deriving from both the development of international governmental organizations and the decline of the (identifying functions of) national political parties. Without implying a demise of the nation-state or the end of representative democracy, the transformations in both the boundaries of the polity and the main political actors have affected the traditional functioning of the democratic state. The increasing number of international institutions has facilitated the creation of transnational social movement organizations as well as experiences of international and inter-issue collaboration, fostering the emergence of infrastructures that facilitate global movement campaigns. As Sidney Tarrow has pointed out, "international institutions serve as a kind of 'coral reef,' helping to form horizontal connections among activists with similar claims across boundaries. This leads to the paradox that international institutions—created by states, and usually powerful ones—can be the arenas in which transnational contention is most likely to form against states" (2001, 15). So "international institutions are not only the targets of national state and non-state actors; they are the fulcrum around which they may turn their attention and their activities" (ibid.).

With weakening parties and the growing importance of a supranational level of governance, the alliance strategies of social movements must change accordingly. In IGOs, they can still sometimes find support in the institutional Left, as represented by some states with social democratic traditions. Movement activists may even enter supranational institutions by taking part in the national delegations of sympathetic states. Support by left-wing governments seems, however, more effective on some of the movement concerns, less on others: Complex internationalism requires complex strategies (Fox and Brown 1998; O' Brien et al. 2000; Boli and Thomas 1999; della Porta and Tarrow 2004; Sikkink 2004).

The traditional questions of alliances in the political and institutional system must also be reformulated at the domestic level. While emphasizing the differences between the two types of actors, the political process approach to social movements has regarded openness and alliances among institutional political actors as decisive for collective mobilization and its success. Although the interactions between institutional politics and politics from below—between *routine* and *contentious politics* (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001)—continue to be important, the image of a sort of division of labor between parties and movements, especially on the Left, is becoming more and more problematic. Although the movement stresses the need for political governance of the economy, there is nonetheless an increasing tension between a representative and a participatory conception of politics—a separation symbolically expressed in the opening slogan for the international parade at Genoa: "You G8, we 6 billion." In the first conception, in a modern representative democracy, politics becomes an exclusive activity for professionals (G8 leaders and other professional politicians) who take decisions legitimated by electoral investiture. The second conception not only articulates a demand for politics but also advances a proposal for "different politics," that is, for participatory politics carried out in areas open to citizens regarded as subjects and actors of politics. If the global justice movement represents a return to politics, it is therefore also a challenge to the traditional understanding of politics.

The mentioned transformations had different consequences in the various countries. Notwithstanding the increasing influence of global institutions, national opportunities still play a role. If in general the movement seems to mobilize more often on the street against right-wing governments (as in Italy and in Spain), left-wing governments are far from being considered natural allies by the global justice movement. Moreover, the Left in government can have different reactions to the movement, ranging from greater emphasis on co-optation (as the socialists in Spain) to containment of at least the direct action wing (as Great Britain's New Labour). Also, if the major traditional parties of the Left distrust the global justice movement, even though they try to incorporate some more moderate sectors of the movement, other political parties (the Greens in the UK, Rifondazione Comunista in Italy, the League Communiste Revolutionnaire in France, or Izquerda Unida in Spain) are openly allied with it. In particular, we will notice that where the Left is electorally divided (as in Italy, France, and Spain) the more radical left-wing parties will ally with the global justice movement; moreover, their potential competition will push the more moderate left-wing parties toward some openings to the protesters' demands.

2.2.3. Which Conflicts for the Global Justice Movement?

Beyond the resources and opportunities it mobilizes, the GJM also challenges some hypotheses about the structural bases for conflict in our societies. Scholars who analyzed social changes started out, beginning in the 1960s, by speaking of new social movements (Touraine 1977) and post-materialistic values (Inglehart 1977), stressing the pacification of conflicts about economic equality and the emergence of new demands tied to the defense of individual freedoms against the new technological society. The new middle classes were regarded as the main social basis for the new movements (but see Rootes 1995), based not on appeals to a "class," but on the sharing of new values—or "other codes" (Melucci 1996).

By extending to (or in some cases starting from) the world's South, the GJM involves the poorest classes like the Brazilian *Sem Terra* or the Argentine *piqueteros*. Also in the world's

North it seems to mobilize—at least in some countries—groups described as poor in collective resources (like the unemployed or precariously employed) or lacking the most basic rights (like migrants). Even there, the end of the "midcentury compromise" between capitalism and the welfare state (Crouch 1999) brought to center stage the conflicts on social rights underlined in the definition "movement for a globalization of rights"—albeit not without attention to new themes (like environmental sustainability or gender) that had emerged with the "new social movements." This explains the encounter, at least in some countries, between the theme of social justice typical of the "Old Left" and the defense of cultural differences, gender parity, or the natural environment more typical of the newer movements. Conflicts on wealth distribution thus do not—as proclaimed since the 1960s, at least for Western societies—appear to be pacified: Instead, wealth distribution is again becoming central in the political debate. In this sense, the movement on globalization presents the challenge to reopen the academic debate on the structural nature of conflicts, in a society that can no longer be simply defined as postindustrial. As Mary Kaldor (2000) observed, the traditional cleavage between neoliberalists and supporters of the welfare state interacts with the one between protectionists and cosmopolitans. How these new strains could be mobilized into new conflicts is a main issue on which our work has focused.

The movement not only builds upon old conflicts, but also faces new challenges. In the first place, the challenge of post-Fordist society has been seen as a weakening of traditional identities, with particular fragmentation of the social basis of the workers' movement. The deregulation of the labor market, with (especially in the 1990s) the spread of insecure and precarious jobs, further fragments the potential reference basis for social protest. From the cultural point of view, the movement must also face the challenge of an extremely individualized postmodern society. As Alain Touraine has noted (1997, 50), "The point is no longer, then, to recognize the universal value of a culture or a civilization, but quite differently, to recognize each individual's right to combine, to articulate in their own experience of personal or collective life, participation in the world of markets or technologies with a particular cultural identity." The processes of identification and recognition thereby acquire a new centrality for the analysis of the movement, where the construction of the feeling of belonging must adapt to the complexity and multiplicity of memberships. Values such as autonomy, creativity, spontaneity, and self-realization take on a central role (Ceri 2003; della Porta 2005a; Bennett 2003b) and must be made compatible with collective action.

Summarizing, social movements are addressing some of the social and cultural challenges that have developed together with globalization processes at various levels. They primarily react to the effects of the liberalization of markets, framing them as consequences of political decisions dominated by the neoliberal agenda. At the cultural level, they support cosmopolitan values, suggesting alternative visions of globalization (globalization of rights, globalization from below, etc.). In the different countries the global justice movement can be defined neither as a return of Old Left concerns that have been challenged by neoliberal policies, nor as yet another "new social movement." Although with cross-national differences, activists are in general not the traditionally understood "losers of globalization" (i.e., the less mobile and more protectionist): They are deep-rooted cosmopolitans, embedded in local networks but also often endowed with academic and linguistic skills (Tarrow 2005; della Porta 2005b; Fillieule et al. 2004). Although they share with the typical "new social movement" activists high levels of education, they are also (at least in some countries) heterogeneous in age and occupational base. With different shades in different countries, the movement blends old and new issues, reacting to

the new challenges of the post-Fordist and "flexible" (or precarious) society and also to the opportunities arising from a trend toward individualization in the construction of new identities.

2.3. Cross-National Similarities and Differences

In all of the analyzed countries, the GJM has brought about a wave of mobilization, linking local and global issues. As previous ones, this wave has innovated the repertoires of collective action. Common characteristics of the GJM in our countries are the development of transnational and cross-issue networks, the bridging of various frames around concerns for global justice and "democracy from below," the combination of old and new forms of action in common protest campaigns. Owing to the very nature of this movement—networked, transnational, heterogeneous—research on the GJM must address organizations and issues that were once treated separately, by specialized areas of social movement studies. Since local and transnational campaigns on global issues involve ecologists and unionists, feminists and communists, religious groups and autonomous squatted centers, large NGOs and affinity groups, our research also had to address and link all of these various streams, providing a description of the development of some emergent trends in contentious politics. We can add that these trends seem to be here to stay. Notwithstanding rapid ups and downs, in all countries under review the movement is still active, consolidating and expanding transnational networks and multiplying protest campaigns.

As mentioned above, however, the definitions of global issues and of the problem, but also conceptions of democracy vary within and across countries. In Germany, the North-South cleavage (human rights as well as development) is presented as the main theme for the emergence of the movement, although national issues—such as the reform of unemployment compensation and the appeal for a social Europe—developed later. Solidarity with the South also plays a main role in the convergence of religious groups, unions, women's groups, and developmental NGOs in the Jubilee 2000 campaigns in Switzerland, where national social issues were late to develop, and in the UK. Conversely, in France, the larger part of the movement developed from a concern with social justice issues at the national level, emerging from the 1997 protest against cuts in the welfare state and the *mouvement de sans* in the second half of the 1990s. Also in Spain and Italy, issues of social justice at home are central in a movement characterized by the presence of critical unions and later of traditional ones as well. More in general, North-European countries these a strong role of the (institutionalized) new social movement organizations, and the influence of the Old Left remains more visible in Southern Europe. If the new social movement component is strong in Germany, Switzerland, and the UK (with both environmentalist and solidarity organizations), it is much weaker in southern Europe. In France, decentralized critical unions and organizations of the "have-nots" have allied with peasants and ecologists active in the anti-GMO campaigns, extending the net to groups active on human rights and solidarity. The new social movement component is also weak in Spain and Italy, where, respectively, radical ecological groups and pacifists play a visible role. In both countries, squatted youth social centers represent an important, although quite scattered component—with a resonance in similar milieus in other countries.

At the risk of some simplification, we can single out the presence of two different constellations of GJMs in the countries covered by our research project:

- In the first constellation, disruptive protest dynamics appear as more dominant; networks are more dense and decentralized, with participation of both informal groups and formal associations; and the issue of global justice is linked with the struggle against neoliberalism at home and a conception of radical participatory democracy. In Italy, the meta-frame of global justice contributed to bringing together a dense network of rank-and-file unions (and later more traditional unions as well), religious groups, squatted youth centers, ecologists, and peace activists. In Spain, a frame of radical democracy spread together with appeals for direct action. In France, social issues—represented by radical unions, farmers' organizations, and the "mouvement de sans" but also by the strongly rooted Attac—play a central role. In all these cases, although more traditional NGOs were also present, the GJM network developed as activist based and protest oriented.

- In the second constellation, collective action relies to a larger extent on lobbying and media campaigns; strong associations and NGOs are more visible, although not unchallenged; global justice issues are framed especially, although not exclusively, in terms of solidarity with the South; and, although not unchallenged, more traditional conceptions of democracy prevail. In Germany as well as in Britain, the GJM is supported by well-endowed NGOs, which confront the frustrating results of more moderate techniques. Similarly in Switzerland, notwithstanding the presence of a more radical wing around the Peoples' Global Action (PGA) and a remobilization of the unions, the GJM relies heavily on the already existing, resource-rich, and well-structured organizations from the 1980s New Social Movements (especially on environmental and solidarity issues), while the weakness of the class cleavage reduces the support of the Old Left.

In the first constellation, unions are (more) present in the GJM, both in the form of the "critical unions" that emerged in an already fragmented system of industrial relations and in the left-wing component of the traditional unions. Especially in Italy and France, rank-and-file unions have been involved in the transnational wave of protest since its very beginning. Political opportunities appear as closed in terms of access to government but open in terms of potential allies; and the GJM is stronger in terms of its capacity to mobilize in the street. In Spain, the socialists of the PSOE were more open toward the GJM when opposing a right-wing Partido popular government; in Italy, the movement gained enormous mobilization capacity during Berlusconi's government, but also developed from a general critique of the party system.

In the second constellation, with more institutionalized systems of industrial relations, critical unions are weak or nonexistent, and traditional unions, involved in neo-corporatist agreements, remain more distant from the GJM (with the exception of public sector and metalworkers' unions). With more open political opportunities at home (with the Red-Green coalition in power in Germany, the New Labour government in the UK, and the all-party coalition in Switzerland), the GJM tends to rely less on street mobilization and more on lobbying and information campaigns. However, also in these countries the movement does often take to the streets: In fact, the mobilization capacity of the movement derives from the availability of moderate NGOs to voice their claims though transnational protest campaigns.

The wave of transnational protest impacted both constellations. In a process of downward scale shift (Tarrow and McAdam 2004), cosmopolitan activists who had been involved in transnational counter-summits and protest campaigns contributed to bringing the conflict back home. However, the global justice movement was also fed by upward scale shift as global concerns were developed during local and national protest campaigns (della Porta and Piazza 2008).

Concluding, our analysis of the GJM has confirmed the usefulness of the concepts developed in the analysis of previous waves of protest and previous social movements: Social cleavages, political opportunities, and mobilizable resources still seem relevant to explaining the movement's collective identities, organizational models, and repertoires of action. However, the GJM does challenge some previous hypotheses, such as the steady decline of class cleavages, the prevalence of libertarian over left-wing frames, the growing single-issue nature of social movement politics, the institutionalization of protest repertoires with a move from the street into the lobby, and the bureaucratization of movement organizations. It also pushes toward a rethinking of the relationship between social movements and parties and a focus on changing conceptions of democracy.

CHAPTER 3. SEARCHING THE NET: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WEB SITES OF GJM ORGANIZATIONS[1]

3.1. The Internet and social movements: an introduction

> I think that these instruments have been fundamental to some changes and to spreading a wider or different awareness in the society. … these media have also increased the potential for protest. Besides communicating, they allow the dissemination of information that is difficult to spread to the overall population. With these means, such information has been able to reach distant places that in the past were absolutely excluded from this type of communication (activist of the social centre Leoncavallo, Milan).

The quotation above briefly synthesizes how activists of social movements perceive the Internet's contribution to collective action. For many years, the debate on the political effects of the Internet has been mainly focused on an abstract level, with scarce references to empirical data. Initial studies on the Internet and politics focused mainly on political parties and on strategies of electronic communication during electoral campaigns. The main results of these studies indicate low interactivity on the part of web sites of political parties (Cuhna et al. 2003; Gibson et al. 2003) and institutions (Coleman et al. 1999). According to these analyses, the Internet has not improved party communication with voters, activists, or citizens – especially (with few exceptions, e.g. Kies 2005) bilateral forms of communication. In particular, web sites have been used more as instruments of top-down propaganda than as tools for debates and exchanges of ideas. In this sense, the way in which the Internet is used by political parties and politicians alike does not seem to differ very much from their use of other media technologies, as potentialities are constrained not only (or not so much) by material resources but by deep-rooted cultural habits (van Os et al. 2007; Zittel 2003, 3).

However, the choice of the research object could have biased the results. As Bennett (2003a, 19) points out, "much of the attention to the Internet has been directed at the places where the least significant change is likely to occur: the realm of conventional politics." In fact, he argues, established organizations are more likely to adapt new technologies to their existing missions and agendas than to be transformed by the Internet. In contrast, social movement organizations (SMOs) and, more in general, loose networks and unconventional forms of politics should be more open to experimentation and permeable to technological changes. Among these groups, social science research has indeed singled out more innovative and dynamic use of the Internet (for instance, on NGOs' web sites in Eastern Europe, see Vedres et al. 2005; on the European social forum organizing process, see Kavada 2007a and 2007b).

The debate on the innovative potential of new technologies has recently been followed by a new interest in empirical research on the relationship between the Internet and social

[1] This chapter is based upon the introductory chapter, authored by Donatella della Porta and Lorenzo Mosca, of the Demos WP2 Report (della Porta and Mosca 2005b). The report includes country chapters authored by Hélène Combes and Isabelle Sommier (France), Mundo Yang and Simon Teune (Germany), Lorenzo Mosca (Italy), Manuel Jiménez and Angel Calle (Spain), Clare Saunders and Christopher Rootes (United Kingdom), and a chapter on the transnational level authored by Raffaele Marchetti and Duccio Zola.

movements. This medium has been said to provide social movements with a cheap and fast means for communication beyond borders, fostering mobilization and favouring more flexible and looser organizational structures (Smith 1997; Bennett 2003b). Even in the field of social movement studies, however, other authors have presented a more pessimistic view on the democratic potential of the Internet based on the limited offering of interactive channels but also on the low use of these applications when offered (Rucht 2004, 80). Indeed, if the Internet presents new opportunities to resource-poor actors, it also creates new challenges for their collective action as, apparently, not only conventional political actors but also unconventional ones have difficulty exploiting its full democratic potential (Mosca 2007). But with few remarkable exceptions, assessment of the qualities of web sites has been either impressionistic or based upon a few paradigmatic cases.

In our empirical research, we have addressed the general question of the qualities (understood here as characteristics that help to increase equal participation, inclusive communication and to reduce inequalities among users) of the use of new technologies by SMOs by focusing on the structural characteristics of an important instrument of Internet communication: the web site. Following our more general interest concerning the democratic conceptions of social movements (della Porta 2005a and 2005b) as well as processes of transnationalization of collective action (della Porta 2007a), we assessed some general qualities of the web sites of 261 organizations belonging to the Global Justice Movement (GJM). We define the GJM as a loose network of individuals and organizations (with varying degrees of formality), engaged in collective action of various kinds, on the basis of the shared goal of advancing the cause of justice (economic, social, political and environmental) among and between peoples across the globe (ibid.).

Though a structured analysis, we have collected information on the web sites that we considered as apt for analysing the following characteristics:

a) *general information provision,* including indicators aimed at estimating the dissemination of information and information usability;

b) *identity building,* considering the publication of information on the organization's history as well as the presence of spaces for *multilateral interactivity* (Rommele 2003) such as online debates;

c) *transparency*, with a set of indicators on the publication of information on constitutions, organizational structure, work agenda, physical existence and reachability, activities, economic situation, number of web site users as well as the presence of information useful for accessing members of the organization (what is referred to as *bilateral interactivity*, that is, the willingness of an organization to offer channels of direct communication with citizens [Rommele 2003, 10]);

d) *mobilization,* looking at the ways in which an organization uses the web site to mobilize its users to take part in forms of political participation both offline (demonstrations, protest events, etc.) and online (e-petitions and electronic disturbance actions such as netstrikes, mailbombings, and so on);

e) *intervention on the digital divide,* looking at the availability of training and resources to socialize users to the Internet.

After a brief discussion of our research design and methodological choices, we will describe some characteristics of the SMOs' web sites in the above dimensions. We shall conceptualize provision of information, identity building, transparency, mobilization, and reduction of users' inequalities in accessing and using this medium (digital divide) as relevant qualities of web sites; suggest appropriate indicators; and assess the empirical performance of our population of web sites on those indicators. Next, we shall single out potential explanations for the varying attention given to various potential qualities of the web sites. After looking at the internal correlation among the different qualities we singled out, we shall assess the influence of contextual and organizational characteristics on the main characteristics of the web sites.

3.2. Our empirical research: the main choices

Before moving to the results of our empirical analysis, some remarks on the research design and methodological choices are in order. In this chapter, we present the results of a cross-national quantitative analysis of the web sites of 261 organizations of the GJM in six European countries (Italy, France, Spain, Germany, Switzerland and Great Britain) as well as at the transnational level. In each country and transnationally, we selected about thirty-five organizations that had been involved in the main initiatives of the GJM (among them the European Social Forums), insuring variance especially on the main issues addressed. Lists of organizations that had signed calls for action of social forums (at the national, European and global levels) and other important movement events were used to single out the groups belonging to the 'core' of the GJM's networks. A common sampling strategy was agreed upon in order to collect comparable data, covering SMOs representing different streams within the movement (environmentalist, pacifist, women's rights, unions, gay, migrant and human rights' activists, squatters and so on), organizations that emerged with the GJM (local social forums, Attac), as well as web sites of media close to the GJM (periodical magazines, radios, newspapers, and networks of independent communication).

Ours is not a random sample and therefore cannot be considered as representative of the composition of the GJM in each country. Random sampling is, however, only one of the possible ways of selecting cases; it has some obvious advantages, but difficult preconditions of applicability. As stated by King et al., "Random selection might not be feasible because the universe of cases is not clearly specified" (1994, 125)—as was indeed our case, since there is no 'official' list of web sites of GJM organizations. We were also aware of the risk of "missing important cases" (ibid.). We were, however, careful not to sample on our dependent variables, following the criterion that "the best intentional design selects observations to ensure variation in the explanatory variable (and any control variables) without regard to the values of the dependent variables" (ibid., 140). Because of this sampling strategy, we cannot say that our national samples are representative of the (unknown) universe of web sites of GJM organizations in each country. Nonetheless, since our case selection respected the principle that "we must not search for those observations that fit (or do not fit) our a priori theory" (ibid., 141; see also 142), we do feel confident that the selection choices did not bias the statistical correlations among the coded variables.

The analysis of web sites of GJM organizations was carried out using a structured codebook designed around a series of variables investigated by previous research on the online presence of political actors (i.e. Gibson and Ward 2000; Van Aelst and Walgrave 2002; Trechsel

et al. 2003; Vedres et al. 2005).[2] The codebook was tested several times by all coders. Two reliability tests were carried out on two different web sites each. After the second test, we intervened in particular upon variables that had not worked well (scores of intercoder reliability below 50%). To make the coding process more reliable, we instructed the coders to follow some general rules, such as: a) limiting some searches to specific parts or sections of the web site; b) using the internal search engine (when present) or an equivalent Google search function that limits the search to a single web site; and c) following the operational definitions provided in the glossary that was inserted at the beginning of the codebook.

The strength of our research design in this part of the Demos research project lies in the use of a systematic, large-N analysis of web sites of SMOs that vary in terms of country, geographic level, issues covered, organizational resources, models and types (the sample includes unions, leftist parties and NGOs, as well as networks and grassroots groups). In this sense, beyond the specific contribution we develop in this chapter, our database can (and will) be used to assess the different emphasis on the aforementioned web site qualities by different organizations. Additionally, in other parts of the Demos project, we have combined this information with interviews about Internet use by SMOs (della Porta and Mosca 2006a) and activists (della Porta and Andretta 2007). Some quotations from interviews with representatives of SMOs whose web sites are analyzed in this chapter have been added at the beginning of each section as an illustration.[3]

Of course, the research design also has obvious limits. Among others, a) we focused mostly on groups that were already active offline and scarcely considered those active exclusively online; b) we analyzed only web sites, without considering other important online tools such as mailing lists, forums, chats, blogs and so on; c) we did not look at the actual use of the web sites, but focused on their (somewhat static) structural characteristics.

3.3. Characteristics and qualities of Web sites

If technology offers various opportunities and constraints, the actual implementation of a technical instrument defines the extent to which its potential is exploited and its limits are overcome. Although we assumed that SMOs (even more than other actors) are attracted by the potential of the Internet to reduce the cost of communication and make it more inclusive, we also considered the actual realization of this potential as a matter for empirical investigation. Additionally, we assumed that the attention to the different 'qualities' of a web site design can vary. In what follows we will analyze different strategic choices in the construction of web sites, presenting web sites' performances on the main analytical dimensions we have already singled out.

3.3.1. Web sites and the provision of information

> As for the web site, it has a specific function: it allows us to keep a memory of what we have done and store the documents we have produced as an archive or database. It would

[2] The codebook can be downloaded at: http://demos.iue.it/PDFfiles/Instruments/wp2codebook_final.pdf.

[3] Interviews were undertaken in the first semester of 2006 for Work Package 4 of the Demos project focusing on Practices of Democracy in the Global Justice Movement (see chapter 5; della Porta and Mosca 2006a).

> be much more difficult to find these materials and disseminate them without the web site (activist of the local social forum in Venice).

As in the quote above, the activists that we have interviewed often underline the importance of web sites as a means for constructing a memory of the activity of the organization, and for disseminating information. A web site can fulfill an important function in that it organizes a set of meanings, selects a part of reality, and proposes an interpretation of it. SMOs belonging to the GJM stress, more than most social movements in the past, the importance of building a specialized knowledge (della Porta et al. 2006). Helped by the Internet, epistemic communities and advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998) spread information on global issues, highlighting negative consequences of economic globalization and possible alternatives to neoliberalism as well as various struggles in different parts of the world (on the paradigmatic case of the Zapatistas, see Olesen 2005). These groups supported the creation of the GJM, providing alternative knowledge on specific issues, access, and visibility on the web and linking organizations acting on different parts of the globe.

Most of the analyzed web sites present a significant amount of information. They frequently offer political education via articles, papers and dossiers (90% of the cases), even providing bibliographical references (40%). More than half of the web sites (53%) publish conference and seminar materials that allow interested users to deepen their knowledge on specific topics; a news section is present in almost four-fifths (78%) of our web sites. In a wider comparative perspective, the web sites of Eastern European NGOs offered a news section in a much lower 48% of the cases and information about conferences in only 16% (Vedres et al. 2005, 154).

An important aspect that affects the quality of information is also the *usability* of a web site – that is, the possibility for users to find information easily. The presence of search engines and web site maps should help the user to rapidly find what he/she is searching for. It seems that SMOs perceive this necessity: almost 60% provide a search engine and almost 30% site map. Only about one-fourth of the web sites, however, offer basic information on the group in another language, and about one-fifth a translation of the 'about us' section. This seems a low proportion, if we consider the highly transnational nature of the movement's frames and action, an impression confirmed by a comparison with Eastern European NGOs, about one-third of which translate at least part of their web sites (see Vedres et al. 2005, 154). Although one could argue that borderless communication develops more through mailing lists than on web sites, it seems that, in a globalizing world, national civil society organizations still find it difficult to speak to each other across borders: language differences continue to represent problematic barriers for transnational communication.[4]

3.3.2. Building identities through the Internet

> Our mailing list is a permanent assembly. … in fact, it is our virtual assembly, where the discussion goes on and on, focusing on different issues—both on concrete things to do and organize and on the analysis of the political situation (activist of the squat 'Cantiere Sociale', Milan).

[4] This result is consistent with other research focusing on the Europeanization of the public sphere on the Internet (Koopmans and Zimmermann 2003).

Web sites serve as opportunities for self-presentation to the general public, while specific tools like forums and mailing lists favour ongoing communication and discussion among activists.[5] The web sites are in fact considered by activists as 'electronic business cards' that reflect and represent the identity and past history of the organization. Social movement scholars have underlined the Internet's capacity to generate new identities. While Diani (2001) claims that the Internet's contribution to the collective identities of social movements is mainly in reinforcing existing ones, Freschi (2002) studied how virtual communities can develop an identifying function, creating social networks with internal solidarity and common beliefs, acting online and offline. In fact, "real communities can and do take root in Internet-based space" (Gurak and Logie 2003, 43).

One type of information generally published on the web sites of GJM organizations does concern the identity and the history of the group itself. The Internet represents an important opportunity for SMOs to overcome the gate-keeping role of traditional media and present themselves to the general public without external manipulation. Overall, around two-thirds of the web sites we analysed provide an archive of press releases (also an important source of information for journalists of traditional media) and an archive of annual reports or a chronology of the history of the organization. Additionally, about two-fifths of the surveyed organizations have online archives of old leaflets (informing about the history of the organization: its actions, its campaigns, its mobilizations, etc.) as well as documents on past assemblies that are considered fundamental steps in their collective history.

If information on the history of a group is particularly interesting for people new to an organization, information on the current life of the organization is of primary importance both for neophytes and for older activists. More than 50% of the analyzed web sites have a newsletter that in the large majority of cases is accessible by all users, while less than 25% publish online the internal work agenda of the group. The organizations that are more interested in enhancing internal communication with their members can provide a members-only section on their web sites: this is the case in one-quarter of the analyzed web sites.

Our previous research on the use of SMOs' web sites during the mobilization against the G8 in Genoa in 2001 (della Porta and Mosca 2005a) indicates that the Internet provides opportunities for reflexivity. Online forums and mailing lists promote debates on specific choices (such as forms of actions, alliances, slogans, etc.) before a protest takes place and, later, a collective reflection on a demonstration's success and failure among 'distant' activists.

This takes us to another characteristic, also relevant for the formation of a collective identity through online debates. The presence of specific applications like forums, mailing lists or chat lines on a web site indicates the organization's commitment to multilateral interactivity through the creation of open spaces for discussion among diverse people. Applications for multilateral interactivity are variously spread on the analyzed web sites. About one-third of the web sites provide an asynchronous space for discussion (forum and/or mailing list). Comparatively, this is not a low proportion – similar indicators show that about one-fifth of the Eastern European NGOs provide instruments for participation via bulletin boards, chat rooms

[5] It must, however, be noted that these interactive tools are sometimes incorporated directly within web sites and sometimes not. First, in our research we could only assess the presence of such tools within SMOs' web sites; we cannot exclude the possibility that the same organizations may place interactive platforms elsewhere in cyberspace without publicizing them on their web sites. Second, the mere existence of certain utilities such as forums and mailing-lists does not tell us anything about their actual use.

and the like (see Vedres et al. 2005, 154). However, it also indicates that a majority of our groups do not consider web sites as instruments for open debate.

Additionally, the newest forms of information management like open publishing (all users can publish news, calls, proposals, etc. without a filter) are used in only 10% of the cases; the same percentage of web sites offers the possibility to respond to the organization's specific request for comments, or for surveys and questionnaires to collect users' opinions on various topics.

3.3.3. Transparency and accountability on the web

> There are also huge challenges as you are bombed with silly things; and it can happen that somebody decides to run a web site and to simulate the presence of a group or a collective behind it, while in reality it is just one person behind an Internet address. … so it is important to adopt some filters but this does not apply only to the Internet; in fact, with other means of communication you also have to select information and use filters (activist of the online information portal 'Social Press', Milan).

One of the main critiques concerning the Internet refers to the risks of opaque and ambivalent communication, as highlighted by one of our interviewees. However, the high information storage capacity of the web sites also provides opportunities for improving transparency and accountability. A large majority of our sampled SMOs uses web sites to improve transparency about their internal life. As many as 80% offer information on the physical existence and reachability of the organization (a similar percentage was noted for Eastern European NGOs; see Vedres et al. 2005, 154), which in 70% of the cases are directly published on the homepage or just one click away. Even more (85%) publish online the constitution (or an equivalent document) of their organizations, and almost two-thirds information on the organizational structure of the group. Less frequent is information on the web site itself: in only one-fourth of the cases do we find information about the last updating, and only 16% give some kind of indication on users' access to the web site (although those statistics are often unclear and very imprecise, lacking also a temporal reference). Probably also because of often low budgets, only 25% of the web sites provide information on the finances of the organization.

The presence of information on how to contact people actively involved in an organization, both with leading and other identified roles, indicates the willingness of the organization to open up to public scrutiny by creating direct channels of communication with web site users. In this sense, the presence of contact information represents a step beyond unidirectional instruments of communication (like a newsletter). Almost 90% of the web sites provide a general email address for the organization, 30% of them on the homepage. A similar percentage (85% and 87%, respectively) was found in the case of Eastern European NGOs (Vedres et al. 2005, 154) and in the analysis of European parliaments online (Trechsel et al. 2003, 23). However, the provision of email addresses of people involved in the organization is not widespread: only 40% of the analyzed web sites provide the email address for the webmaster; 31% the email address for other people/departments within the organization; and 14% the one for the person responsible for international relations. Among the groups that identify the presence of a leader, less than half give information on the person that performs this role, and about a quarter provide leader contact information to the general users.

The responsiveness of the general information service and of the webmaster is indicated by the response rate to an email we sent (using the email addresses published on the web site) to request information about the site's management.[6] Overall, the response rate varied from 31% for the request sent to the general email address, to 45% for the one sent to the webmaster.[7]

3.3.4. Mobilization through the web

> The Internet has a pivotal and strategic role for us; it is part of our strategy of communication and pressure. … We are employing it in a very interesting way to organize online pressure campaigns on national deputies and also on representatives at the local level. We have used mail-bombing on political representatives and it has given interesting results (spokesperson of the ecopacifist network rete Lilliput, Rome).

As the quotation above shows, activists are sensitive to the potential of the Internet to organize pressure campaigns and to directly perform acts of dissent, both online and offline. Research on unconventional political participation has stressed that the ability of citizens to exert democratic pressure on their representatives through active mobilization is particularly problematic at the transnational level. The organization of transnational protest has, in fact, very high transaction costs — which partially explains why, although competences increase at the international level, protest remains mainly national, if not local. However, the Internet has substantially reduced the cost of communicating with large numbers of individuals spread all around the globe. There is rising evidence that "protests are increasingly conceived, planned, implemented and evaluated with the help of the Internet" (O'Brien 1999). In the last few years, the Internet has allowed for the organization of large, transnational demonstrations, occurring with a frequency and a numerical consistency unknown before.

The web sites of our sampled SMOs perform mobilization functions to very different degrees. Most widespread is the use of the Internet for *offline protest*. More than 60% of the organizations publish their action calendar online, a significant proportion when compared with the 42% in the case of Eastern European NGOs (Vedres et al. 2005, 154). About one-third also publish online the action calendar of other organizations belonging to the GJM; the same proportion provide concrete information (through handbooks or links to useful resources) on offline forms of action. Almost one-fifth of the analyzed web sites organize physical meetings connected with offline forms of action (between 16% and 22% organize workshops and help desks to socialize people to offline forms of action); about one-third (36%) give information on offline forms of action. As many as two-thirds of our web sites advertise the participation of their organization in protest campaigns.

The Internet also provides instruments for *online protest*, such as e-petitions, netstrikes and mailbombings. Many hackers—with their attention to the Internet and online protest—belong to the GJM, struggling against copyright and for the right to privacy (Jordan 2002).

[6] When an email address was available, we emailed the information service and the webmasters a message with questions. We asked the information service how many people managed the web site, the average number of information requests they received in a month, the average number of messages they responded to and the time frame of the answers. We asked the webmaster for the number of volunteers and/or paid staff employed to maintain the web site, the average traffic demand, the number of subscribers to newsletters and/or mailing lists/forums, the frequency of updating, and the type of software used to produce the web site.

[7] This rate was calculated considering only the web sites that published the respective email addresses.

Computer-mediated communication allows the mounting of transnational campaigns against multinational corporations (among others, De Beers, Microsoft, Monsanto, and Nike), especially via *e-petitions*, which have also been used to denounce specific human rights violations and to pressure national governments against the death penalty. Thanks to the Internet, these campaigns have become more long lasting, less centrally controlled, more difficult to turn on and off, and more flexible in terms of networks and goals (Bennett 2003b). A more radical form of online protest is the *netstrike*, in which a large number of people connect simultaneously to the same domain at a prearranged time, 'jamming' a site considered a symbolic target and making it impossible for other users to reach it. For instance, a netstrike was promoted against the WTO web site during the protests in Seattle, ideally linking offline and online environments (Jordan 2002). Similar to the netstrike, *mail-bombing* consists of sending emails to a web site or a server until it overloads and gets jammed.

In our web sites, however, online forms of action are promoted less often than offline forms: almost 30% of the analyzed web sites use the online petition; almost 18% propose to their users a form of online mobilization like the e-postcard; and 15% publish concrete information about online forms of actions on the web site. The percentage is even lower for calls for netstrikes and/or mailbombings; other forms of online mobilizations are more widespread, but still limited to a minority.

3.3.5. Intervening on the digital divide

> I think that there is always a problem with technology… the web site we had before was much more complex than the present one and it forced people to have some knowledge of html language. But this is something that selects [who can participate], and so you become a filter and a funnel and all depends on you. This was a strong limitation with which we had to cope. To create the new web site, we used French free software that is completely open (...). The advantage is that this new system is very easy and it can be used by everybody (activist of the online portal Social Press, Milan).

Although the Internet is perceived by social movement activists as an opportunity for informing, building identities, making communication more transparent, and mobilizing, the limits of Internet communication are recognized. The extent to which the Internet allows for mobilizing different groups of the population, especially the least 'technologically educated,' is an open question, often discussed in the literature on the Internet and protest. The Internet is in fact the specific source of a new form of inequality, the 'digital divide' – that is, the differential access to digital technology by particular social groups and countries (Norris 2001). Our own data from a survey of activists participating in the first European Social Forum in Florence confirm to a certain degree the existence of a digital divide within social movements, although they also point at the role movement organizations play in socializing their members to the Internet (della Porta and Mosca 2005a).

The organizations we selected for our analysis, however, do not seem very concerned with this issue. In fact, less than 10% provide laboratories, help desks and other electronic applications to socialize their users to the Internet. Only 5% of these groups offer free email to their users, and just 8% host web pages or web sites. The presence of a text-only version of the web site, allowing people with slow connections or old hardware to access its contents, is present in only about 5% of the web sites. Only very seldom did we find reference to the accessibility

issue on the homepage of an analyzed web site. The issue of the digital divide, then, is addressed mainly by a limited number of SMOs specifically engaged with this problem, while others clearly do not consider it a priority.

3.4. Contextual characteristics, organizational features and web site qualities: some explanations

How can we explain the varying emphasis of the different web sites on the diverse dimensions of communication? Technological explanations have frequently been used to account for the effects of technological innovation (for example, comparisons between television and the Internet often refer to the technological opportunities and constraints offered by the two media). Similarly, technological skills have been cited in explaining the qualities of web sites, with significant improvement in the web sites of political organizations resultig from contracting out their design and management to professional webmasters. Recent research has, however, singled out the presence of various models that adapt technology to organizational style and strategy (Vedres et al. 2005), as well as to the contextual dimension. Criticizing the technological interpretation of the Internet as favouring – thanks to its inherent networked logic – the decentralization of power and empowerment of citizens, most scholars nowadays agree in underlining the role of the agency in shaping the online environment (Oates and Gibson 2006, 3). Relations between technology and its users are therefore considered as bi-directional: technology impacts upon social relations, while social relations shape the use of the Internet as a technology. Assuming that offline characteristics matter in explaining the online presence of SMOs, in our explanatory model we take into account contextual dimensions as well as organizational factors (see Fig. 1).

Figure 1. Explanatory model



To address the influence of context, we first looked at the level of Internet access in the selected countries.[8] We assumed that a larger diffusion of the Internet could explain a greater investment in this medium by SMOs, whereas in countries with limited Internet use SMOs would be more likely to limit their online presence to advertisements, without investing very much in other aspects of their web sites.

Moreover, we classified the web sites according to the characteristics of the GJM in the respective countries.[9] We noticed in other parts of our research that the density and format of GJM organizational networks tended to vary in the selected countries, generating two different constellations of social movements that corresponded, with some caveats, to Northern and Southern Europe (della Porta 2007b). The two social movement constellations are characterized by different types of networks (more integrated in the French, Italian and Spanish cases and more polarized in Germany and Switzerland and, to a lesser extent, in the UK); different organizational structures (more horizontal in the first constellation, more vertical in the second); and a different orientation towards unconventional collective action (more protest-oriented in the first, more lobbying-oriented in the second).

Concerning the organizational characteristics, attitudes towards the Internet could vary on the basis of the age of the group, as newer, resource-poor organizations that tend to reject conventional politics may be defined in important ways by their Internet presence (Bennett 2003b), while established organizations seem to have a conservative approach (Smith 1997; Tarrow 2003, 31). The level of resources available to an organization might facilitate a more effective use of the Internet—as some findings on political parties (Ward 2001) and NGOs (Warkentin 2001) seem to suggest. In fact, while it is quite easy and inexpensive to create a web site and to let it float in cyberspace, a well-organized, frequently updated and interactive web site demands significant investment of resources. Therefore, the web sites of big (and resourceful) organizations can be expected to perform better on the analyzed dimensions than the websites of smaller grassroots groups (Pickerill 2003). Other organizational features such as horizontality, formalization and the territorial level of the group can also be expect to affect web site qualities in different ways.

In order to control for the effect of relevant organizational characteristics, we looked at some indicators on which we collected information during our research. The date of foundation of the organization is an obvious indicator of the organizational age, and the budget an indicator of resources. In addition, we used the absence of leadership roles (present in almost 70% of the sample) as an indicator of horizontality; the presence of membership fees as an indicator of formalization; the definition of the group as local (almost one-fifth of the cases) as an indicator of the territorial scope of the action.

For the dependent variables, we built five additive indexes (standardized in order to vary from zero to one) by adding up the binary indicators used for each of the mentioned qualities of

[8] We created a variable that assigned values varying between 0 (=0 per cent) and 1 (=100 per cent), depending on the percentage of people accessing the Internet in the country the organization belonged to (source: http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats4.htm). We excluded from the analysis the thirty cases sampled at the transnational level.

[9] We used a dummy variable giving value 0 to Germany, United Kingdom and Switzerland and value 1 to France, Italy and Spain. Also in this case, we excluded the thirty cases sampled for the transnational level.

web sites, and looked at the reciprocal association among them (see Table 1).[10] First, the fact that not all the indexes are correlated with each other seems to confirm that organizations tend to focus on some of the relevant functions, choosing among various techniques rather then being driven by technology (Vedres et al. 2005). Additionally, we found that provision of information is particularly related to mobilization and identity building. The web sites that score high on these three dimensions belong to less hierarchical organizations, are more dynamic and interactive. For reasons we shall see below, transparency is not correlated with other dimensions of Internet presence. Web sites that score high on transparency, but not on other dimensions, are likely to belong to more hierarchical organizations, to be more static and less interactive. Third, online and offline mobilization is highly correlated with intervention on the digital divide. Organizations with high scores on both dimensions emerge as more concerned with empowering citizens, by encouraging them to play an active role (mobilizing in the streets and in the Net) and by socializing them to the use of new technologies.

Table 1. Indexes of online democracy (non parametrical correlations, Kendall's Tau-B)

INDEXES	*Information provision*	*Identity building*	*Transparency*	*Mobilization*	*Digital divide*
Information provision	--				
Identity building	0.295**	--			
Transparency	0.187**	0.147*	--		
Mobilization	0.317**	0.382**	n.s.	--	
Intervention on digital divide	0.182**	0.123*	n.s.	0.281**	--

N = 261. Legend: ** = significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); * = significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed); n.s. = not significant. Source: Demos data quoted in the WP2 integrated report (della Porta and Mosca 2005b).

Correlation coefficients between the mentioned additive indexes and contextual characteristics show that in the group of countries more oriented towards protest and where Internet access is still limited, the Internet is more likely to be used as instrument for offline mobilization. In the same countries, it is also more often used for identity building and information provision. The countries more oriented towards conventional forms of action and where Internet access is higher are more likely to use the Internet especially as an instrument for transparency or accountability.

The organizational characteristics we considered are particularly helpful in explaining transparency, information provision and online mobilization. The degree of formalization and the territorial level of organizations are both correlated with the index of transparency, as informal and local groups pay less attention to formal structures. More structured organizations seem to invest more in information provision: the presence of a division of roles is in fact associated with

[10] We report significance of correlation coefficients as it is still a prevalent practice in statistical analysis, although we are aware that their usefulness for non-random samples is debated.

more attention paid to the production and diffusion of information on the Internet. Availability of material resources and age of the organization help in explaining the degree of transparency: unsurprisingly, older and wealthier groups are likely to be more transparent online. Mobilizing online is, in contrast, a characteristic typical of less formal organizations that seem to make use of the more innovative aspects of this medium, exploiting it as a tool to strengthen their mobilization capacities. Organizational characteristics, however, do not help in explaining the use of the Internet to intervene on the digital divide or to disseminate information concerning offline mobilizations.

Table 2. Online democracy and characteristics of the organization (Kendall's Tau-B)

INDEXES of online democracy	**ENVIRONMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS**		**ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS**				
	Internet access	*Constellation of the GJM*	*Horizontality (lack of roles)*	*Formalization (fee membership)*	*Local level group*	*Budget*	*Age of the group*
Information provision	0.154**	0.187**	-0.242**	-0.160**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Identity building	n.s.	0.181**	-0.125*	-0.105*	-0.126*	n.s.	n.s.
Transparency	-0.188**	-0.235**	0.409**	-0.257**	-0.206**	0.444**	-0.287**
Offline Mobilization	0.105*	0.173**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	0.141*
Online Mobilization	n.s.	n.s.	-0.160**	-0.287**	-0.118*	n.s.	n.s.
Intervention on digital divide	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Total (N)	231	231	261	261	261	139	150

Legend: ** = significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); * = significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed); n.s. = not significant
Source: Demos data quoted in the WP2 integrated report (della Porta and Mosca 2005b).

3.5. Between virtual and real: some conclusions

The analysis of the web sites of organizations belonging to the GJM confirms that the Internet plays an important role for these social movements. However, we observed that SMOs pay varying degrees of attention to the various potentialities of web sites. Overall, web sites are used mostly for spreading information, mobilizing offline and increasing transparency about some organizational features. The use of the Internet for mobilizing online and socializing users to new technologies is particularly limited. This is quite a surprising result, as we expected SMOs to be more concerned with using their web sites to reduce inequalities among users and engage them in online mobilizations. Interestingly, in between purely informative functions and functions directed at empowering people, we find that the Internet is used to develop and strengthen collective identities through memory building With only one-third of the web sites having mailing lists or forums, interactivity emerges as lower than expected, although not in absolute terms in comparison with similar groups (such as NGOs).

Contextual and organizational characteristics help to explain, at least in part, the strategic choices made by SMOs. We found that, in an adaptation to national cultures, SMOs tend to privilege transparency and provision of information in the Northern countries, identity building and mobilization in the Southern ones. Our research confirms the role played by actors in defining the specific objectives to be reached through the use of new technologies. As Pickerill

noted in research on online environmental activism: “deterministic assumptions are challenged by an awareness that technology is not a discrete artifact which operates externally to impact upon social relations” (2003, 23). In fact, different SMOs tend to exploit different technological opportunities, producing web sites endowed with different qualities. Different contexts encourage an emphasis on different characteristics, and web sites’ qualities apparently reflect organizational models. In particular, SMOs oriented towards more formal and hierarchical organizations seem to show a more traditional (and instrumental) use of the Net, while less formalized groups tend to use more interactive tools (and identity building) available online, as well as various forms of computer-mediated protest.

Overall, our data seem to show a trend of path dependency in the characteristics of web sites: less resourceful, informal and newer SMOs tend to develop a more innovative use of the Internet, while more resourceful, formal and older groups tend to use it as a more conventional medium of communication. However, these observations need to be supported by further research and empirical evidence. According to our findings, in fact, the trend that small radical organizations are more likely to be innovative with the Internet is not uniform. There are also some smaller groups that are not making use of the interactive opportunities of the web. At the same time, we also found some formal organizations (often better resourced than the others) not limiting themselves to using the Internet as a traditional information provider. The social characteristics of the organizational membership as well as the groups’ conceptions of democracy are likely to affect the use of the new technology. The important question of how web site potentials are implemented in their actual use remains open.

CHAPTER 4. VISIONS OF DEMOCRACY IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS[1]

4.1. Visions of democracy. An Introduction

Social movements do not limit themselves to presenting demands to decision makers but, more or less explicitly, they express a fundamental critique of conventional politics, thus shifting their endeavours from politics itself to meta-politics (Offe 1985). From this point of view, social movements affirm the legitimacy (if not the primacy) of alternatives to parliamentary democracy, criticising both liberal democracy and the 'organised democracy' of political parties. Their ideas resonate with 'an ancient element of democratic theory that calls for an organisation of collective decision-making referred to in varying ways as classical, populist, communitarian, strong, grass-roots, or direct democracy against a democratic practice in contemporary democracies labelled as realist, liberal, elite, republican, or representative democracy' (Kitschelt 1993, 15). According to the representative democracy model, citizens elect their representatives and exercise control through the ballot box. The direct democracy favoured by social movements limits the principle of delegation, viewed as an instrument of oligarchic power, and asserts that representatives should be subject to recall at all times. Moreover, delegation is general in a representative democracy, with representatives deciding for citizens on a whole range of matters; in a system of direct democracy it relates only to a particular issue. Whereas representative democracy foresees the creation of a specialised body of representatives, direct democracy opts for continual turnover. Representative democracy is based on formal equality (one person, one vote); direct democracy is participatory, with decision-making rights assigned only to those who demonstrate their commitment to the public cause. While representative democracy is often bureaucratic, with decision-making concentrated at the top, direct democracy is decentralised and emphasises that decisions should be taken as near as possible to ordinary people's lives.

In this sense, social movements are also a response to problems that have emerged in the system of interest representation, 'compensating' for the tendency of political parties to favour interests with a better payoff in electoral terms, and of interest groups to represent social strata better endowed with resources while marginalising the rest. Participatory democracy should give a voice to those with neither material resources nor strength of numbers, but who are committed to a just cause. While the principal instrument in the hands of citizens in representative democracy is the vote, direct democracy legitimates all forms of pressure to the decision-making process, defined as protest repertoires.

While participatory aspects have long been present in theorising about democracy and social movements, some emerging developments can be usefully discussed in light of the growing literature on deliberative democracy, with its attention to communication, particularly within the participatory approach (della Porta 2004a; della Porta and Reiter 2005) and locating democratic deliberation in voluntary groups (Cohen 1989), social movements (Dryzek 2000),

1 This chapter is based upon the introductory chapter, authored by Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter (with the collaboration of Massimiliano Andretta), of the Demos WP3 Report (della Porta and Reiter 2006). The report includes country chapters authored by Hélène Combes and Francine Simon Ekovich (France), Simon Teune and Mundo Yang (Germany), Herbert Reiter (with the collaboration of Massimiliano Andretta) (Italy), Manuel Jiménez and Angel Calle (Spain), Clare Saunders and Christopher Rootes (United Kingdom), and a chapter on the transnational level authored by Duccio Zola and Raffaele Marchetti.

protest arenas (Young 2003, 119) or, more in general, enclaves free from institutional power (Mansbridge 1996).

Deliberative participatory democracy refers to decisional processes that under conditions of equality, inclusiveness and transparency, and communication based on reason (the strength of a good argument) are able to transform individual preferences, leading to decisions oriented to the public good. Some elements of this definition echo those already included in the participatory models we have just described as typical of (new) social movements, although with an emerging emphasis on the quality of discourse. In particular, deliberative democracy "requires some forms of apparent equality among citizens" (Cohen 1989, 18); in fact, deliberation takes place among free and equal citizens (as "free deliberation among equals", ibid., 20). At least, "all citizens must be able to develop those capacities that give them effective access to the public sphere", and "once in public, they must be given sufficient respect and recognition so as to be able to influence decisions that affect them in a favourable direction" (Bohman 1997, 523-24). Deliberation must exclude power deriving from coercion, but also an unequal weighting of the participants as representatives of organisations of different sizes or as more influential individuals.

Also common to traditional conceptions of direct democracy is the emphasis on inclusiveness. All citizens with a stake in the decisions to be taken must be included in the process and able to express their views. This means that the deliberative process takes place under conditions of plurality of values, including people with different perspectives but facing common problems. Deliberation (or even communication) is based upon the belief that, while not necessarily giving up my perspective, I might learn if I listen to the other (Young 1996). Moreover, transparency resonates with direct, participatory democracy: assemblies are typically open, public spheres. In Joshua Cohen's definition, a deliberative democracy is "an association whose affairs are governed by the *public* deliberation of its members" (1989, 17, emphasis added).

What is especially new in the conception of deliberative democracy, and in some of the contemporary movements' practices, is the emphasis on preference (trans)formation with an orientation to the definition of the public good. In fact, "deliberative democracy requires the transformation of preferences in interaction" (Dryzek 2000, 79); it is "a process through which initial preferences are transformed in order to take into account the points of view of the others" (Miller 1993, 75). In this sense, deliberative democracy differs from conceptions of democracy as the aggregation of (exogenously generated) preferences. A deliberative setting facilitates the search for a common end or good (Elster 1998). In this model of democracy, "the political debate is organized around alternative conceptions of the public good", and, above all, it "draws identities and citizens' interests in ways that contribute to public building of public good" (Cohen 1989, 18-19).

In particular, deliberative democracy stresses reason, argumentation, dialogue: people are convinced by the force of the better argument. In particular, deliberation is based on horizontal flows of communication, multiple producers of content, wide opportunities for interactivity, confrontation on the basis of rational argumentation, and attitude to reciprocal listening (Habermas 1981; 1996). Deliberations are based upon arguments that participants recognise as reasonable (Cohen and Sabel 1997). In this sense, deliberative democracy is discursive. These conceptions also often refer to practices of consensus, with decisions approvable by all

participants -- in contrast with majority rule, where decisions are legitimated by vote. Consensus had already been mentioned by previous movements, but now acquires more relevance.

In this chapter, we shall discuss the visions of democracy present in the global justice movement (GJM). Conceptions of democracy emerge as particularly relevant for this movement, face to external as well as internal transformations. Regarding the external ones, the movement must adapt to challenges to representative democracy: the shift of power from the state to the market; the increasing power of transnational institutions, not electorally accountable; the decline of mass-parties (della Porta and Tarrow 2004). As for the internal transformation, the open and inclusive structure already typical of other movements (particularly the women's and peace movements) appears in the global justice movements in a version with heightened reticularity: international counter-summits and campaigns, but also local-level protests, are normally organised by structures co-ordinating hundreds if not thousands of groups (della Porta 2005a).

In particular, we will focus upon the organisational documents of 244 social movement organizations, except for two the same organizations whose websites we analyzed in the previous chapter. The analysis addresses the general tensions between deliberative/participatory and representative patterns, both in the internal dynamics of the social movements and in their relationships with institutions. This part of the Demos research project was not meant to capture the actual functioning of the organisations/groupings, but rather their organisational ideology. The assumption is that when a group has strong normative statements about internal democracy, these tend to be written in a 'visible' document such as a constitution, a mission statement, an 'about us' section on the organisation's website, and so on. We are aware that in some cases constitutions or mission statements are strategically instrumental—that is, they can be adapted to the requirements of external sponsors/state institutions and so on, in order to obtain funds and influence (and this will be assessed with interviews and other documents). Formalised decision-making procedures tend, however, to have an impact on the organisations by constraining institutional structures and frames.

In addition to the information on the conception of democracy, we have also analysed the relevant data on organisational structures, general themes covered, and main (perceived) functions. We expect these internal characteristics to be related with different conceptions of democracy. We have collected data by country and at the transnational level, as well as coding the organisations' date of foundation. Space and time are, in fact, expected to play a role in the organisational culture. As neoinstitutional approaches to organisational sociology have pointed out (March and Olsen 1989; Boli and Thomas 1999), organisations tend to be *isomorphic* to their environments, adapting to some of their characteristics. Thus we expect the history of the interaction between states and social movements in each specific country and at the transnational level to be embedded in the movements' organisational culture, defining appropriate behaviours and attitudes. Neoinstitutionalists have also suggested that organisational characteristics are path-dependent: organisational features are resilient over time. In fact, we expect the historical periods in which the organisations were founded to play an important role in determining organisational structures and values.

In what follows, we shall present some results about the conceptions of democracy revealed by the analysis of organisational documents, and discuss some possible explanations for the differences that emerged among models of democracy. After presenting our research instruments and sampling strategies (part 2), we will present some data from the quantitative analysis, focusing of the characteristics of our organisations on the dependent variable,

conceptions of democracy (part 3). Later on, we shall discuss explanations for the different visions of democracy by focusing on the characteristics of the Social Movement Organisations (SMOs) (part 4) as well as of their environments (part 5).

4.2. Research instruments and sampling strategies

With very minor exceptions, the organizations sampled for this part of our research project were the same ones as for our website analysis (see chapter 3, p. 33, for the sampling strategy). We aimed at collecting information on a relatively large number of organisations/groupings per country and on very different organisational models. We did not focus on measuring degrees of democracy, but instead on constructing a typology of the different models of democracy that are present, in a more or less 'pure' form, in the GJM organisations. A main assumption of our research is indeed that the general principles of democracy such as power (*kratos*) by/from/for the people (*demos*) can be combined in different forms and with different balances: representative versus participatory, and majority versus deliberative (see below). The plurality of repertoires that we have singled out in the GJM (see della Porta 2007a) is also reflected in the variety of conceptions of democracy expressed by the GJM groups and organisations.

The analysis of the organisational documents focused on: a) the constitution of the organsation; b) a document of fundamental values and/or intent; c) a formally adopted program; d) the 'mission statement'; e) the 'about us' section of the website; f) the 'frequently asked questions' section of the website; and g) equivalent or similar material on the website expressing the 'official' position of the organisation as a whole (e.g. internal documents referred to in documents a) – f) such as annual reports, membership application forms, etc.). Many but not all of these materials were available on websites. After an analysis of the websites, we contacted the social movement organisations to ask for missing documents.

For the quantitative part of the research, we developed a codebook aimed at conducting a structured analysis of a specific aspect of the movement discourse on democracy, that is, the organisational ideology of social movement organisations. This part is quite new from a methodological point of view. Documents describing the structure of social movement organisations have been analysed in various research projects, but mostly within qualitative in-depth analyses of a few groups that had the advantage of a "dense" description but were difficult to summarise in larger comparison (among others, TEA project, second year report; for a review of the literature, Clemens and Minkoff 2004; della Porta and Diani 2006). Through systematic coding of the organisational vision of democracy, we tried to go beyond a "dense" description, devising an instrument for a larger-N comparison. One of the rationales for selecting a large number of cases was the heterogeneity of the GJM in terms, among others, of organisational designs (see chapter 2; della Porta 2007a) that made the analysis of a large number of different groups interesting. Having enlarged the number of observed organisations, some instruments for quantitative analysis became necessary.

To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to develop a systematic content analysis of SMOs' organisational documents on democratic values. We therefore invested considerable energies in the preparation of the codebook, taking into account both our main research questions and the characteristics of the available materials. We built our codebook around the following sets of variables: general information on the organisational characteristics (among them country

and date of foundation, territorial level of activity, number of individual and collective members); membership rules (among them the requirements for being admitted and procedures for admission as well as expulsion); organisational structures and decision-making methods (among them, if mentioned, the role of assemblies, executive committees and presidents or general secretaries; their composition and functioning; the methods for the choice of delegates; the limits on delegation; incompatibility rules); relationships with public institutions (distinguishing among collaboration, democratic control and refusal of relationships with local institutions, national institutions, and international governmental institutions, as well as with economic actors); identity and conceptions of democracy (including references to internal organisational values such as limitation of delegation, inclusiveness, deliberation; to general democratic values, such as participation, equality, dialogue; to themes covered, such as democracy, social justice, human rights, ecology; to specific functions of the organisation, such as protesting or lobbying).[2]

For the development of these instruments, we could rely upon some previous experiences in other fields of research. In particular, the constitutions of political parties have been studied in research on party organisational models, and party electoral manifestos have been analysed as important sources of information on party ideology (see Klingeman, Hoffenbert, and Budge 1994). The challenge in our research, however, is the presence of very different types of organizations, ranging from political parties to unions, from large associations to small informal groupings, from transnational networks to local groups. We could, of course, have focused our attention only on organisations of the same type—for instance, organisations with a constitution. However, this approach would have excluded some relevant alternative organisational forms from our analysis. We must therefore accept that the quantity and character of written material varies a lot by group: in fact, substantial written production makes it more likely that we will find statements about democracy, while the absence of a formal constitution makes it less likely that we will find detailed information about the formal rules of decision-making. In the interpretation of our results, we shall take into account these differences and their consequences. A related problem is that, while formal organisations often provide easy access to the selected documents (generally on their websites; see chapter 3; della Porta and Mosca 2005b), this is not always true for less formalised organisations. In addition, informal organisations also proved more reluctant to provide documents offline. This meant that, especially in some countries, the corpus of documents on some groups was reduced. We shall also have to consider this caveat in interpreting our results.

Before moving to the results of our empirical analysis, some brief remarks on the sampling strategies are in order. As already explained in detail (see chapter 3, 26), in our case random selection is impossible given that the universe is unknown (there is no 'official' list of GJMOs). Instead, we tried to select in each country and at the supranational level organisations at the core of the Global Justice Movements. Additionally, we tried to reflect the heterogeneity of the movements by issues covered and ideological leanings. In this sense, we were careful not to sample on our dependent variables (conceptions of democracy), following the criterion that "the best intentional design selects observations to ensure variation in the explanatory variable (and any control variables) without regard to the values of the dependent variables" (King et al., 140). Because of this sampling strategy, we cannot say that our national samples are representative of the (unknown) universe of GJM organisations in each country. Since our case

[2] The codebook can be downloaded at: http://demos.eui.eu/PDFfiles/Instruments/wp3codebook_final.pdf.

selection also respected the principle that "we must not search for those observations that fit (or do not fit) our a priori theory" (ibid., 141, see also p. 142), we do however feel confident that the selection choices did not bias the statistical correlations among the coded variables.

Our quantitative analysis of the organisational documents of 244 social movement organisations was complemented by a qualitative analysis of a reduced sample of groups, for which we collected additional documents. This step allowed a more detailed view of some central aspects of conceptions of democracy circulating within the GJM. In particular, the meanings given to concepts such as consensual decision-making, participation, and deliberation have been analysed in depth. In the qualitative part, we also paid particular attention to visions of external democracy, reporting the main criticism movement organisations address to representative institutions and intergovernmental organisations as well as their proposals for reforms.

4.3. Visions of democracy: A plurality of models

4.3.1. Internal and general democratic values

As mentioned, previous research has observed that social movement organisations pay close attention to the issue of democracy, often developing alternative values. These organisations have also been said to be self-reflexive insofar as they tend to debate the issue of democracy as it applies to their internal lives. Our data confirm that the issue of democracy continues to be a very relevant one: most of the organisations we sampled mention democratic values in their documents. Looking at the values mentioned on internal democracy (table 1), participation is still a main reference in SMOs' visions of democracy, mentioned by one third of the organisations as an internal value. It is a founding principle not only for the 'purest' forms of social movement organisations, but also for trade unions and left-wing political parties. However, additional values emerge specifying (and differentiating) the conceptions of participatory democracy. References to the limits of delegation, the rotation principle, mandated delegation, criticism of delegation, or deliberative democracy as internal organisational values are present but not dominant (between 6% and 11%). References to the consensual method and non-hierarchical decision-making are more significant (17% and 16%); even more frequently mentioned are inclusiveness (21%) and the autonomy of local chapters or member organisations (33% and 39%).

Looking at the general democratic values (table 1), it is remarkable that the documents of as much as half of our sample refer to plurality, diversity, and heterogeneity as important democratic values, at a level very near to that of (more traditional) participation. Equality is mentioned in the analysed documents of about one third of our sample and values such as transparency, inclusiveness, and individual freedom in about one fourth. Significantly, representative values are mentioned by only 6% of our organisations.

Table 1. Internal and general democratic values explicitly mentioned in the selected documents*

Internal democratic values	*%*	*General democratic values*	*%*
Autonomy of the territorial levels**	38.5	Participation	51.2
Autonomy of member organisations***	33.1	Difference/plurality/heterogeneity	47.1
Participatory democracy	27.9	Equality	34.0
Inclusiveness	20.9	Dialogue/communication	31.6
Consensual method	17.2	Inclusiveness	25.8
Non-hierarchical decision-making	16.0	Transparency	23.8
Criticism of delegation and/or representation	11.1	Individual liberty/autonomy	21.7
Deliberative democracy	7.0	Autonomy (group; cultural)	18.9
Rotation principle	6.6	Representation	6.1
Limitation of delegation	6.6		
Mandated delegation	6.1		

* N=244, with the exception of ** not applicable for 62 (25.4%) groups, because they do not mention territorial levels of organisation; and *** not applicable for 114 (46.7%) groups, because they do not mention organisations as members.

For further analysis, we decided to aggregate our data. As far as the internal values are concerned, we grouped positive responses on critique of delegation, limitation of delegation, non-hierarchical decision-making, and mandated delegation into an index of 'critique of delegation/non-hierarchical decision-making'. Another new variable grouped responses on autonomy of member organisations and autonomy of local chapters. In what follows, the variables on the consensual method and deliberative democracy will not be explored as internal principles, since they were used in the construction of our typology of democratic internal decision-making (see below). Based on the correlations shown in a factor analysis, the data on general democratic values were recoded into 'deliberative general values' (references to participation, equality, inclusiveness, transparency, dialogue/communication). For the 'deliberative general values', we created a new dichotomised variable as well as an additive index. On the recoded data, about one fourth of the organisations express critique of delegation, and more than one third stress autonomy of member organisations or local chapters as a positive value. Moreover, most organisations tend to mention more than one value, for instance qualifying their participatory appeal with references to inclusiveness and/or autonomy.

4.3.2. The typology of democratic internal decision-making

By crossing the two dimensions of participation (referring to the degree of delegation of power, inclusiveness, and equality) and deliberation (referring to the decision-making model and to the quality of communication), we suggest a typology whose heuristic relevance will be checked in our research. In particular, we dichotomise the two variables as follows: on the first dimension, we distinguish participatory conceptions that stress inclusiveness of equals (high participation)

from those based upon delegation of power to representatives (low participation); while on the second dimension of the typology, we distinguish conceptions that highlight the aggregation of conflicting interests over the deliberation and transformation of preferences (low deliberation) from those that focus on the quality of communication, stressing consensus building (high deliberation) (see figure 1).

Four conceptions of internal democracy (or models of internal democracy) thus emerge from the movement documents reflecting organisational ideology: in the *associational model,* the assembly chooses the executive body and the president of the association, while the everyday politics of the group is managed by delegates who make decisions in a process that leaves relatively little space for argumentation and consensus building. When, according to the selected documents, delegates elected by the assembly make decisions on a consensual basis, we speak of *deliberative representation*. Especially in social movement organisations, important decisions are often made directly by the members in the assembly: when they decide by majority, the model is the classic *assembleary* one; when consensus and communicative processes based on reason are mentioned as important values, the decision-making process can be called *deliberative participation*.

Figure 2. Typology of democratic internal decision-making*

		Delegation of power	
		High	Low
Consensus	Low	**Associational model (51.6%)**	**Assembleary model (13.1%)**
	High	**Deliberative representation (13.5%)**	**Deliberative participation (9.4%)**

* N = 244, of which 12.4% are Not applicable

We have operationalised our typology by considering a series of indicators on decision-making mentioned in the organisational documents analysed (the frequencies of the variables for the typology are available on request). The presence of an assembly is mentioned in three quarters of our cases, but other roles are also present: a president or general secretary was mentioned by about half of our groups and an executive committee by 62%. While the assembly is mentioned as a decision-making body on future activities in 61% of the cases, the executive follows in as many as half of our cases. In more than one third of the valid cases, the assembly is formed by delegates; but again in more than one third it consists of all members, and in 8% of whoever wants to participate. Of the groups that mention the decision-making method of the assembly, about one third declare the use of consensual methods; of those referring to the decision-making rule of the executive, consensual methods are mentioned by less than one fourth. Mentions of rotation of delegates and mandatory delegation, although present, are quite rare.

By crossing these and other data (for details see della Porta and Reiter 2006), setting narrow conditions for an organisation to be considered assembleary or deliberative participative, we have operationalised our types of internal decision-making as follows.

a) We defined as following an *associational* model those SMOs whose documents: did not mention an assembly but did refer to other decision-making bodies; mentioned an assembly but not as making decisions, at the same time mentioning other decision-making bodies; mentioned the assembly as one or the main decision-making body, but as composed by delegates; mentioned an assembly composed by all members as one or the main decision-making body, but at the same time mentioned an executive committee as a decision-making body. In consequence, the associational type is, if anything, overrepresented. In addition, in these cases consensus is *not* mentioned as an organisational value or decision-making method and/or as the decision-making rule for the assembly or for the executive committee.

b) We considered as belonging to the *deliberative representative* type those organisations that, in terms of declared decision-making, fulfil the conditions of the associational type, but, in contrast to the organisations of that type, do mention deliberative democracy or the consensual method as general principles of internal debate and decision-making, or use consensus as a decision-making method for the assembly or the executive committee.

c) We operationalised the *assembleary* type as all cases in which the documents analysed mention the assembly as one or the main decision-making body, and the assembly consists of all members or whoever wants to participate.

d) We considered as belonging to the *deliberative participative* type those organisations that fulfil the conditions of the assembleary type, but, in contrast to the organisations of that type, do mention deliberative democracy or the consensual method as a general principle of internal debate and decision-making, or use consensus as a decision-making method for the assembly or the executive committee.

In interpreting our results, we must bear in mind some caveats. First, the different quantity and quality of the material we were able to collect for the different groups can reduce the degree of confidence in the allocation of especially informal organisations, and therefore the reliability of our indicators. This problem is not new: for instance, in research on party manifestos, similar problems emerge when comparing long electoral manifestos with short ones. Second, the dichotomisation of ordinal variables (such as the role of the assembly) imposes a simplification, linked among others to the decision of what should be considered a threshold point (for instance, which characteristics of an assembly should be mentioned for an organisation to be considered as belonging to the assembleary type?). This is also a typical problem deriving from the necessity of reducing complexity. Third, as stated in the introduction, this is a new exercise; we therefore had to develop our indicators and typology through a (time-consuming but intellectually challenging) process of trial and error.

As we can see in figure 1, half of the organisations in our sample support an associational conception of internal decision-making. This means that – at least formally – a model based upon delegation and majority principle is quite widespread. Here, the typical form of internal accountability is the representative one: delegates elected by the assembleary body have an important role in organisational decisions, and the decision-making system stresses majority principles: preferences are aggregated either by pure majority or by bargaining, and the balance of aggregated preferences determines the group line. To a certain extent, this is an expected result: the presence of well established, large, and resourceful organisations such as parties, unions, and third sector associations in the global justice movement has often been noted. In this sense, our results push for a (not yet developed) reflection on the conditions for and

consequences of the presence of large numbers of associations in common campaigns and networks.

However, this is only part of the picture. We classified 13.1% of the organisations as assembleary, since in the documents we analysed they stressed the role of the assembly in a decision-making process that remains tied to aggregative methods of decision-making such as voting or bargaining. The participatory elements are emphasised via the important role attributed to the assembly and its inclusiveness, but consensus is not mentioned as a principle, nor used as a decision-making method. The attempts to build direct models of democracy are therefore well alive.

In an additional one fourth (23%) of the organisations, the deliberative element comes to the fore. In particular, these organisations stress the importance of deliberation and/or consensus over majoritarian decision-making. In these groups, consensus and/or deliberative democracy are explicitly mentioned as organisational values, and/or consensus is used in the decision-making process in the assembly or in the executive committee. We can distinguish between the 13% of organisations that apply consensus within an associational type (deliberative representation) and the 9% applying it within an assembleary model (deliberative participation). This stress on elements of discursive quality is a most innovative contribution to conceptions of democracy in social movements.

If the role played by the assembly increases going from the associational to the deliberative participative type (Cramer's V is a strong and significant .325***), the typology of internal decision-making contains a high variation in the degree of importance that the organisations, also of the associational type, attribute to the assembly. Within the associational type, about one fifth (21.4%) of the organisations do not mention the assembly in their documents; in more than half (57%), the assembly is composed of delegates, while in 21% it is composed of all members and plays an important role in decision-making—although counterbalanced by the prominent role of an executive committee. The importance of the assembly increases in the different types of internal democracy, being very relevant for 21% of the groups allocated to the associational model, 30% of those supporting deliberative representation, 53% of those belonging to the assembleary type, and 82.6% of those following a deliberative participative model.

4.3.3. Attitudes towards representative institutions

Notwithstanding their critique of representative democracy, social movement organisations interact with representative institutions: They struggle against—but often also collaborate with—those institutions. Social movements are traditionally seen as challengers of institutional actors. In their attempts to influence institutional decisions, they use a variety of strategies and reveal different attitudes towards institutional politics. Protest is only a small part of overall social movement activity: it is undoubtedly considered important, but also often not effective unless accompanied by more direct interactions with government and public administrations.

In the late twentieth century, social movements were indeed instrumental to the introduction of institutional changes towards greater grassroots control. In many European countries, administrative decentralisation has taken place since the 1970s, with the creation of new channels of access to decision makers at the local level. Social movements also contribute to

the creation of new arenas for the development of public policy. Expert commissions are frequently formed on issues raised by protest, and social movement representatives may be allowed to take part, possibly as observers. Other channels of access are opened by the creation of consultative institutions on issues related to social movement demands. In many countries state ministries, local government bureaux, and other relevant administrative bodies now exist on women's or ecological issues. Similar developments can be observed for IGOs. The public administrators working in these institutions mediate particular social movement demands through both formal and informal channels, frequently allying themselves with movement representatives in order to increase the amount of public resources available in the policy areas over which they have authority. Some regulatory bureaucracies established under the pressure of movement mobilisations see movement activists as potential allies (Amenta 1998): movement activists have been co-opted inside specific public bodies as staff members, or these bodies' administrative staffs have supported movements. New opportunities for 'conflictual cooperation' develop within regulatory agencies set up to implement goals that are also supported by movement activists (Giugni and Passy 1998, 85). Collaboration can take various forms, from consultation to incorporation in committees to delegation of power (ibid., 86). Besides a certain degree of institutional recognition, NGOs specialising in the supply of various services have received funding for development programs they have submitted, or for joining in projects already elaborated by national or international governments (even in the most extreme cases of exclusionary IGOs: see O'Brien, Goetz Scholte, and Williams 2000, 120). From human rights groups to environmentalists, 'advocacy networks'—composed of activists, bureaucrats belonging to international organisations, and politicians from many countries—have won significant gains in a number of areas such as a ban on anti-personnel mines, decontamination of radioactive waste, and the establishment of an international tribunal for violations of human rights (Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002; Klotz 1995; Risse and Sikkink 1999; Thomas 2001).

Most important, so-called deliberative arenas based on the principle of participation of 'normal citizens' in public arenas for debates, empowered by information and rules for high quality communication, have developed in the last two decades, especially at the local level. Deliberative arenas have been promoted in the forms of Citizens' Juries in Great Britain and Spain; Planungszellen in Germany; Consensus Conferences in Denmark; Conferences de citoyens in France, as well as Agenda 21 and various experiments in strategic urban planning. Experiments as diverse as participatory budgeting, the Chicago inner-city neighbourhood governance councils for policing and public schools, joint labour-management efforts to manage industrial labour markets, stakeholder participation in ecosystem governance arrangements under the US Endangered Species Act, and village governance in West Bengal, India are presented as part of an 'Empowered Deliberative Democracy' model centred around participation, quality of discourse, and citizens' empowerment (Fung and Wright 2001). The focus of these experiments is the solution of specific problems through the involvement of ordinary, affected people. It implies the creation of new institutions and the devolution of decision-making power, co-ordinated, however, with representative institutions. The institutional mission of these institutions includes effective problem solving; equitable solutions; and broad, deep, and sustained participation. Actors associated with social movements intervened in the development of some of these processes, sometimes as promoters, sometimes as critical participants or external opponents. In particular, the participatory budget has been credited with creating a positive context for associational life, fostering increased activism, better interconnectedness, and a citywide orientation of associations (Baiocchi 2002).

Numerous arenas of interaction between movements and institutions can therefore be present at the local, national, or international level. Although the local level is traditionally considered more open to innovation and closest to the citizens (and citizens' control), recent research on IGOs has also stressed the presence of some niches for direct contact with activists within international public bureaucracies (della Porta and Tarrow 2004). In multilevel governance, SMOs often differentiate their attitudes towards different territorial levels and also towards non-institutional but still powerful actors such as economic corporations. In the quantitative part of our research, we coded references to different attitudes towards institutions ranging from open refusal to co-operation, distinguishing attitudes towards local, national, and international governmental organisations as well as economic actors. For this battery of variables, we saw a high rate of organisations whose documents did not mention relationships with institutions (slightly over 50%, concentrated in particular in some countries). Those who did were quite open to interaction with institutions—they are not simply emphasising a negative message, but also often accept collaboration on specific problems. However, they tend to be critical of institutions, perceiving their own role as the active engagement in citizens' control of institutional politics, implementing channels of discursive accountability. In relationship with representative institutions, statements of open refusal of collaboration are rare (11.5%), while an attitude of either collaboration or democratic control is more frequent (about one third each). Collaboration with IGOs and economic actors seems less frequent than with national institutions, but still relevant. Relations of collaboration are more often mentioned at the national than at the supranational level (where relations of control prevail) or with economic actors (where refusal is more often mentioned). Differences among institutions are limited, however, indicating that attitudes tend to spread from one institution to the others.

Recoding these variables, we built a typology that combines statements of collaboration with and control of institutions, leaving aside the small number of organisations that mentioned refusal of relations with institutions. Uncritical collaborators are those that expressed interest in collaboration with institutions, but did not mention a function of control; uncollaborative controllers are the opposite. Critical controllers are those that mention both. In fact, very often (about half of the cases where either one is mentioned) collaboration and democratic control overlap, being present within the same organisation. Finally, we built variables that signal any collaboration with, refusal of, and control of national institutions, transnational institutions, and economic actors. Here we can distinguish among SMOs with at least one mention of refusal (22%), at least one of collaboration (37%), and at least one of democratic control (43%).

Crossing attitudes towards institutions with the internal and general democratic values mentioned in organisational documents (table 2), references to inclusiveness correlate with both refusal and democratic control while references to participation correlate positively only with refusal of relationships with institutions. A stronger correlation emerges with organisations stressing their critique of delegation, increasing references to refusal and reducing references to collaboration. The mention of individual and collective autonomy and of autonomy of local chapters or member organisations also seems to increase the tendency to refuse collaboration. It seems, therefore, that explicit references to democratic values that are different from (if not opposed to) those implemented in representative institutions reduce the tendency to collaborate and, especially, lead to stressing the role of civil society as a controller of institutions. Deliberative values are associated with a communicative attitude with existing institutions, but 'deliberative' organisations seem to stress especially their role as controllers.

Table 2. Relationships with institutions and organisational values

Organisational values	Relation with institutions and economic actors		
	Any collaboration	Any refusal	Any democratic control
Participatory demo.	n.s	.131*	n.s
Inclusiveness	n.s	.260***	.123*
Crit. Del. and non hier.	.225*** (-)	.266***	n.s
Autonomous org. or loc.	n.s	.179**	.133*
Deliberative values (dic.)	.129*	n.s	.291***
Ind. or coll. Autonomy	n.s	.243***	n.s

Finally, if we cross models of internal decision-making with relationships with institutions (table 3), we can note that organisations belonging to the associational and the deliberative representative models tend to mention more often collaboration and democratic control, while refusal is more often mentioned by groups located in either the deliberative representation, the deliberative participation, or the assembleary model.

Table 3. Relationships with institutions and democratic types

Type of internal democracy	Relation with institutions and economic actors		
	Any collaboration	Any refusal	Any democratic control
Associational	46.0	15.1	48.4
Deliberative representation	48.5	30.3	54.5
Assembleary	21.9	25.0	21.9
Deliberative participation	8.7	26.1	26.1
Cramer's V	.280***	n.s	.235**

4.4. Organisational characteristics and visions of democracy

Democratic values are expected to correlate with organisational characteristics such as organisational structure, identity, and repertoire of action, as well as with environmental characteristics. In this part, we shall present some characteristics of the organisations that express different visions of democracy.

4.4.1. The organisational structure

Organisational structure has been linked to conceptions and practices of democracy—either organisational structures have been seen as constraining the conceptions of democracy, and the latter as the rationalisation of previous choices, or the opposite: values have been seen as orienting the choices of organisational models. Mansbridge (2003) has suggested that a decision-making model based on consensus is advantageous for organisations lacking other legitimate tools for convincing members to act collectively. More informal organisations (such as Earth First) seem more able to promote good communication than those that are hierarchically organised (such as Friends of the Earth [FOE]) (Whitworth 2003). As for the global justice movement, the emphasis on consensus seems greater in decentralised networks such as the Italian ecopacifist group Rete Lilliput (Veltri 2003) and less in more centralised ones such as Attac-Italia (Finelli 2003). In addition, transnational networks (counter-summits or social forums) seem more sensitive to deliberative values and more able to integrate different organisations through the construction of master-frames (della Porta, Andretta, Mosca, and Reiter 2006; Andretta 2005a). Mobilisation in specific campaigns at the national or local level (against the war, for immigrant rights, or on labour issues) often includes moments of negotiation between representatives of social movement organisations (Andretta 2005b).

The organisations belonging to our sample are quite heterogeneous:

- First, our organisations cover a wide range in terms of *size* of individual and collective membership: about 50% declare (individual) membership of up to one thousand individuals; those organisations that allow for collective membership often involve quite a large number of groups (more than 25 in half of the cases).
- As for the *territorial* level involved, local presence is considered important by three quarters of our organisations; however, the international level is also important: about one third of our groups declare that they are organised at that level. Among the organisations with a supranational level, we can find hierarchical 'single' organisations (such as Greenpeace, 6.6%), traditional federations (such as ETUC, 11.5%), modern/loose networks (such as ATTAC-International, 11.5%) and campaigns (such as Euromayday, 8.2%).
- Social movement organisations also present different levels of *formalisation, centralisation, formalised accountability,* and *autonomy from external actors*. For instance, more than half of our organisations (57%) have an organisational structure formalised by a constitution.

Statistical analyses have indicated that size of group is in fact correlated with conceptions of democracy. Smaller groups (below one thousand members) more frequently mention participation and criticise delegation; anti-hierarchical values are also more often mentioned by small and informal groups, active at the local level. Larger organisations, active at the multi-territorial level, tend instead to stress the autonomy of member organisations and local chapters

(cross-tabulation tables not shown, but available on request). Those organisations supporting an associational model (more delegation, less deliberation) are larger in size, whereas the assembleary ones and those mentioning deliberative values are smaller and more informal. The organisations that present a deliberative participatory vision have low levels of formalisation, but high degrees of inclusiveness and decentralisation.

These different organizations, however, do have something in common. Very significant for the GJM is the high presence of *network* organisations: in our sample, this is reflected in about half of our cases being networks/federations or ad hoc umbrella organisations. An additional indicator of the high reticularity of the GJM organisations is that almost half of the groups in our sample allow for collective membership. Especially relevant, in their documents as many as about 80% of our organisations mention as an important aim of their group collaboration/networking with national SMOs, and about the same percent with transnational SMOs. Of the organisations mentioning collaboration/networking, about one third (slightly more at the transnational level) point at the relevance of collaboration with groups working on different issues than they do but sharing similar values. About half of our groups stress collaboration with alternative economic actors. Moreover, our organisations emerge as inclusive in terms of membership: only 15% mention requirements for becoming an individual member and 20% for becoming a collective one.

4.4.2. Movement discourses and identities

That the ideology of a movement affects its view of democracy can be seen as a truism. Nevertheless, the relationship between internal decision-making and general values has long been neglected in empirical research and theorising. The resource mobilisation approach emphasises the role of institutionalisation for the achievement of movements' goals, but puts little emphasis on how cultural processes influence internal organisational structure (Minkoff 2001). Not only does it tend to present social movement organisations as homogeneous entities, neglecting the variation of forms, but also "the spirit of Michels infuses resource mobilization arguments through a sort of syllogism: organizations are resources; effective organizations are hierarchies, therefore, hierarchical organizations are valuable resources for movements" (Clemens and Minkoff 2004, 156; see also Gamson 1990). Indeed, only recently have organisational forms been analysed in relation to the cultural meaning that activists give to them. If Clemens (1993) claims that organisational forms are part of a broader social movement repertoire, Breines (1989) shows that the organisational models have a 'prefigurative' function, embedding the kind of social relations that activists would like to see in the outside world.

If organisational values are not just means but also ends in themselves (Polletta 2002), it is interesting to investigate which types of values/ideologies favour which types of organisational models. In fact, various studies have stressed the resonance with organisational values of individual values (della Porta 2004b on tolerant identities; Gundelach 1989 on anti-hierarchical values; Katsiaficas 1997 on autonomous values); or general cultural values (e.g. Eber 1999 on values of social responsibility). Multi-issue organisations and supranational networks are expected to invest more in the participation of their members and in the development of channels of communication (Faber and McCarthy 2001). Environmentalists dealing with social justice have been proven to elaborate a particular view of democracy, stressing fair democratic procedures, inclusion, and equal treatment (Salazar and Alper 2002). Research on the decision-

making process of international protest events (such as counter-summits), involving many and different groups, stressed the role of consensual decision-making in the creation of shared master frames (della Porta, Andretta, Mosca and Reiter 2006; Andretta 2005a; Mosca 2005). In contrast, single-issue movements seem to be less participatory-oriented (Staggenborg 1988; Kriesi 1996).

In our research, we collected information on the general themes subscribed to by organisations. Our data (see table 4) on the basic themes and values mentioned in organisational documents confirms the 'bridging' function of such frames as 'alternative globalisation' and 'democracy' (about half of the groups mention them) as well as 'social justice' (almost two thirds of our groups), 'global justice', and 'workers' rights' (about half for each). Ecological values also emerge as quite relevant (about half of the groups cite ecology, and the same percent mention sustainability, with much lower attention to animal rights). The World's South is referred to in about half of the groups calling for solidarity with third world countries, but also the same percentage stressing human rights and in the one third referring to fair trade. Mentioning of women's rights and peace are also well present (again in half of the groups sampled) as are migrant rights.

Table 4. Basic Values/Themes (% of yes)

Basic Values/Themes	Frequencies of yes (%)	Total of valid cases
Social justice/defense of the welfare state/fighting poverty/social inclusion	68.9	244
Democracy	52.0	244
Another globalization/a different form of globalization	50.0	244
Peace	49.6	244
Ecology	47.1	244
Human rights	47.1	244
Solidarity with Third World countries	46.3	244
Immigrants' rights/anti-racism/rights of asylum seekers	45.9	244
Global (distributive) justice	45.1	244
Women's rights	42.6	244
Workers' rights	40.2	244
Anti-neoliberalism	39.3	244
Sustainability	32.8	244
Critical consumerism/fair trade	29.1	244
Non-violence	27.5	244
Anti-capitalism	23.0	244
Ethical finance	16.8	244
Gay/lesbian rights	15.2	244
Alternative knowledge	12.7	244

Autonomy and/or antagonism (disobedients)	9.0	244
Socialism	7.8	244
Religious principles	7.0	244
Anarchism (traditional or libertarian)	3.7	244
Animal rights	3.7	244
Communism	3.3	244

On the basis of bivariate correlations between all themes, we recoded these variables, aggregating under 'new globalism' references to another globalisation, democracy, and social justice. Almost all groups cite these fundamental issues. 'Eco-minority' includes groups mentioning issues that reverberate with new social movement discourse, such as ecology, animal rights, women' rights and antiracism. These are present in about two thirds of our organisations. Roughly the same number focuses on issues of peace and non-violence. 'Critical sustainability', at about 60%, contains references to sustainability, solidarity with the third world, critical consumerism, and ethical finance. 'Anti-capitalism' includes also the mention of anarchism and autonomy, and the 'traditional left' groups references to socialism and communism. As we can see, the anti-capitalist wing is present, although minoritarian, with about one fourth of the sampled groups.

Crossing basic themes and values with internal and general democratic values (table not shown but available on request; see also della Porta and Reiter 2006), eco-minority groups emerge as stressing more the democratic values we have analysed; the same is true for new-globalism (with the exception of critique of delegation and autonomy of member organisations and local chapters) and anti-capitalism (with the significant exception of deliberative values). Groups that mention peace and non-violence tend to stress especially participation. With the exception of groups mentioning the themes of the traditional Left and of critical sustainability, reference to the other basic values/themes tends to increase the likelihood of an interest in the various aspects of participatory and deliberative democracy we are investigating. Crossing the aggregated basic themes and values with the types of internal democracy (see table 5), we notice that deliberative representative organisations mention the widest range of values/themes, in particular new globalism, eco-minority, and peace and non-violence. The anti-capitalist values/themes are especially shared by the assembleary and by both deliberative types of organisations. New globalism themes are shared by almost 90% of the groups, whatever the type of internal democracy.

Table 5. Basic values/themes and types of internal democracy (Cramer's V, or Eta for comparing means when explicitly mentioned)

Type of internal democracy	Themes					
	Peace and non-violence	**Critical Sustainibility**	**New Globalism**	**Eco-minority**	**Anti-capitalism**	**Traditional left**
Associational	74.6	66.7	88.1	69.0	18.3	9.5
Deliberative representative	78.8	69.7	97.0	90.9	36.4	18.2
Assembleary	56.3	37.5	87.5	62.5	34.4	6.3
Deliberative participative	60.9	39.1	87.0	82.6	39.1	0.0
Cramer's V	n.s	.261***	n.s.	.207**	.206**	n.s

4.4.3. Repertoires of action

Movement repertoires of action are also expected to have an impact on conceptions of democracy. Emphasis upon protest mobilisation should push toward a 'logic of membership' that favours participatory models (Schmitter and Streek 1981). More 'radical' unions are more prone to advocate broader participation by members (Heckscher 2001). Class ideology and collective experiences (such as mobilisation in strikes and demonstrations) significantly increase workers interest in workplace democracy (Collom 2000; 2003). Of the eight women's movement organisations examined by Jennifer Disney and Joyce Gelb in the US (2000), those who privileged the mobilisation of women and cultural changes were more inclusive. Groups using more disruptive forms of direct action, such as Earth First!, tend to be more able than moderate ones to implement internal communicative rationality (Whitworth 2003). Research on local movement organisations shows that the more a group emphasises the need for effective decisions and lobbying, the less likely its decision-making will be inclusive (Andretta 2005b). Participation in common protest campaigns tends to increase reciprocal trust and tolerance of diversity (della Porta and Mosca 2005). Social movements that embrace non-violent ideologies and practices—stressing value change—are more likely to emphasise consensual internal decision-making (Kats and Kendrick 1990; Mushaben 1989). Consensus methods of decision-making are seen as a non-violent organisational strategy that does not repress internal minorities (Veltri 2003). Violent forms of action, on the other hand, require discipline and foster hierarchical values, as the case of left-wing terrorist organisations shows (della Porta 1995). More generally, if there is a search for innovative and creative forms of action, deliberation may be useful insofar as it gives everyone the possibility to freely express his/her ideas. In an interesting experiment, Walter Podilchak (1998) shows that when a group searches for an intrinsically rewarding form of protest (such as happenings etc.), it tends to favour inclusionary organising, consensus decision-making, interpersonal collective bonds, and personal attachment.

Our data include statements about the perceived functions of the organisations. While protest is mentioned by a large majority of our groups (69.3%), it is interesting to notice that a

similarly large share mentions influencing the media, spreading alternative information, and raising awareness (68%) as a main function of their group, and that almost half of the organisations (42.6%) mention the political education of the citizens. Although smaller, the significant percentages of groups mentioning political representation, advocacy, provision of services, and self-help (oscillating between 11 and 22%) signal that most organisations engage in different types of activities. More than one third of our organisations even mention lobbying (35.7%), and almost one fifth (18.4%) the defence of specific interests. This plurality of functions confirms the internal differentiation of the GJM, as well as a pragmatic attitude towards the use of multiple tactics.

Crossing organisational functions with internal and general democratic values (table 6), the mention of participatory democracy is positively related with protest (Cramer's V .196) and political representation (.178). Organisations that mention inclusiveness as a democratic value are less likely to lobby (-.130) and more likely instead to present themselves as agents of political representation (.163) and education of citizens (.168). Similarly, the groups who criticise delegation are less likely to be involved in lobbying (-.229) or to offer services (-.150), and those who stress autonomy are more likely to engage in protest (.251). The mention of deliberative values is more frequent among groups that stress their role in political representation (.170), advocacy (.158), and spreading of information (.202).

Table 6. Organisational functions and types of internal democracy

Objective/functions	Type of internal democracy (% of column)				
	Associational	**Deliberative Represent.**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**	**Cramer's V**
Protest/mobilisation	69.0	81.8	59.4	87.0	.182*
Lobbying	46.0	36.4	15.6	21.7	.246**
Political representation	14.3	21.2	6.3	0.0	.181*
Rep. of specific interests	26.2	18.2	9.4	0.0	.229**
Self-awareness/self-help	14.3	12.1	9.4	13.0	n.s
Advocacy	35.7	24.2	18.8	4.3	.234**
Offer services	31.0	21.2	12.5	4.3	.224**
Spreading information	75.4	63.6	53.1	56.5	.195*
Political education	46.8	54.5	31.3	39.1	n.s
Legal protection/ repression	18.3	3.0	18.8	21.7	n.s

As far as types of internal democracy are concerned, protest is mentioned more frequently by groups adopting a model of deliberative participation, but also of deliberative representation. Lobbying, the defence of specific interests, the provision of services, and advocacy are quoted more often by organisations adopting an associational model. Spreading of information and political education of the citizen is more often declared an important function by groups belonging both to the deliberative representative and the associational models, with groups belonging to the deliberative representative model privileging also political representation.

As for relations with institutions (data available on request), it is not surprising that organisations declaring lobbying as one of their functions favour a more collaborative attitude with institutions (and this is true for all levels, from the local to the international). Organisations stressing political representation are more frequent among collaborators and controllers, and the same is true for those stressing advocacy. Self-help is more often mentioned by those who refuse to collaborate with institutions. The spreading of information and political education of the citizens are more frequent among collaborative controllers. However, a wide range of functions is declared no matter which type of relationship is expressed towards institutions.

4.5. Environmental context and democratic values

There is no doubt that context influences the development and types of democratic values, although we have to specify that a variety of models do exist in any single country and historical period. Social movement studies have connected contextual factors especially with political opportunities. Organisational studies on organisational population have mentioned mechanisms of path dependency and institutional isomorphism (March and Olsen 1989). Our database allows us to check especially the influence of environmental characteristics by time and space, looking in particular at the date of foundation of an organisation and the country (or transnational sphere) it belongs to.

4.5.1. Path dependency: the impact of organisational origins

Research on different types of political organisations has stressed their tendency to remain imprinted by the specific conditions in which they were created, as well as by the choices made at their inception. Clientelistic structures tend to survive in political parties that had to distribute individual incentives when they emerged (Shefter 1977), and left-wing parties tend to reproduce the democratic centralism they had chosen at their origins (Panebianco 1982). Similarly, social movement organisations – notwithstanding much lower rates of survival – tend to maintain, when they do survive, some of the characteristics they developed at their origins. Notwithstanding processes of institutionalisation, the Italian women's groups in the 1980s and the 1990s maintained their reliance upon affinity groups and small size structures that had characterised the consciousness raising groups so important in the high mobilisation phase of the 1970s (della Porta 1996). Similarly, the autonomous squatted youth centres, although becoming somewhat more efficient in selling cultural products and more open to collaborative interactions with local institutions, maintained a concern for autonomy, often expressed in the refusal to occupy spaces officially allocated to them and their preference for illegally squatted spaces.

A characteristic of the GJM is its capacity to remobilise organisations that had emerged in previous cycles of protest, including quite old unions and political parties. In our sample, about one third of the organisations were founded before 1990 (about 13% before 1968), one third between 1990 and 1999, and one third after the year 2000. Significantly, the mention of most democratic values tends to grow with year of foundation (table 7). It is particularly frequent in organisations founded after 2000, which refer more often to participation, inclusiveness, and deliberation. In contrast, references to individual and cultural autonomy are more present in older organisations (1969-1989). As far as types of internal democracy are concerned (table 8), the presence of deliberative participation, deliberative representation, and assemblearism also grows with time, with peaks of deliberative representation in the organisations founded between 1990 and 1999 and of deliberative participation and assemblearism in those founded after 1999. The associational model is particularly present in organisations founded before 1999. In terms of relations with institutions, collaboration is more frequently mentioned by older organisations.

Table 7. Age and internal and general democratic values

Year of Foundation	**Internal and general democratic values**					
	Part. Democ.	**Inclusiveness**	**Crit. Del. and non hier.**	**Autonomous org. or loc.**	**Deliberative values (dic.)**	**Ind. or Coll. Autonomy**
Before 1968	18.2	18.2	12.1	48.4	24.2	27.3
1969-1989	26.0	24.0	22.0	38.8	26.0	34.0
1990-1999	27.1	15.3	24.7	38.4	22.4	31.8
2000+	36.8	29.4	30.9	40.0	38.2	32.4
Cramer's v	n.s	n.s	n.s	n.s	n.s	n.s

Table 8. Age and types of internal democracy

Type of internal democracy	**Year of foundation**				
	Before 1968	**1969-1989**	**1990-1999**	**2000+**	**Total**
Associational	**23.6**	**27.6**	**35.8**	13.0	123 (100.0)
Deliberative representative	12.5	21.9	**34.4**	**31.3**	32 (100.0)
Assembleary	0.0	12.9	**38.7**	**48.4**	31 (100.0)
Deliberative participative	0.0	13.0	**30.4**	**56.5**	23 (100.0)
Cramer's V	.252***				

4.5.2. Political opportunities and democratic visions

If the data concerning the year of foundation of an organisation confirm what neoinstitutionalists have called path dependency, cross-national analyses allow us to check hypotheses of institutional isomorphism, that is, the tendency to adapt to environmental features. Among the institutional variables considered as relevant for social movement organisations are the territorial division of competences and the functional division of power (Kriesi 1995; Kriesi et al. 1995; Rucht 1994; 1996). Territorial centralisation and functional concentration of power reduce institutional channels for challengers, and vice versa. For instance, decentralised states tend to produce decentralised movement organisations. However, as Dieter Rucht (1996, 192) argues, "In the long run, this [decentralisation] encourages the formalisation of centralised and professional interest groups within the movement (and movement parties)", while "strong executive power structures in a given political system tend to induce a fundamental critique of bureaucratic and hierarchical political forms, which is then reflected in the movements' emphasis on informal and decentralised structures". Comparing France, West Germany, and the United States, Rucht (1996, 198) found that the grassroots level of the movements is much stronger in the two federal states than in the more centralised France. In the US and Germany, he also found a very strong interest group type of social movement structure. This means that in federal states we have both professional and grassroots organisational structures, with overall more space for participation. Similarly, more inclusive states, opening channels of participation, have favoured the development of large, well structured and formalised associations. At the same time, however, smaller groups have contested the institutionalisation and moderation of those associations, experimenting with alternative organisational models. If repression does not stimulate collaboration, refusal to relate with institutions can also derive from a fear of co-optation.

Our sample includes organisations based in one of the six European countries covered by the Demos project or at the transnational level (about 35 per team). A cross-national analysis confirms that different internal and general democratic values are indeed present in all analysed countries and at the transnational level (table 9). References to participation are more widespread among the more mobilised Italian and Spanish organisations, but also among the Swiss. Mentions of inclusiveness are more frequent in consensual Switzerland but also in majoritarian Great Britain. References to deliberative values are more numerous in Switzerland, where they resonate with a tradition of direct democracy, but also at the transnational level where such a tradition is lacking. The same is true for references to autonomy and cultural rights. Critique of delegation is more frequent in centralised France and Great Britain, but also in decentralised Spain.

Table 9. Organisations'country and internal and general democratic values

Countries	Internal and General Democratic values					
	Participatory Democracy	Inclusiveness	Crit. Of Del. and non hier.	Autonomous org. or loc.	Deliberative values (dic.)	Ind. or Coll. Autonomy
UK	15.8	34.2	31.6	34.5	34.2	23.7
France	9.4	6.3	28.1	33.3	15.6	28.1
Germany	32.3	19.4	25.8	12.5	29.0	38.7
Italy	51.2	9.8	17.1	45.9	22.0	22.0
Spain	35.1	21.6	24.3	35.5	0.0	16.2
Switzerland	40.0	42.9	17.1	57.1	57.1	51.4
Transnational	3.3	10.0	20.0	50.0	46.7	53.3
Cramer's V	.363***	.312***	n.s	.262**	.395***	.289***

Similarly, we can note a larger presence of organisations belonging to the associational model in all countries except Germany and (especially) Spain (see table 10). The model of deliberative representation as well as deliberative participation is more present in (semi)federal Spain and Germany, but also in the centralised UK. The assembleary type is more widespread in Germany, Spain, and France.

Table 10. Organisations' country and types of internal democracy

Countries	Type of internal democracy				Total Row cases	Cramer's V
	Associational	Deliberative Represent.	Assembleary	Deliberative Participat.		
UK	60.0	17.1	5.7	17.1	35 (100.0)	.239***
France	58.1	16.1	19.4	6.5	31 (100.0)	
Germany	45.8	12.5	20.8	20.8	24 (100.0)	
Italy	70.0	7.5	15.0	7.5	40 (100.0)	
Spain	27.3	24.2	30.3	18.2	33 (100.0)	
Switzerland	85.7	10.7	3.6	0.0	28 (100.0)	
Transnational	65.2	21.7	8.7	4.3	23 (100.0)	

Organisations mentioning refusal of relationships with institutions are more present in the Swiss case (where, however, the other attitudes are also mentioned more often than in the other countries), and in the French and British samples. Collaborative groups prevail at the transnational level and in Switzerland, where control of institutions is also very often mentioned. Democratic control is less frequently mentioned in Spain and Italy.

In interpreting these data, we should keep in mind the impact of our selection process: each national team had to include the most important organisations of the GJM in each country, providing as much variation in terms of organisational structures (formal/informal, large/small, and so on) and ideological orientations (environmentalist, leftist, anti-capitalist, and so on) as possible. This is why we find it difficult to determine the impact of political opportunities on organisational values, and especially on conceptions of democracy. Moreover, a potentially relevant intervening variable is the national configuration of the GJM in each country (see della Porta 2007b).

4.6. Some (provisional) conclusions

The analysis of the quantitative part of the Demos research on visions of democracy allowed us to highlight some interesting results. First, we noticed the dominance of participatory discourse, but also the frequency (in about one third of our organisations) of deliberative values. Our data also confirmed the importance that movement organisations assign to the meta-discourse of democracy: notwithstanding the different amount of materials collected on the different types of organisations, the high relevance of the discourse on democracy is confirmed by frequent and multiple references to a wide range of democratic values. Similar emphasis upon values of participation and deliberation is, however, compatible with different balances between different models. We noticed, in fact, a large presence of organisations of an associational type, followed by those of an assembleary type, but also a relevant number of groups mentioning consensus building as a central aspect of their decision-making. Groups that stress deliberative values also tend to pay more attention (at least in written form) to democratic values in general. In terms of attitudes towards political institutions, our organisations in most cases do not perceive themselves as just outsiders. While there were few cases of refusal to interact with institutions, an attitude of uncritical collaboration was also low, the most widespread attitude being one of critical collaboration. We could also note that internal conceptions of democracy do influence the propensity and forms of collaboration with institutions.

Focusing on the internal structure, as emerging from the written documents of the selected SMOs, our data confirm the multilevel nature of the GJM. If transnational movement organisations are growing in number, our population is made up in large part of groups active at the local, regional, and national levels. Also worth stressing is the large presence of networks and their transnational and trans-issue nature. Although social movements are traditionally considered ‘networks of networks’ (della Porta and Diani 2006, chap. 1), the large number of organisations made up of other organisations is confirmed by the strong presence of collective membership, as well as the frequent use of terms like campaign, network, or round table in the names of the groups. Also very high is the expressed tendency to advocate networking with groups from other countries as well as with groups active on different issues. Notwithstanding strong heterogeneity in the size of our organisations (ranging from a dozen to millions of members), they share high degrees of structural inclusiveness. While assembleary models are

more present at the local level, mentions of deliberative values and structures are also very widespread at the transnational level. In terms of attitudes towards institutions, our data also confirm that more formal structure and larger size increase attitudes of collaboration with public institutions at different levels.

Looking at the themes mentioned by our organisations, we found a strong emphasis upon a multiplicity of issues. If social movements have been considered (especially in some periods) as instances of 'single issue' politics, our groups do not fit this image, mentioning instead a large range of claims and interests. Significantly, social justice, democracy, peace, and human rights emerged as bridging frames, being core concerns shared by most groups. Ecology, worker's rights, and gender rights are also often referred to by our groups, while anti-capitalism is mentioned by about one fourth of our sample. Critical collaboration resonates within all of the mentioned themes, with the exception of anti-capitalism.

The organisations of our sample are not only multi-issue, but also multi-form: in fact, they often present themselves as acting through a combination of different strategies. Most of them mention protest but also the development of (a different) knowledge as at the basis of their modus operandi (about 70% on both). However, more conventional strategies are also present: for instance, about one third of the groups declare that lobbying is part of their repertoire of collective action. Rarer was the mention of political representation and the defence of specific interests. Significantly, and in line with previous results, organisations supporting deliberative and participative models of democracy tended to rely more upon protest, while among those groups supporting an associational model the use of lobbying, representation of specific interests, and provision of services is more often mentioned. We also noticed a certain congruence between the type of action repertoire and the general attitudes towards institutions (e.g., those groups that mention lobbying among their functions are more open to acritical collaboration; those who emphasise the education of the public are more oriented towards critical control).

Our data confirmed the role of contextual conditions. In a historical perspective, we observed that the GJM is formed by groups of quite different age and 'generations'. Many groups already existed before the emergence of the GJM, having been founded during previous waves of protest and on different concerns: some are labour movement organisations or charities born long ago, others were founded in the wave of the '68 movement/s; still others emerged with the 'new' social movements of the last two decades. As with previous waves of mobilisation, however, the ones initiated at the turn of the millennium also produced new organisations; the 'younger' organisations were more likely to mention democratic values. Our data also confirm a mechanism of path dependency: assembleary models are more likely among post-'68 groups, deliberative models among those developed after 1989.

With some caution -- as we repeatedly mentioned, our cases cannot be considered as representative of the different countries -- looking at our data in a cross-national perspective, we can observe that political conditions are filtered through different group ideologies. In fact, all models are present in all countries and, if some expectations about country specificities are confirmed, the effects of the specific movement cultures (decentralisation in Spain, formalisation in Germany etc.) are however filtered by the specific constellations of the global justice movement in the various countries.

CHAPTER 5. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES AND PRACTICES OF DEMOCRACY[1]

5.1. Introduction

Like the previous one, also this chapter concerns conception and practices of democracy in the Global Justice Movement (GJM). Whereas in chapter 4, however, we focused on the organizational ideologies contained in fundamental documents, here we are concerned with organizational practices, as they emerge from interviews with representatives of social movement organizations (SMOs)

Attention to social movement organizations has been at the core of the resource mobilization approach, whose proponents stress that "The entrepreneurial mode of analysis includes both the rational-economic assumptions and formal organizational thrusts of our approach" (Zald and McCarthy 1987a, 45). Social movement organizations must mobilize resources from the surrounding environment, whether directly in the form of money or through voluntary work by its adherents; they must neutralize opponents and increase support from both the general public and the elite (for examples, McCarthy and Zald 1987b [1977], 19). Stressing its instrumental role, a social movement organization can be defined as a "complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or countermovement and attempts to implement those goals" (ibid., 20). However, SMOs are also sources of identity for the movements' constituencies as well as their opponents and the public (della Porta and Diani 2006). In this sense, SMOs can be defined as "associations of persons making idealistic and moralistic claims about how human personal or group life ought be organized that, *at the time of their claims making* [italics in the original], are marginal to or excluded from mainstream society" (Lofland 1996, 2-3).

In the Demos research project, we looked at organizations as both mobilization agents and spaces of deliberation and value construction. In social movement literature, the first approach has been dominant. As Clemens and Minkoff (2004, 156) have recently noted, with the development of the resource mobilization perspective, "Attention to organization appeared antithetical to analysis of culture and interaction. As organizations were understood instrumentally, the cultural content of organizing and the meanings signaled by organizational forms were marginalized as topic for inquiry". In recent approaches, however, SMOs are considered more and more as "contexts for political conversation", characterized by specific etiquettes (Eliasoph 1998, 21).

This evolution reflects changes in the sociology of organization from the closed to the open system approach, and then to neoinstitutionalism. These approaches can be distinguished first of all according to the relative role assigned to environmental influence and the role of organizational agency (see figure 1). When organizational sociology started to develop, the so-called closed system approach presented internal organizational

[1] This chapter is based upon the introductory chapter, authored by Donatella della Porta and Lorenzo Mosca, of the Demos WP4 Report (della Porta and Mosca 2006a). The report includes country chapters authored by Hélène Combes and Isabelle Sommier (France), Simon Teune (Germany), Lorenzo Mosca (Italy), Manuel Jiménez and Angel Calle (Spain), Clare Saunders (United Kingdom), and a chapter on the transnational level authored by Raffaele Marchetti and Duccio Zola.

factors as "the prime causal agents in accounting for the structure and behavior of organizations" (Scott 1983b, 156). In the 1960s, an open system approach stressed instead the technical interdependence of organizations and their environment, while later on the metaphor of a "garbage can" was used to describe decision making in conditions of high ambiguities of preferences and low information on environmental constraints and opportunities (see March 1988). More recently, with the neoinstitutional approach in organizational theory, there has been a shift of focus from the technical to the socio-cultural environment (ibid., 161). According to two proponents of this approach: "The new institutionalism in organizational theory and sociology comprises a rejection of the rational-actor models, an interest in institutions as independent variables, a turn towards cognitive and cultural explanations, and an interest in properties of sovra-individual units of analysis that cannot be reduced to aggregations or direct consequences of individuals' attributes or motives" (DiMaggio and Powell 1991a, 8-9).

Figure 1 - Approaches to organizational sociology

		Environmental Influence	
		-	+
Organizational Agency	-	[Garbage can]	Open system
	+	Closed system	Neoinstitutionalism

In our research, we share some of these concerns. First of all, we consider organizations as socialized agents and norms producers, that "do not just constraint options: they establish the very criteria by which people discover their preferences" (ibid., 11). Oganizations are therefore not just means for mobilization, but arenas for experimentation. Second, we look at formal as well as informal practices. Within the neoinstitutional approach, "The relevance of relationships was no longer defined by the formal organization chart; forms of coordination grounded in personal networks as well as non authoritative projects of mobilization were made visible, as were influences that transgressed the official boundaries of an organization" (Clemens 2005, 356). Thus, our analysis will go beyond the formal organizational charts and look at the practices and ideas that are embodied in each organization. Third, we share with the neoinstitutional approach an attention to cognitive mechanisms: organizations do not automatically adapt to their environment; environmental pressures are filtered by organizational actors' perceptions. Neoinstitutionalists marked a shift from Parson's conception of internalization (with utilitarianism derived by Freud) to an emphasis on cognitive processes, derived from ethnomethodology and phenomenology and their attention of everyday action and practical knowledge (DiMaggio and Powell 1991a, 15ff.). In this sense, "Organization members discover their motives by acting" (ibid., 19). Important for this analysis is Bourdieu's notion of *habitus* as "a system of 'regulated improvisation' or generative rules that represents the (cognitive, affective and evaluative) internalization by actors of past experiences on the basis of shared typifications of social categories, experienced phenomenally as 'people like us'" (ibid., 26). In our research, we aim at

combining an analysis of organizational formal roles with that of informal practices, general values, and participation in protest campaigns. While considering environmental constraints as potentially important in shaping organizational behavior, we believe that organizations play an important and active role in shaping their environment. For social movements, as for other social actors, the organization is therefore not just a means, but also an aim in itself.

In this chapter our focus remains on the GJM in six European countries (France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain and Switzerland), and at the transnational level. We have defined the GJM as the loose network of individuals and organizations (with varying degrees of formality), engaged in collective action of various kinds, on the basis of the shared goal of advancing the cause of justice (economic, social, political and environmental) among and between peoples across the globe. This means that we focus on an empirical form of transnational activism, without implying that this covers all the existing manifestations of that abstract concept. We operationalized our definition by looking at collective identity, non-conventional action repertoires, and organizational networks (see della Porta 2007b).

Our aim in this chapter is to asses to what extent principles like horizontal participation and consensual decision-making are embodied in social movement organizations. Moreover, our attention is focused on different forms of interaction between movement organizations and authorities. Differently from chapter 4, where we analyzed organizational ideology on the basis of key documents, here we are concerned with the functioning of GJM organizations (GJMOs) as revealed by representatives of these organizations. We developed a *semi-structured questionnaire* administered to key informants of national and transnational GJMOs with the purpose of analyzing their main strategic choices and describing and explaining conceptions of democracy in the GJM.[2] The explanatory model of our research is synthesized in figure 2 below (numbers in parentheses refer to the variables of the questionnaire).

In the following, we shall first present our methodological choices (part 2) and describe our selected organizations according to some main dimensions (part 3). We will then look at the relationship between practices of democracy and organizational structure, organizational strategies, relations with institutions, relations with the GJM, and contextual characteristics (part 4).

[2] The codebook can be downloaded at: http://demos.eui.eu/PDFfiles/Instruments/WP4_Questionnaire.pdf.

Figure 2 - WP4 analytical scheme



5.2. A survey of SMOs: methodological choices

5.2.1. Instruments for the empirical research. The questionnaire

Our *questionnaire* addresses internal organizational characteristics (name, year of foundation, internal decision-making, types of activity, type of campaigns, type of organization, type of members, type and sources of budget) and the relationships of GJMOs with the outside (relationship with other groups/networks/campaigns of the GJM, types of interactions with the institutions at different territorial levels).

In order to assess the validity of our research instrument, we conducted a pretest at the Perugia "Reclaim our UN" meeting (September 2005), where about 30 questionnaires were collected. On the basis of the results of the pretest the questionnaire was revised, in particular by shortening it (focusing on factual information on organizational decision-making, networking and interactions with authorities) and rephrasing the questions that had not worked well in the pre-test. Taking into account the logistic of telephone

interviews (see below), we also decided to use some open questions. A proposal for the coding of these questions was circulated, tested and amended on the bases of comments and feedbacks received by the members of the project.

Because of the high costs of face-to-face interviews (most of our organizations are located in different cities in the different countries) we chose telephone interviews (unless otherwise required by the respondents). Considering the range of issues covered by the questionnaire, we decided that the person to be interviewed should be somebody knowledgeable about the history of the organization, and where necessary to interview two persons (e.g. for questions concerning the budget). Especially for trade unions, political parties or large NGOs we decided to interview the person responsible for protest campaigns, for international relations or for relations with social movements. As for more informal groups, lacking clear organizational roles, we decided to interview activists with long-lasting experience in the group.

5.2.2. Sampling method: problems and limits

For each country and at the transnational level we selected about thirty-five organizations involved in the main initiatives of the GJM (e.g. the European Social Forums).[3] In order to facilitate integrated analyses, a main methodological choice of the Demos project was to aim at having similar samples for the different parts focusing on the organizations of the GJM. This ideally implied to include for the administering of the questionnaire all groups that had been sampled for the analysis of websites (see chapter 3) and of key documents (see chapter 4). However, in this respect in particular some teams encountered difficulties. For all countries we had some refusals, especially by small autonomous groups (that refused to participate in a research project founded by the European Commission) but also by large, over-surveyed organizations. In addition, some groups had disappeared. For this reason, most teams were not able to cover the whole sample used in the previous parts of our research and had to substitute certain organizations with similar ones. However, as shown in table 1, the rate of substitution was quite limited (below one fifth of the groups) with the exception of the Spanish and the transnational samples. The number of interviews conducted was 210. They were distributed as follows: 28 in France, 26 in Germany, 37 in Italy, 35 in Spain, 28 in Switzerland, 29 in the United Kingdom and 27 at the transnational level.

Table 1. Sampling strategy per country (%)

Sampling strategy	**Country (%)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Organizations in common with previous parts of our research	89.3	92.3	97.3	51.4	100.0	86.2	48.1	80.5
New organizations	10.7	7.7	2.7	48.6	0.0	13.8	51.9	19.5
Total	13.3	12.4	17.6	16.7	13.3	13.8	12.9	100.0
(N)	(28)	(26)	(37)	(35)	(28)	(29)	(27)	(210)

[3] For the sampling strategy see chapter 3, p. 33.

5.3. The organizations of the GJM: A descriptive analysis

The main focus of our research is on the different conceptions and practices of democracy as they are elaborated "from below" and implemented both in the internal organization of social movements and in experiments of participatory and deliberative decision-making.

5.3.1. The dependent variable: a typology of democratic decision-making

Although representative models of democracy remain dominant, they are challenged by a crisis of legitimacy as well as of efficiency: a declining use of conventional forms of political participation is accompanied by the perception of poor performances of representative democratic government. Other models of democracy (re)emerge as possible correctives of the malfunctioning of representative democracy; experiments in participatory and deliberative forms of democracy are underway within political institutions as well as political and social actors. In this context, various conceptions of democracy coexist, stressing different indicators of democratic quality. A main assumption of our research is in fact that the general principles of democracy (representative versus participatory, majority versus deliberative, etc.) can be combined in different forms and with different balances. We did not aim at measuring degrees of democracy, but instead at constructing a typology of the different models of democracy that are present, in a more or less 'pure' form, in GJM organizations. In this sense, we aim at analyzing in detail the plurality of conceptions and practices of democracy expressed by GJM organizations.

These questions are relevant for social movement research that has described different organizational models as typical for social movements. On the one hand, social movements have been defined as *loosely structured collective conflict*, in which "hundreds of groups and organizations - many of them short-lived, spatially scattered, and lacking direct communication, a single organization and a common leadership - episodically take part in many different kinds of local collective action" (Oberschall 1980, 45-6). In this vein, social movements are: (1) *segmented*, with numerous different groups or cells in continual rise and decline; (2) *policephalous*, having many leaders each commanding a limited following only; and (3) *reticular*, with multiple links between autonomous cells forming an indistinctly-bounded network (Gerlach 1976). In a recent contribution, Gerlach (2001) qualified his argument by stressing the undirected, acephalous (rather than policephalous) nature of such networks.

Widespread in social movements, grassroots organizations are said to combine a strong participatory orientation with a low level of formal structuration and orientation to consensus. Social movement organizations would therefore be collectivist organizations with a horizontal structure sense of community and solidarity, task sharing and job rotation (Rothschild-Whitt 1979), as well as encouraging spontaneity (Obershall and Farris 1985). Francesca Polletta (2002, 7) also stressed the use of deliberative discussion by activists. Having only limited access to material resources, unlike political parties or pressure groups, social movement organizations may in fact substitute these with other

resources. Their existence depending on their members' willingness to participate in their activities, they tend to strengthen such participation through different combinations of ideological and solidaristic incentives. A participatory structure also tends to favour internal solidarity through the gratification of immediate needs (Donati 1984). Social movement organizations give particular importance to internal relations, transforming the very costs of collective action into benefits through the intrinsic rewards of participation itself (della Porta and Diani 1999, 141). Within cohesive groups the conditions for the development of alternative value systems are constituted and "communal associations become free spaces, breeding grounds for democratic change" (Evans and Boyte 1992, 187). In "free spaces" a "sense of a common good" develops alongside the construction of "direct, face-to-face, and egalitarian relationships" (Gamson 1990, 190-1). A small group of activists "uses naturally occurring social relationships and meets a variety of organizational and individual needs for emotional support, integration, sharing of sacrifice, and expression of shared identities" (ibid., 175).

The literature on social movements has however also stressed an alternative model: a *professional social movement organization* characterized by "(1) a leadership that devotes full time to the movement, with a large proportion of resources originating outside the aggrieved group that the movement claims to represent; (2) a very small or non-existent membership base or a paper membership (membership implies little more than allowing a name to be used upon membership rolls); (3) attempts to impart the image of 'speaking for a constituency'; and (4) attempts to influence policy toward that same constituency" (McCarthy and Zald 1987a [1973], 375). In this model, ordinary members have little power and "no serious role in organizational policy-making short of withholding membership dues. The professional staff largely determines the positions the organization takes upon issues" (McCarthy and Zald 1987a [1973], 378). In the 1980s and the 1990s, social movement organizations have been described as more and more approaching this second model (see, among others, Kriesi 1996). As we are going to see, our research confirms the presence in the GJM of various types of organizations, confirming that social movements are characterized by "considerable variation in organizational strength within and between movements" (Klandermans 1989, 4).

We constructed our typology of democratic forms of internal decision-making in parallel to other parts of our research (chapter 4, 45; see also della Porta and Reiter 2005, 9; 2006, 13). The first dimension concerns the degree of *participation/delegation* and is operationalized by distinguishing groups characterized by a central role in the decision-making process of the organization of an assembly consisting of all members from all other types of organizations (executive-centered, leader-centered, mixed models, etc.). The second dimension refers to the emphasis on decision-making methods assigning a special role to public discussion, common good, rational arguments and transformation of preferences. These aspects are particularly valorized by the *method of consensus* that puts a special emphasis on the decision-making process *per se* than on the outcome of such process. Considering this dimension we separated groups employing the method of consensus from all other organizations employing different decision-making methods (simple majority, qualified majority, mixed methods, etc.). Crossing the two dimensions

of participation/delegation and consensus/majority vote[4], our typology distinguishes four democratic types: a purely assembleary model (where the refusal to delegate power is mixed with majoritarian methods of decision-making), a deliberative participative model (where the refusal to delegate power is mixed with consensual methods of decision-making), an associational model (where the delegation of power is mixed with majoritarian methods of decision-making), and a deliberative representative model (where the delegation of power is mixed with consensual methods of decision-making) (see figure 3).

Figure 3. Models of Democracy

Decision-making method: Consensus	*Decision-making body: delegation of power*	
	Low	High
Low	**Assembleary** 9.8% (N = 18)	**Associational** 30.4% (N = 56)
High	**Deliberative participative** 21.7% (N = 40)	**Deliberative representative** 38.0% (N= 70)

We could classify 184 out of a total of 210 cases: in 13% of the cases we were unable to collect enough information on the main decision-making body or on the method of decision-making (see table 2). Almost two fifths of the selected organizations fall in the deliberative representative category where the principle of consensus is mixed with the principle of delegation. Almost one third of the groups adopt an associational model that is based on majoritarian decision-making and delegation Around one fifth of the groups combine a consensual decision-making method with the principle of participation (refusal of delegation to an executive committee) while almost 10% of the selected organizations mix the principle of participation with the majoritarian principle (assembleary model). Thus, our sample confirms a significant variation on the democratic models employed by the organizations.

The prevalent model in the British and German samples is the associational one (almost 50% of the cases) while in all the other samples–with the exception of the Spanish one– the deliberative representative model prevails. In the Spanish sample, half of the cases are classified as deliberative participative, a result that reflects the large number of informal organizations, active mainly at the local level, with few members and a limited budget. Deliberative representative models are employed by almost half of the

[4] As for the operazionalization of the two dimensions, our interviewees were asked to indicate the main decision-making body within their organization (question 9 of the questionnaire) and to specify the decision-making method adopted by it (questions 10g and 11c of the questionnaire). To build the typology presented above answers to question 9 were re-aggregated in a dummy variable (0 = president / leader / secretary; executive committee or similar body; 1 = assembly / open meeting; when possible the categories "thematic groups" and "other" were attributed to one of the two categories, otherwise they became missing values). Questions 10g and 11c were re-coded in two dummy variables distinguishing between 0 (majority vote and mixed methods; value 0 and 9 in the original variable) and 1 (only pure forms of consensus; value 1 in the original variable).

French, the Swiss, and the transnational organizations. Democratic models mixing consensus and participation are instead particularly uncommon in the French, German, and British samples, while instead characterizing about one fifth of the groups in the other samples. Overall, assembleary democratic models are quite rare and characterize especially the German and the French groups.

Table 2. Democratic models per country (%)

Democratic models	**Country (%)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Associational	32.0	48.0	30.6	15.6	23.8	46.2	15.8	30.4
Deliberative representative	48.0	28.0	36.1	28.1	47.6	34.6	52.6	38.0
Assembleary	16.0	16.0	11.1	6.3	4.8	3.8	10.5	9.8
Deliberative participative	4.0	8.0	22.2	50.0	23.8	15.4	21.1	21.7
Total **(N)**	13.6 (25)	13.6 (25)	19.6 (36)	17.4 (32)	11.4 (21)	14.1 (26)	10.3 (19)	100.0 (184)
Missing cases (N)	3	1	1	3	7	3	8	26

Cramer's V is 0.250**.

The correlation between the type of internal decision-making resulting from our analysis of key documents (see chapter 4) and the one resulting from our telephone interviews (0.371**, N=137) indicates some consistency, but the democratic conceptions emerging from written documents and the democratic practices declared by our interviewees are not identical. Comparing the results of the two parts of our research, we can notice that interviewees tend to stress consensus more than their organizational documents do. These discrepancies can be explained in different ways: respondents might be more up to date and accurate in describing the actual decision-making in their groups, or they might want to give a better image of decision making in their organization. Whatever the explanation, norms of consensus appear as very much supported in the movement.

In our interviews we tried to deepen our understanding of the internal decision-making processes of the selected organizations by concentrating on the characteristics of the main decision-making bodies of the sampled organizations. As table 3 illustrates, in more than half of the cases the most important decision-making functions are delegated to a monocratic body (11%) or to a collective body like an executive committee (46%). Around one quarter of the groups leave these powers to the assembly and one tenth attributes them to other bodies or distribute them among multiple bodies. In just 4% of the cases thematic groups function as important decision making bodies.

As for national peculiarities, in the Spanish sample the role of the assembly is particularly strong; the role of monocratic body is especially prominent in the British case (around one third of the cases); a dominant position of the executive committee and similar bodies is more widespread in France, Germany, and Italy. The relevant presence of "other bodies" in the Swiss case is explained by the federal structure of the state: most of those bodies are in fact national coordinations of cantonal sections or cantonal sections

themselves. Finally, also at the transnational level "other bodies" (mostly international coordination committees) play an important role.

Table 3. Most important decision-making body per country (%)

Most important decision-making body	**Country (%)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
President / leader / secretary / director	3.6	7.7	5.4	2.9	10.7	34.5	11.1	10.5
Executive committee / management / staff / heads of division / secretariat / board of directors	60.7	61.5	51.4	31.4	46.4	37.9	37.0	46.2
Assembly / open meeting	21.4	23.1	27.0	54.3	21.4	17.2	22.2	27.6
Thematic group	0.0	3.8	5.4	2.9	3.6	3.4	7.4	3.8
Other bodies	14.3	3.8	10.8	8.6	17.9	6.9	22.2	11.9
Total	13.3	12.4	17.6	16.7	13.3	13.8	12.9	100.0
(N)	(28)	(26)	(37)	(35)	(28)	(29)	(27)	(210)

Cramer's V is 0.255**.

To better understand the internal democratic functioning of our groups we focused on the decision-making method of the assemblies/open meetings, with particular attention to the use of the method of consensus. We therefore distinguished groups that only use consensual methods from the ones using a majoritarian one (simple majority and qualified majority) sometimes mixed with consensus. The method of consensus is particularly mentioned by the groups sampled for Italy, Spain, and at the transnational level, while in the other national samples more traditional decision-making methods prevail (see table 4).

Table 4. Decision-making method of the assemblies/open meetings (%)

Decision-making method of the main decisional body	**Country (%)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Majority + other	79.2	69.2	48.6	38.2	54.5	66.7	26.1	53.9
Consensus	20.8	30.8	51.4	61.8	45.5	33.3	73.9	46.1
Total	12.6	13.5	19.2	17.6	11.4	14.0	11.9	100.0
(N)	(24)	(26)	(37)	(34)	(22)	(27)	(23)	(191)

Cramer's V is 0.332**.

We also asked our interviewees about the size of the assembly/open meeting, since we suppose that its scale could explain the decision-making style. Consensual decision-making should be easier to implement in smaller groups while other types of decision-making methods (i.e. simple majority, qualified majority, mixed methods, etc.)

better adapt to bigger decisional bodies. Table 5 shows that small assemblies are very important in the Italian, Spanish, and Swiss samples (in the latter middle-sized ones are also widespread) while large ones characterize especially French, British, and transnational groups. A considerable amount of German groups (almost one third) present a middle-sized format. If we correlate the indicator concerning the dimension of the assembly/open meeting with the indicator referring to its decision-making method we find a confirmation of our hypothesis (-0.304** Kendall's Tau B): the smaller the assembly the more often consensus is used.

Table 5. Size of the assembly/open meeting per country (%)

Dimension of the main decisional body	**Country (%)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Less than 30	30.8	46.2	63.9	60.0	59.1	44.4	28.6	48.9
Between 30 and 100	26.9	30.8	16.7	23.3	36.4	25.9	28.6	26.1
More than 100	42.3	23.1	19.4	16.7	4.5	29.6	42.9	25.0
Total	13.8	13.8	19.1	16.0	11.7	14.4	11.2	100.0
(N)	(26)	(26)	(36)	(30)	(22)	(27)	(21)	(188)

Cramer's V is not significant.

For the groups mentioning the presence of an executive committee, it is also important to assess the decision-making method of this body and the source of its legitimacy (see table 6). Around two thirds of our groups have an executive committee (with a low 40% for the Spanish sample), and when present, this body (often characterized by a small size) tends to adopt the method of consensus (with lower figures for the German and the British samples, with respectively one third and two fifth of the cases). In most of the cases the executive committees are elected by the general assembly/congress or by assemblies of local groups/affiliates.

Table 6. Characteristics of the executive committee per country (%)

Presence of an executive committee	**Country (%)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Yes	78.6	84.6	75.7	40.0	63.0	72.4	63.0	67.5
Total	13.4	12.4	17.7	16.7	12.9	13.9	12.9	100.0
(N)	(28)	(26)	(37)	(35)	(27)	(29)	(27)	(209)**
Decision-making method of the executive								
Majority + other	40.9	65.2	42.9	35.7	41.2	57.1	25.0	45.4
Consensus	59.1	34.8	57.1	64.3	58.8	42.9	75.0	54.6
Total	15.6	16.3	19.9	9.9	12.1	14.9	11.3	100.0
(N)	(22)	(23)	(28)	(14)	(17)	(21)	(16)	(141)

Election of the executive committee								
By an assemblearian body	88.2	88.2	85.0	90.9	81.3	93.3	80.0	86.5
By other bodies	11.8	11.8	15.0	9.1	18.8	6.7	20.0	13.5
Total	15.3	15.3	18.0	9.9	14.4	13.5	13.5	100.0
(N)	(17)	(17)	(20)	(11)	(16)	(15)	(15)	(111)

Cramer's V is: 302** (presence); not significant (decision-making method); not significant (election).

In order to have a more complete picture of the internal democratic functioning we also focused on the agenda setting process and the rules for discussion within the assembly/open meeting. The power to define the agenda and the rules of a discussion are considered as potential sources of hidden power. Table 7 shows that in almost two thirds of the cases the agenda is set by a monocratic body or by the executive committee (or similar bodies). The role of monocratic bodies in setting the agenda is particularly relevant in the Italian and in the Swiss samples that, together with the German one, show also an important role of the executive body (more than half of the cases). The Spanish sample represents an exception: in the majority of cases the agenda is set directly by the assembly. This result is not surprising if we consider the peculiar features of the Spanish groups discussed above and their high decentralization and informality, due to a lack of resources and the presence of pro-local cultures like peripheral nationalisms and libertarian ideologies. In the French sample and at the transnational level, an important role in setting the agenda is played by small committees representing different membership groups. In the same two samples and in the British one other bodies are also mentioned, like international committees or local groups organizing the meeting (for the transnational groups) and members and affiliates defining the agenda through Internet communication (for France and the UK).

Table 7. Body proposing the agenda per country (%)

Body proposing the agenda	**Country (%)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
President / leader / secretary / director	16.0	15.4	24.3	2.9	22.7	18.5	8.7	15.5
Executive committee / management / staff / heads of division / secretariat / board of directors	44.0	57.7	54.1	35.3	59.1	40.7	47.8	47.9
Assembly / open meeting	8.0	7.7	10.8	44.1	13.6	14.8	8.7	16.5
Small committee representing different membership groups	12.0	3.8	0.0	8.8	0.0	7.4	13.0	6.2
Other bodies	20.0	15.4	10.8	8.8	4.5	18.5	21.7	13.9
Total	12.9	13.4	19.1	17.5	11.3	13.9	11.9	100.0
(N)	(25)	(26)	(37)	(34)	(22)	(27)	(23)	(194)

Cramer's V is 0.231**.

Only one quarter of our groups declared not having adopted specific and formal rules for the discussion (table 8). Around half of the groups regulate their discussions with traditional regulations such as time limits for interventions, the presence of moderators/facilitators/chairs, the drafting of minutes, lists of speakers, rules of procedure (contained in the constitution), division in (small) working groups in order to offer the possibility to participate in the discussion to everybody, transparency/accountability in decision-making (i.e. the discussion ends with a clear statement about the decisions made, specifying the responsibilities for the decision-making process), etc. Only 5% of the groups (not shown in the table) foresee exclusively innovative rules for the discussion like rotating moderation, gender quota, enforcement of rules of conduct (no male dominance, no authoritative behaviour, let speakers finish their statement), protection of minorities, specific kinds of seating arrangements (i.e. circular), use of hand signals, etc. Almost one fourth of the groups mix traditional and innovative rules or adopt only innovative rules. As for the crossnational comparison, especially at the transnational level rules are not present (almost two thirds of the groups), while German, Italian, and Swiss groups are particularly oriented towards what we have called "traditional rules of discussion". The German sample, however, also presents a significant amount of groups experimenting exclusively "innovative rules" (data not shown in the table). In the French, Spanish, Swiss, and British samples around one third of the groups use innovative rules or mix them with traditional ones. In the British case, one out of five groups adopt a peculiar technique of discussion (use of hand signals) that is barely present in the other samples.

Table 8. Rules of discussion per country (%)

Rules of discussion	**Country (%)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Not present	21.7	12.5	26.1	20.0	0.0	25.9	65.0	24.5
Only traditional rules	47.8	62.5	65.2	50.0	68.8	40.7	30.0	51.5
Both traditional and innovative rules + only innovative rules	30.4	25.0	8.6	30.0	31.3	33.3	5.0	24.8
Total	14.1	14.7	14.1	18.4	9.8	16.6	12.3	100.0
(N)	(23)	(24)	(23)	(30)	(16)	(27)	(20)	(163)

Cramer's V is 0.274**.

Concluding, our results indicate the presence of very different democratic models in the GJM. As emerged also from the analysis of organizational documents, associational models are quite widespread, reflecting the presence in the movement of formal NGOs, unions, and parties. However, there are also more participatory models (testified by an important role of general assemblies), as well as significant references to deliberation and consensual decision-making.

5.3.2. Organizational structure

As we already anticipated in the previous paragraph, the organizational structure and history of a group could be very important factors in explaining the model of internal democracy adopted. In what follows we will assess the material and human resources available for the selected organizations focusing on their membership, their budget, their paid staff, their volunteers (a term usually employed by more formal organizations to indicate members that devote a significant amount of time to the organizations, usually getting involved in provision of services) and also their founding period.

The sampled organizations are quite heterogeneous. Considering the type of membership, the great majority of our groups (over 80%) are either organizations with individual membership (36%) or organizations with mixed individual and collective membership (41%); the groups with only collective membership are less than one fourth (table 9). Individual membership is more widespread among the French, Spanish, British, and Swiss organizations while mixed individual and collective membership prevails for the Italian and the German groups. Unsurprisingly, at the transnational level we find a very high presence of groups with collective membership, and the absence of groups with only individual membership. Considering only individual membership, groups with a high number of affiliates are only present in the Italian and the French samples (more than 40% declares more than 10,000 members). Small groups of 1 to 100 members are more widespread in the Spanish and in the transnational samples. At the transnational level, however, there are no groups declaring an exclusively individual membership and a very high percentage (almost 70%) declared no individual membership at all.

As for the Swiss and British samples the intermediate categories (respectively between 100 and 1,000 members and between 1,000 and 10,000 members) are prominent. Considering only collective membership, the majority of the groups have between 10 and 100 members, with some variations: the British and transnational groups have the largest collective membership (more than 100 members), followed by the French and Swiss groups (between 10 and 100 collective members). Groups with small collective membership are particularly relevant in the Italian, Spanish, and Swiss samples.

Table 9. Number of individual and collective members per country (%)

Type of members	**Country (%)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Individual	46.2	40.9	31.0	58.3	46.4	42.1	0.0	35.8
Collective	15.4	13.6	13.8	0.0	14.3	21.1	69.2	22.8
Both individual and collective	38.5	45.5	55.2	41.7	39.3	36.8	30.8	41.4
Total	16.0	13.6	17.9	7.4	17.3	11.7	16.0	100.0
(N)	(26)	(22)	(29)	(12)	(28)	(19)	(26)	(162)
Number of individual members								
Between 1 and 100	6.3	33.3	16.0	58.3	9.1	7.7	60.0	21.6

Between 101 and 1,000	31.3	33.3	32.0	16.7	40.9	23.1	20.0	30.6
Between 1,001 and 10,000	18.8	11.1	8.0	25.0	31.8	38.5	0.0	19.8
More than 10,000	43.8	22.2	44.0	0.0	18.2	30.8	20.0	27.9
Total	14.4	16.2	22.5	10.8	19.8	11.7	4.5	100.0
(N)	(16)	(18)	(25)	(12)	(22)	(13)	(5)	(111)
Number of collective members								
Between 1 and 10	10.0	0.0	33.3	50.0	38.5	0.0	15.4	20.5
Between 11 and 100	70.0	50.0	33.3	50.0	53.8	40.0	46.2	47.9
More than 100	20.0	50.0	33.3	0.0	7.7	60.0	38.5	31.5
Total	13.7	11.0	20.5	5.5	17.8	13.7	17.8	100.0
(N)	(10)	(8)	(15)	(4)	(13)	(10)	(13)	(73)

Cramer's V is: 0.378*** (members' type); 0.322*** (individual members) 0.360*** (collective members).

The type of membership provides a first insight into the differences between the selected groups. Not only human, but also material resources are however relevant for their potential impact on organizational strategies. In fact, groups with a higher budget tend to be more formal (adopting formal rules) and professional (being able to hire technical and administrative staff). Table 10 presents the amount of material resources available to the selected organizations. Very few of them have no budget at all (with a high 27% in the Spanish sample). Around one tenth of our respondents declared that it was impossible for them to give an estimate of their budget since it varies a lot from one year to another. This is particularly frequent among transnational organizations (more than two thirds). Italy has a relatively high proportion of "poor" organizations with an annual budget below 50,000 euros. Most of the German and Swiss groups in our samples are quite wealthy with a budget between 50,000 and 500,000 euros. Among the selected organizations, the "richer" ones are settled in France, Germany, Italy and at the transnational level: around one third of the groups declared a yearly budget higher than 500,000 euros.

Unsurprisingly, the relationship between budget and paid staff is linear and strong (Cramer's V 0.619**). Groups with a higher budget are also the ones that have the higher number of paid staff. As illustrated in table 11, the national samples with less paid staff are the Spanish (47%) and British (35%). Most of the groups have less than 16 paid staff members (especially Swiss and transnational groups). The Swiss sample has also a considerable quota of groups (almost one fifth) declaring between 16 and 100 paid staff members. The countries with a significant number of groups (around one fifth) with more than 100 paid staff members are France, Germany, and the UK.

Table 10. Budget of the groups per country (%)

Budget of the groups	**Country (%)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Highly variable	4.5	0.0	6.9	0.0	17.9	21.4	36.8	12.1
None	4.5	0.0	0.0	26.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.6
Less than 50,000	27.3	9.5	37.9	26.9	21.4	25.0	15.8	24.3
Between 50,000 and 500,000	27.3	52.4	17.2	30.8	39.3	21.4	10.5	28.3
More than 500,000	36.4	38.1	37.9	15.4	21.4	32.1	36.8	30.6
Total	12.7	12.1	16.8	15.0	16.2	16.2	11.0	100.0
(N)	(22)	(21)	(29)	(26)	(28)	(28)	(19)	(173)

Cramer's V is 0.335**.

Table 11. Number of paid staff per country (%)

Paid staff	**Country (%)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
None	28.6	24.0	30.6	47.1	25.0	34.5	16.0	30.2
Up to 16	42.9	44.0	41.7	41.2	50.0	34.5	60.0	44.4
Between 16 and 100	10.7	12.0	16.7	11.8	21.4	13.8	12.0	14.1
More than 100	17.9	20.0	11.1	0.0	3.6	17.2	12.0	11.2
Total	13.7	12.2	17.6	16.6	13.7	14.1	12.2	100.0
(N)	(28)	(25)	(36)	(34)	(28)	(29)	(25)	(205)

Cramer's V is not significant.

Groups with a low budget can overcome the lack of material resources thanks to the contribution of volunteers devoting their work to the organization for free. However, table 12 shows that budget and volunteer trends are not very different. In fact British, French, German, and Italian organizations have the highest number of volunteer, with more than one third declaring more than 100. Spanish, Swiss and transnational organizations are in between with more than one third of the groups declaring a number of volunteers between 16 and 100. Half of the British groups declared a limited number of voluntary staff (less than 16 volunteers). The correlation between budget and volunteers is positive with a Cramer's V of 0.331**. This means that the groups with a higher budget also tend to have higher number of volunteers (with less clear-cut results in the British sample).

Table 12. Number of volunteers per country (%)

Number of volunteers	**Country (%)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Less than 16	23.8	21.7	34.5	34.4	22.2	50.0	36.8	32.4
Between 16 and 100	28.6	34.8	27.6	37.5	59.3	14.3	36.8	34.1
More than 100	47.6	43.5	37.9	28.1	18.5	35.7	26.3	33.5
Total	11.7	12.8	16.2	17.9	15.1	15.6	10.6	100.0
(N)	(21)	(23)	(29)	(32)	(27)	(28)	(19)	(179)

Cramer's V is not significant.

Another characteristic that could influence strategic choices of a group is its founding period. Our organizations are in fact part of different generations of social movements and could be shaped by the cultural, political, social and economic features of the generation to which they belong. As table 13 illustrates, almost one fifth of the groups were founded before the mobilizations of 1968 and another fifth between 1968 and the fall of the Berlin wall (1989) while almost one third was founded during the 90s and the same number after the protests of Seattle (1999). National differences exist as far as the representation of the various movement generations in the GJM are concerned: around one fourth of German and British groups were founded before 1968, around one third of French and Swiss groups between 1968 and 1989, more than half of the Italian groups were founded (or re-founded) during the 1990s and almost half of the Spanish, British and transnational groups after 1999.

Table 13. Movement generations per country (%)

Movement generations	**Country (% of Yes)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Before 1969	21.4	23.1	10.8	7.7	22.2	25.0	15.4	18.6
Between 1969 and 1989	28.6	23.1	13.5	15.4	33.3	10.7	7.7	19.8
Between 1989 and 1999	28.6	30.8	54.1	30.8	22.2	14.3	30.8	31.4
After 1999	21.4	23.1	21.6	46.2	22.2	50.0	46.2	30.2
Total	16.3	15.1	21.5	7.6	15.7	16.3	7.6	100.0
(N)	(28)	(26)	(37)	(13)	(27)	(28)	(13)	(172)

Cramer's V is 0.233**.

We can conclude that our results confirms the pluralistic picture that emerged from our analysis of organizational documents (see chapter 4). Our selected organizations cover a wide range in terms of the *size* of individual and collective membership, the amount of material resources and the levels of *formalization and centralization.* Also the *age* of the organizations involved in the movement varies, confirming that the GJM has

created new SMOs, but also re-mobilized groups coming from previous waves of protest (della Porta, Andretta, Mosca and Reiter 2006).

5.3.3. Relationship with the institutions

Another central focus for our research is the relationship between our groups and the institutions at different territorial levels. Institutions can act as important allies of social movement organizations, providing opportunities and resources. The attitudes of social movements towards institutions tend to vary with the territorial level of the latter. International institutions are often criticized by the GJM because of their democratic deficit: they lack a popular legitimation and transparency in the decision-making process. National institutions are the most often selected target of protest: they are sometimes allies (especially, but not always, when the left is in power), but more often opposed for their neo-liberal policies. Finally, local governments are generally perceived as closer to citizens and their problems, more legitimated, more open to movements' claims, and therefore more trusted by the activists of the GJM (Andretta *et al.* 2002 and 2003; della Porta *et al.* 2006).

The tables below show that the selected organizations tend to collaborate especially with local and national governments. However, relationships are also frequent with international governmental organizations (see table 14). Overall, more than half of our groups declare to collaborate (in general or selectively/critically) with international institutions. Refusal to collaborate involves about 14% of our groups (but almost one fourth for the Spanish and British samples), with an additional one third (in particular Spanish and Swiss organizations) showing indifference towards IGOs, or denouncing a refusal of cooperation on the side of the authorities. Interestingly, collaboration concerns 39% of the Swiss and 52% of the transnational organizations, while critical/selective collaboration is particularly widespread among French, German, British, and transnational groups.

Table 14. Relationship with international institutions per country (%)

International institutions	**Country (%)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Refusal of collaboration	8.7	16.0	13.9	21.9	7.1	24.1	0.0	13.5
Indifference/no contacts/denial of collaboration by authorities	30.4	24.0	33.3	46.9	53.6	20.7	14.8	32.5
Critical/selective collaboration	34.8	44.0	25.0	6.3	0.0	34.5	33.3	24.5
Collaboration	26.1	16.0	27.8	25.0	39.3	20.7	51.9	29.5
Total	11.5	12.5	18.0	16.0	14.0	14.5	13.5	100.0
(N)	(23)	(25)	(36)	(32)	(28)	(29)	(27)	(200)

Cramer's V is 0.276***.

Table 15. Relationship with national institutions per country (%)

National institutions	**Country (%)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Refusal of collaboration	4.2	16.0	5.6	26.5	10.7	17.2	0.0	11.8
Indifference/no contacts /denial of collaboration by authorities	12.5	20.0	19.4	38.2	28.6	6.9	18.5	21.2
Critical/selective collaboration	62.5	48.0	38.9	11.8	3.6	51.7	33.3	34.5
Collaboration	20.8	16.0	36.1	23.5	57.1	24.1	48.1	32.5
Total	11.8	12.3	17.7	16.7	13.8	14.3	13.3	100.0
(N)	(24)	(25)	(36)	(34)	(28)	(29)	(27)	(203)

Cramer's V is 0.304***.

As for the relationship with national institutions, according to previous research (that however did not produce univocal results on this issue) the presence of left-wing governments tends to ease the relationship with institutions. At the time of the interviews, we had center left governments in Spain and the UK (where however the Blair government was strongly criticized by the movement for its leading role in the war on Iraq). Contrary to the image of a "no-global", antagonist movement, table 15 shows that as many as two thirds of our organizations declared to cooperate with national governments (in one third of the cases however defining this collaboration as critical or selective). Only 10% declared to refuse collaboration on principle (with a higher rate for the Spanish sample where many organizations also declared a lack of contacts at the national level). Selective collaboration was more often mentioned by French, German, and British interviewees. Unconditioned collaboration with institutions is most frequent among Swiss and transnational groups.

Also for local institutions we find cross-national variation (see table 16). This relationship is more difficult to interpret since we do not have sufficient information on the political orientation of local administrations in our six countries (in fact our groups belong to different cities with different local governments). Again, more than two thirds of the groups declared experiences of collaboration (in most cases unconditioned). Not surprisingly, lack of contact (but not refusal) is declared by more than one third of the transnational groups (they interact less with local institutions), but also by the British groups. The refusal of collaboration is frequently mentioned by German, Spanish, and British groups. Selective collaboration is widespread among French, German, and Italian groups while unconditioned collaboration regards especially Switzerland and, again, Italy (where the lack of contacts with local authorities is hardly present).

Table 16. Relationship with local institutions per country (%)

Local institutions	**Country (%)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Refusal of collaboration	0.0	16.0	2.7	18.2	3.6	17.2	0.0	8.4
Indifference/no contacts/ denial of collaboration by authorities	13.0	24.0	8.1	27.3	21.4	31.0	37.0	22.8
Collaboration with restrictions	56.5	44.0	37.8	21.2	0.0	27.6	25.9	29.7
Collaboration	30.4	16.0	51.4	33.3	75.0	24.1	37.0	39.1
Total	11.4	12.4	18.3	16.3	13.9	14.4	13.4	100.0
(N)	(23)	(25)	(37)	(33)	(28)	(29)	(27)	(202)

Cramer's V is 0.305***.

Using dummy variables (collaboration/no collaboration)[5] and comparing the different territorial levels (see table 17), the most striking result is the high level of collaboration with institutions at the international level. We should keep in mind that the result could be biased by the fact that the category "international institutions" is very heterogeneous because it mixes under the same label UN agencies, European Union (EU) institutions and international institutions such as WTO, IMF, and WB. The EU and the UN sometimes provide funding and support for social movement organizations and are therefore more likely to receive a positive evaluation than international financiary institutions that are considered the very symbol of neoliberalism and are strongly opposed by the GJM. Transnational organizations show a positive attitude toward collaboration especially with international and national institutions (above 80%). A positive attitude towards collaboration grows for French, Italian, Spanish, and Swiss organizations moving from international to national and to local institutions, while among British and German ones collaboration is higher with national institutions, followed by international and local ones.

Table 17. Attitudes toward institutions at different levels per country (%)

Collaboration with institutions	**Country (% of Yes)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
International level	60.9	60.0	52.8	31.3	39.3	55.2	85.2	54.0
National level	83.3	64.0	75.0	35.3	60.7	75.9	81.5	67.0
Local level	87.0	60.0	89.2	54.5	75.0	51.7	63.0	68.8
Total (N)	23-24	25	36-7	32-4	28	29	27	200-203

Cramer's V is: 0.320*** (international); 0.341*** (national); 0.311*** (local).

[5] We created dummy variables by assigning value 1 to all forms of collaboration (both with restrictions and indiscriminate), and value 0 to all other categories.

We also asked our interviewees their opinion on experiments of participatory public decision-making such as agenda 21, participative budgeting, etc. As table 18 illustrates, about 40% of the groups did not discuss this issue or do not have a clear position on it. Over one third declared that these participative experiments improve the quality of political decisions; about one fifth was skeptical. Positive opinions were more widespread among French, Italian and transnational groups, negative opinions among German and Swiss groups.

Table 18. Attitudes toward public decision-making per country (%)

Public decision-making improves the quality of political decisions	**Country (% of Yes)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
No	17.9	30.8	16.2	15.2	32.1	20.7	3.7	19.2
Yes	46.4	11.5	70.3	33.3	28.6	24.1	44.4	38.5
No definite position	35.7	57.7	13.5	51.5	39.3	55.2	51.9	42.3
Total	13.5	12.5	17.8	15.9	13.5	13.9	13.0	100.0
(N)	(28)	(26)	(37)	(33)	(28)	(29)	(27)	(208)

Cramer's V is 0.300***.

When asked to qualify their judgment on experiments of public decision-making, almost one fifth of the groups spoke of both advantages and risks. About half underlined the positive aspects and almost one third pointed at the negative side of institution-driven experiments (table 19). Criticism concerns both the input and the output sides of the decision-making process. Such experiments are considered elitist ("they involve mostly experts and not citizens"), but also useless ("no real changes occur") and even dangerous ("serve for cooptation of critical engagement", "are used to create political consensus and legitimation of institutions"). These processes are also labeled as artificial (not true experiments of a new democratic model) or "top-down" (promoted and implemented from the top of the political system). Other groups instead underline the positive effects of public decision-making based on citizens' participation. Positive judgments concern the input side of the decision-making process: they are considered as being inclusive ("they stimulate active citizens' participation") and bottom-up ("they express the real needs of citizens", "people become closer to politics"). Additionally, these experiments are positively evaluated for their consequences on the output side of the decision-making process: they attribute more responsibility to the people, foster transparency and publicity of the decision-making, produce a more consensual decision-making and allow for the emergence of new political styles and administrative practices.

Table 19. Evaluation of public decision-making per country (%)

Evaluation of public decision-making	**Country (% of Yes)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Negative	23.5	45.5	25.8	35.3	50.0	20.0	9.1	30.4
Both negative and positive	17.6	45.5	19.4	17.6	0.0	20.0	9.1	17.4
Positive	58.8	9.1	54.8	47.1	50.0	60.0	81.8	52.2
Total (N)	14.8 (17)	9.6 (11)	27.0 (31)	14.8 (17)	15.7 (18)	8.7 (10)	9.6 (11)	100.0 (115)
Motivation of the evaluation								
Instrumental	8.7	22.7	9.1	25.0	3.6	0.0	5.0	9.4
Artificial	4.3	0.0	12.1	0.0	21.4	3.4	0.0	7.0
Exclusive	4.3	0.0	9.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.3
Placebo politics	21.7	18.2	15.2	31.3	7.1	6.9	5.0	14.0
Top-to-bottom-politics	8.7	13.6	6.1	0.0	3.6	3.4	5.0	5.8
Bottom-up-politics	17.4	4.5	24.2	43.8	0.0	6.9	20.0	15.2
Responsibility	0.0	4.5	6.1	0.0	7.1	3.4	10.0	4.7
Inclusive	26.1	4.5	45.5	0.0	14.3	3.4	40.0	20.5
Transparency/publicity of the decison-making	17.4	0.0	18.2	6.3	0.0	6.9	10.0	8.8
More consensual decison-making	4.3	4.5	0.0	0.0	3.6	3.4	10.0	3.5
Creative effect	4.3	0.0	6.1	12.5	0.0	0.0	20.0	5.3
Total (N)	13.5 (23)	12.9 (22)	19.3 (33)	9.4 (16)	16.4 (28)	17.0 (29)	11.7 (20)	100.0 (171)

For the evaluation Cramer's V is 0.299*.

NB – for the motivation overall % of column can sum above 100% because of multiple responses.

For the issue of relationships with the institutions, also the sources of the budget of GJMOs are an important factor to consider. In fact, groups depending upon governmental funding might be conditioned by their desire to keep this kind of revenue while groups mostly financed by their members are freer from this point of view.

For their budget the groups of our sample draw on a multiplicity of different sources (see table 20).[6] Most of them rely on contributions from members (the Spanish, Swiss and British groups are particularly dependent on this kind of funding). Above one third of the groups receive money from government funded projects (at the transnational

[6] We asked our interviewees about the most important sources of their organization's budget but we do not have information on the specific importance of the single sources for their budget.

level the percentage is almost doubled), but also from non-governmental sources (i.e. private donations and financing from foundations). The latter is especially significant among the German, Swiss and transnational groups. Two fifth of the groups collect funds through initiatives of self-financing like the organization of concerts, festivals, sales of books and other materials (this is especially the case for the Spanish organizations).

Table 20. Type of funding per country (%)

Type of funding	**Country (% of Yes)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
From members	75.0	64.0	77.8	87.9	96.4	92.9	72.0	81.3
Governmental	42.9	36.0	36.1	27.6	39.3	28.6	60.0	38.2
Non governmental	14.3	56.0	19.4	13.8	42.9	32.1	72.0	34.2
Sales of goods/service/rent	35.7	24.0	38.9	53.3	42.9	46.4	36.0	40.0
Total								
(N)	28	25	36	29-33	28	28	25	199-203

Cramer's V is: 0.272** (members); n.s. (governmental); 0.425*** (non governmental); n.s. (sales).

Table 21. Type of funding per country (%)

Type of funding	**Country (% of Yes)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
No	21.4	20.0	22.2	12.1	3.6	7.1	12.0	14.3
Only from members	35.7	44.0	41.7	63.6	57.1	64.3	28.0	48.3
Only from governments	3.6	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	16.0	4.4
Both from members and governments	39.3	20.0	36.1	24.2	39.3	28.6	44.0	33.0
Total	13.8	12.3	17.7	16.3	13.8	13.8	12.3	100.0
(N)	(28)	(25)	(36)	(33)	(28)	(28)	(25)	(203)

Cramer's V is 0.250**.

In an additional step we distinguished between groups on the basis of the type of funding they received, i.e. whether material resources were provided by members, governments or both. Table 21 shows that the percentage of groups receiving money only from governments is very limited except for German and transnational groups. Spanish, Swiss and British groups rely the most on funds coming only from members. Around 40% of Swiss, French, and transnational groups tend to have both sources of revenue. Around one fifth of French, German and Italian groups do not receive funding from members nor from governments.

In conclusion, confirming the results from other parts of our research (see chapter 4; della Porta and Reiter 2006), our data indicate that notwithstanding their critical position, social movement organizations of the GJM frequently *interact with the institutions of representative democracy*. Our organizations are in fact quite open to interactions with institutions—they are not emphasizing a negative message, but often offer specific advice and cooperation on specific problems. At the same time, however, they tend to be critical of those institutions, and to perceive their own role as actively engaging in citizens' control of institutional politics and implementing channels of discursive accountability.

5.3.4. Organizational strategies of the groups

In this paragraph we will analyse the organizational strategies of our groups, focusing on the main areas of activity of the groups, their main strategies, their repertoire of collective action, their relationship with the GJM (participation in its events, campaigns and networks, and vision of the movement) and their perception of the communicative role of the Internet (in the interaction with public administrators, media and members).

As far as the main area of activity is concerned, our interviewees responded to an open question and responses were then recoded into up to five thematic issues. The recoded answers were later aggregated into five categories: social issues (rights, immigrants, labour, welfare, common goods, social justice, civil liberties, education), international issues (against war, international solidarity, cooperation, fair trade, food sovereignty, world trade, Aids/health), new social movement issues (women's rights, gay/lesbian/queer's rights, youth problems, environment/animal/agriculture), democracy (democracy and alternative knowledge) and religion. As many as two thirds of our groups focus their activity on social issues (see table 22). Also international issues are prominent in the activities of the sampled organization. Issues related to the so-called post-materialist values widespread among the "new social movements" (ecologist, feminist etc.) are mentioned by (only) around one third of the groups while the issue of democracy was indicated as the main area of activity by one fifth of the sample. Religion is important only for a very small number of groups. German, Italian and British groups are particularly focused on social issues while Italian, British and transnational respondents (more than two thirds) more often mention international issues. British and transnational groups show also higher percentages on post-materialist issues and on religion while the issue of democracy is particularly relevant for the Spanish and the transnational samples (around 40%).

Table 22. Main area of activity of the group per country (%)

Main area of activity of the group	**Country (% of Yes)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Social issues	65.4	84.6	75.7	42.9	71.4	78.6	59.3	67.6
International issues	26.9	57.7	70.3	51.4	60.7	67.9	74.1	58.9
New social movement issues	19.2	23.1	29.7	17.1	32.1	42.9	40.7	29.0
Democracy	19.2	7.7	18.9	37.1	7.1	7.1	44.4	20.8
Religion	0.0	0.0	2.7	0.0	0.0	7.1	3.7	1.9
Total	12.6	12.6	17.9	16.9	13.5	13.5	13.0	100.0
(N)	(26)	(26)	(37)	(35)	(28)	(28)	(27)	(207)

NB – overall % of column can be above 100% because of the possibility of multiple responses.

Groups can employ different strategies to reach their goals: protest, lobbying, constructing concrete alternatives, or promoting political education and trying to raise citizens' awareness. Most of our groups do not limit themselves to a single strategy but try to maximize their possibility of success by employing and mixing different strategies (also depending on the political situation they face). As table 23 shows, almost 90% of the groups value cognitive activities disseminating information, organizing conferences, seminars and workshops, publishing research reports, etc.. Both around three quarters of the groups declare to perform protest activities and to engage in the construction of concrete alternatives. About one half of the groups employ a strategy of lobbying with direct pressure on public decision-makers. Contrary to the assumption that lobbying and protest are opposite strategies used by different actors, we found evidence for the use of both by a significant percentage of our groups. This result is consistent with most observations concerning the Seattle protests and similar events: involved organizations feel that a heterogeneous blend of tactics and strategies can multiply the opportunity to reach their objectives. However, organizations from different countries favor different strategies. While lobbying concerns more organizations from Northern European countries (Britain in particular) and the transnational level, protest regards especially Southern European countries (Spain in particular). Finally, almost all German and Swiss groups invest in political education of citizens while most of the French, Swiss and transnational groups declared to employ a strategy aimed at building concrete alternatives.

Considering the use of multiple strategies, we can note that few groups (less than 10 per cent) focus on a single strategy. More than two thirds of the organizations employ at least three strategies at the same time while one fifth employs only two different strategies. As for cross-national variation, all four strategies are used by more than 2 out of 5 German, British, and transnational groups. The use of three strategies concerns more than 2 out of 5 British, Italian, and Swiss groups.

Table 23. Main strategies of the groups per country (%)

Main strategies of the group	**Country (% of Yes)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Protest	78.6	73.1	81.1	97.1	75.0	75.9	59.3	78.1
Building concrete alternatives	85.7	61.5	64.9	62.9	89.3	79.3	88.9	75.2
Lobbying	42.9	57.7	51.4	37.1	57.1	69.0	70.4	54.3
Political education/raising awareness	78.6	100.0	89.2	82.9	96.4	89.7	92.6	89.5
Number of overlapping strategies								
0-1	10.7	7.7	8.1	5.7	3.6	10.3	7.4	7.6
2	21.4	34.6	21.6	31.4	10.7	6.9	22.2	21.4
3	39.3	15.4	43.2	40.0	50.0	41.4	22.2	36.7
4	28.6	42.3	27.0	22.9	35.7	41.4	48.1	34.3
Total	13.3	12.4	17.6	16.7	13.3	13.8	12.9	100.0
(N)	(28)	(26)	(37)	(35)	(28)	(29)	(27)	(210)

Cramer's V is: 0.257** (protest); 0.269** (alternatives); 0.232* (lobbying); n.s. (political education).
NB – overall % of column can sum above 100% because of the possibility of multiple responses.

Table 24. Repertoire of action of the groups per country (%)

Forms of action	**Country (% of Yes)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Petition	82.1	76.9	67.6	88.6	53.6	72.4	88.9	75.7
Demonstration	92.9	61.5	91.9	85.7	75.0	75.9	66.7	79.5
Strike	21.4	11.5	37.8	45.7	21.4	13.8	7.4	24.3
Boycott of certain products	32.1	11.5	48.6	37.1	17.9	41.4	22.2	31.4
Blockade	35.7	34.6	32.4	40.0	25.0	10.3	11.1	27.6
Occupation of buildings	50.0	11.5	16.2	45.7	10.7	17.2	18.5	24.8
Civil disobedience	71.4	30.8	35.1	57.1	35.7	24.1	29.6	41.0
Artistic/cultural performance	64.3	57.7	67.6	71.4	46.4	65.5	40.7	60.0
Total	13.3	12.4	17.6	16.7	13.3	13.8	12.9	100.0
(N)	(28)	(26)	(37)	(35)	(28)	(29)	(27)	(210)

Cramer's V is: 0.270** (petition); 0.275** (demonstration); 0.315*** (strike); 0.269** (boycott); 0.247** (blockade); 0.353** (occupation); 0.319*** (civil disobedience); n.s.. (artistic/cultural performance)

As for the repertoire of collective action, groups very engaged with different forms of action (both conventional and unconventional) are more likely to be from Southern European countries (see table 24). Petitions and demonstrations are used by most of our surveyed organizations (over 75%). Less widespread instead are more radical

and/or unconventional/innovative forms of action like boycotts (especially common in Italy, Spain and the UK), blockades (particularly mentioned for France, Germany and Spain), occupations and civil disobedience (especially practiced in France and Spain). Most groups share the creative and symbolic side of collective action: almost two thirds of our organizations engage in artistic and cultural performances (especially in Southern European countries and the UK). In some countries the strike is still limited to groups organizing workers while in other countries this form has spread from the trade union sector to the social movement sector. This seems especially the case for Italy and Spain.

Table 25. Evaluation of the role of the Internet per country (%)

Internet and public administrators	**Country (% of Yes)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Negative	70.8	50.0	65.0	33.3	64.3	53.6	22.2	52.9
Both negative and positive	4.2	5.6	5.0	4.8	0.0	0.0	5.6	3.2
Positive	25.0	44.4	30.0	61.9	35.7	46.4	72.2	43.9
Total	15.3	11.5	12.7	13.4	17.8	17.8	11.5	100.0
(N)	(24)	(18)	(20)	(21)	(28)	(28)	(18)	(157)
Internet and mass media								
Negative	42.9	9.1	17.2	8.3	21.4	34.5	16.7	21.6
Both negative and positive	4.8	4.5	6.9	12.5	0.0	10.3	11.1	7.0
Positive	52.4	86.4	75.9	79.2	78.6	55.2	72.2	71.3
Total	12.3	12.9	17.0	14.0	16.4	17.0	10.5	100.0
(N)	(21)	(22)	(29)	(24)	(28)	(29)	(18)	(171)
Internet and members								
Negative	7.7	0.0	6.3	6.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.3
Both negative and positive	26.9	13.0	25.0	23.3	0.0	7.7	4.2	15.4
Positive	65.4	87.0	68.8	70.0	100.0	92.3	95.8	81.3
Total	14.3	12.6	17.6	16.5	11.5	14.3	13.2	100.0
(N)	(26)	(23)	(32)	(30)	(21)	(26)	(24)	(182)

Cramer's V is: n.s. (public administrators); n.s. (media); 0.246** (members).

Together with strategies and repertoires of action, we considered the communicative strategies of our organizations. We decided to focus our attention especially on the Internet, to which a specific Work Package (WP2) of the Demos project has been devoted (see della Porta and Mosca 2005). The Internet has been said to empower resource-poor groups such as social movement organizations, but also to be selective (privileging the most educated) and to substitute offline for online participation (see della Porta and Mosca 2006b for a review). In order to estimate the perception of the

impact of the Internet on communicative strategies, we asked our interviewees an open question on the effect of the Internet in general and of their organizations' website in particular on their communication with different actors and constituencies. We then recoded each answer in up to three categories. Table 25 – distinguishing between negative, positive, and mixed perceptions of the communicative role of the Internet – presents a synthesis of our results. The overall judgment concerning the impact of the Internet on the communication with *public administrators* is negative, with however, above 40% of the groups registering a positive impact. Negative perceptions concern particularly French, Italian and Swiss groups while Spanish and transnational organizations appear as more optimistic. The evaluation of the impact of the Internet on relationships with the *mass media* is significantly different: only one fifth of the groups give a negative evaluation while for more than 70% the Internet improved communication with the mass-media. Negative evaluations are more widespread among French and British groups while groups from other countries appear as more enthusiastic. One eighth of British, Spanish, and transnational groups expressed a mixed judgment. Finally, optimism prevails when respondents are asked about the contribution of the Internet to communication with *members and sympathizers*. Negative evaluations are very few and were recorded only in Southern European countries where about one quarter of the groups showed a mixed position. Positive evaluations are expressed in particular by Northern European and transnational groups.

Exploring campaigns can tell us about action strategies and networking of our groups. Each group indicated up to five of the most important campaigns (and their territorial level) promoted or supported during the last three years. We classified the different campaigns according to their issue and territorial level. More than four fifth of the groups (in particular from the British, Italian, and transnational samples) are involved in campaigns concerning international issues (table 26). Social issues are mentioned by around two fifth of the groups (more than half in the Italian, British and Swiss samples). One fifth of the campaigns are specifically focused on national issues (i.e. campaigns to reform national legislation on international cooperation, campaigns for a new national law for the associations, alternative proposals for public spending of national budget, campaigns against repression, pro-independence campaign, campaigns against the mafia), on the promotion of transnational party federations or on the creation of think thanks. The issue of democracy is raised by almost one fourth of the campaigns, involving especially German and Spanish groups. Around one tenth of the campaigns concern so-called post-materialist values, promoted by new social movements. This type of campaign is more widespread among French and Swiss groups.

As for the territorial levels of campaigns, consistently with the main issues of these campaigns, three fourth are transnational campaigns, less than two thirds national and only one fifth are local. Here we find interesting crossnational variations: local campaigns are more diffused in Germany, Spain (one third of the groups) and especially in Switzerland (three fourth of the groups). French, Italian and Spanish groups are focusing more on the national level, while the transnational level characterizes mostly French, Italian, British and, obviously, transnational groups.

Table 26. Characteristics of campaigns per country (%)

Issues of campaigns	**Country (% of Yes)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Social issues	38.1	11.8	55.6	42.9	53.8	50.0	30.0	42.0
International issues	81.0	70.6	88.9	61.9	69.2	90.9	95.0	81.3
National issues/political parties/think thanks	9.5	17.6	41.7	19.0	30.8	9.1	0.0	20.0
Democracy	4.8	47.1	30.6	47.6	15.4	22.7	0.0	24.7
New social movement issues	23.8	0.0	16.7	9.5	30.8	4.5	10.0	13.3
Territorial levels of campaigns								
Local	9.5	35.3	13.9	33.3	76.9	4.5	0.0	20.7
National	81.0	41.2	80.6	71.4	53.8	54.5	0.0	58.0
Transnational	81.0	70.6	88.9	38.1	46.2	81.8	100.0	75.3
Total	14.0	11.3	24.0	14.0	8.7	14.7	13.3	100.0
(N)	(21)	(17)	(36)	(21)	(13)	(22)	(20)	(150)

Concluding, our analysis confirms the plurality of issues covered by the movement and the plurality of repertoires used by most groups. As also our results on organizational discourses had indicated (see chapter 4; della Porta and Reiter 2006), in trying to influence institutional decisions social movement organizations use a variety of strategies. A multiple repertoire confirms the pluralistic nature of the movement, with a (somewhat pragmatic) orientation towards the use of multiple tactics.

5.3.5. Relationships with the movement

Our research project concerns especially the Global Justice Movement and its national declinations and constellations in Europe. In this paragraph we will focus on the relationship between the selected organizations and the GJM.

First of all, we tried to map the participation of our group in a series of events organized by the GJM (see table 27). This information indicates the degree and type of involvement of the selected organizations in the dynamics of collective action. More than 75% of the groups participated in a transnational event like a World Social Forum or/and a European Social Forum. A similar share took part in Global Days of Action (i.e. against war) and more than 70% in counter-summits to meetings of International Governmental Institutions. Less then two thirds of the groups participated instead in national or local social forums.

Regarding national specificities, the groups in the French and Italian samples appear to be the most engaged in the GJM events we listed. This is probably due to the organization of important movement events in those countries during the last decade (especially G8 counter summits and European Social Forums). National and local social

forums have been important events also for German (national social forum in Erfurt), Swiss and transnational groups, while the 3rd European Social Forum (2004) in London has been particularly important for the British groups. Global days of action against war figured prominently for the Spanish groups. When moving from local to national and transnational activities, engagement in the GJM increases in all samples except the British, the German and the Swiss ones.

Table 27. Participation in movement events per country (%)

Participation in movement's events	**Country (% of Yes)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
World/European social forums	96.4	73.1	94.6	54.3	67.9	79.3	85.2	78.6
National/local social forums	82.1	73.1	54.1	48.6	71.4	17.2	63.0	57.6
Counter-summits	85.7	46.2	91.9	74.3	60.7	65.5	66.7	71.4
Global days of action	89.3	73.1	89.2	82.9	75.0	58.6	66.7	77.1
Total	13.3	12.4	17.6	16.7	13.3	13.8	12.9	100.0
(N)	(28)	(26)	(37)	(35)	(28)	(29)	(27)	(210)

Cramer's V is: 0.354*** (WSF/ESF); 0. 394*** (NSF/LSF); 0.317*** (counter-summits); 0.255** (GDA).

Table 28. Issues of networks/campaigns of the movement per country (%)

Issues of networks/campaigns	**Country (% of Yes)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Social issues	66.7	45.5	56.7	38.5	36.8	81.5	33.3	53.3
International issues	70.4	81.8	76.7	88.5	94.7	85.2	100.0	84.0
National issues/political parties/think thanks	14.8	22.7	20.0	3.8	0.0	3.7	5.6	10.7
Democracy	7.4	4.5	10.0	34.6	5.3	7.4	5.6	11.2
New social movement issues	18.5	13.6	3.3	19.2	10.5	22.2	33.3	16.6
Total	16.0	13.0	17.8	15.4	11.2	16.0	10.7	100.0
(N)	(27)	(22)	(30)	(26)	(19)	(27)	(18)	(169)
Territorial levels of networks/campaigns								
Local	3.7	0.0	0.0	7.7	10.5	7.4	0,0	4.1
National	88.9	100.0	56.7	53.8	68.4	96.3	0,0	69.0
Transnational	96.3	70.8	86.7	88.5	89.5	66.7	100.0	84.4
Total	15.8	14.0	17.5	15.2	11.1	15.8	10.5	100.0
(N)	(27)	(24)	(30)	(26)	(19)	(27)	(18)	(171)

The interviewees were further asked to indicate the five organizations, campaigns and networks dealing with global justice issues with which their groups interacted most intensively. Table 28 presents the issue and the territorial level of these groups/campaigns/networks. More than two fifth concern international issues (even more present for the Swiss and transnational groups), around half social issues (even more for France and UK) while between 10 and 20 percent concern national issues, democracy or new social movement issues. National issues are raised especially by German and Italian campaigns/networks, the issue of democracy is addressed in particular by Spanish groups, while the focus on new social movement issues concerns especially British and transnational campaigns/networks. As for the territorial level, most are active transnationally (almost 85%, especially French and transnational organizations) and nationally (almost 70%, especially German, French and British groups) but very few locally (4%, especially Spanish, Swiss and British groups).

We also asked our respondents whether their group felt part of the Global Justice Movement (see table 29). Almost 80% answered affirmatively, including organizations that pre-date the emergence of the GJM (we did not find a significant correlation between the year of foundation and sense of belonging to the movement). Almost one tenth declare to feel part of the movement but with some reservation. Very few groups (less than 10%) don't perceive themselves as being part of a GJM or don't have a shared view on the question. This information helps to define more clearly the borders and the geography of the movement in different European countries (with reference, e.g., to the role of the NGOs, the relationship with anarchist and antagonist groups generally critical toward the social forum process, etc.). French and German groups have a more critical stance towards the movement: around 15% feel part of the movement but express reservations while around one fifth declare not to be part of it. In all other countries (and at the transnational level) a full involvement in the movement is dominant, with in a few cases (about one tenth) a conditioned involvement, and (except for Italy) no cases of non-involvement.

Table 29. Sense of belonging to the GJM per country (%)

The group feels part of the movement	**Country (% of Yes)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
No	17.9	23.1	13.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.6
The group doesn't have a shared view	14.3	0.0	2.7	2.9	3.6	0.0	0.0	3.3
Yes, but with reservations	14.3	15.4	5.4	11.4	0.0	10.3	11.1	9.5
Yes	53.6	61.5	78.4	85.7	96.4	89.7	88.9	79.5
Total	13.3	12.4	17.6	16.7	13.3	13.8	12.9	100.0
(N)	(28)	(26)	(37)	(35)	(28)	(29)	(27)	(210)

Cramer's V is 0.270***.

An additional point of interest was the opinion of our groups on the main aims of the Global Justice Movement. As table 30 shows, the main aims of the movement are

perceived to be social by two thirds of the groups, international by more than one third. More than half of our groups point at new social movement issues and around one fourth underline the issue of democracy. The picture is more nuanced if we consider crossnational variation. International aims are underlined (unsurprisingly) especially by transnational groups while national groups (with the exception of the Swiss ones) point at social aims. Swiss and Spanish groups focus more on new social movement issues while democracy (together with free access to information) is seen as being at the core of the movement by a significant number of British, French, and Italian groups.

Finally, we recoded claims raised by the sampled groups distinguishing between general statements and specific proposals and between negative/contra-claims and positive/pro-claims. This contributes to our understanding of the character of national movements. The groups of our sample underline especially the *pars construens* of the movement, with 85% (especially British and transnational groups) advancing positive claims while almost 40% (especially French and Spanish groups) mention negative claims. As for the type of statement, most groups (around 80% --especially Swiss and transnational groups) advance general statements (i.e. equality for all, society transformation) while one third (especially Spanish and transnational groups) raise specific issues and/or advance policy proposals (i.e. climate change, peace, Kyoto agreement, corporate accountability law, etc.).

Table 30. Perception of the movement per country (%)

Main aims of the movement	**Country (% of Yes)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Social issues	77.3	71.4	88.2	58.6	22.2	68.0	83.3	67.0
International issues	27.3	33.3	32.4	37.9	29.6	36.0	70.8	37.9
New social movement issues	50.0	47.6	52.9	65.5	88.9	24.0	54.2	55.5
Democracy / free access to information	45.5	9.5	38.2	27.6	3.7	40.0	29.2	28.0
Total	12.1	11.5	18.7	15.9	14.8	13.7	13.2	100.0
(N)	(22)	(21)	(34)	(29)	(27)	(25)	(24)	(182)
Type of claim								
Negative/contra claim	78.3	45.0	44.1	51.7	44.4	15.4	16.7	42.1
Positive/pro claim	82.6	85.0	85.3	89.7	66.7	96.2	95.8	85.8
Total	12.6	10.9	18.6	15.8	14.8	14.2	13.1	100.0
(N)	(23)	(20)	(34)	(29)	(27)	(26)	(24)	(183)
Type of statement								
General statement	77.8	57.7	83.8	74.3	100.0	69.0	100.0	80.0
Specific proposal	37.0	34.6	27.0	45.7	14.8	17.2	50.0	32.2
Total	13.2	12.7	18.0	17.1	13.2	14.1	11.7	100.0
(N)	(27)	(26)	(37)	(35)	(27)	(29)	(24)	(205)

Concluding, our data indicate a high level of identification with the Global Justice Movement also by organizations that pre-date its emergence. Our data also point at the importance of networking (especially at the transnational levels) for our groups, that express high levels of participation in campaigns, forums and global days of actions, as well as in transnational umbrella organizations.

5.4. How to explain models of internal democracy?

In this paragraph we will evaluate the influence of different sets of variables on internal democratic practices. Concerning the dependent variable, we will consider most of the variables presented in paragraph 3.1: main decision-making body, decision-making method of the assembly, presence of an executive committee, decision-making method and source of legitimation of the executive and, finally, the model of internal decision-making.[7] We will test different hypotheses concerning competing explanations of internal democratic practices, using five sets of independent variables: organizational structure, relationship with institutions, organizational strategies, relationship with the movement, contextual characteristics (see figure 2).

5.4.1. Organizational characteristics and internal democratic practices

The first set of hypotheses tests the importance of organizational characteristics for internal democratic practices. We will consider in particular the size of the organization (number of individual and collective members), its budget, the presence of paid staff (one of the possible indicators of professionalization), and the capacity to mobilize volunteers.

Organizational structures are important elements of social movements. As Bert Klandermans noted (1989, 7): "Social movements are organized. Clearly the organizational forms they adopt very often, although not always, differ from the bureaucratic, formal structures we are used to thinking of as an organization". More in general, "Formal structure is a blueprint for activities" (Meyer and Rowan 1983, 23). In social movement organizations resources vary in scale and type (Rucht 1989, 73). "Organizational capacity refers to the organization's financial and human resources as well as the administrative knowledge and capabilities to implement procedures and programs relevant to movement-related goals" (Zald, Morrill and Ro 2005, 265). The organizational decision-making model and conceptions of democracy in fact have been linked to some organizational characteristics. Availability of resources has been linked to formalized models and, conversely, bureaucratization and centralization are said to generate revenues (Knoke 1989, 136). On the other hand, informal SMOs based upon face-to-face interaction of people that know each other personally tend to rely upon direct democracy through reasoned debates followed by collective choices (Rosenthal and Schwartz 1989, 45 ff.).

[7] Ordinal variable varying from lower levels to higher levels of deliberation and participation.

As table 31 shows, organizational characteristics are very useful in explaining internal democratic practices. Large numbers of individual and collective members are correlated with hierarchical organizations where an executive committee is present as the main decision-making body employing non consensual decision-making methods. Most important, the larger the number of members the lower are possibilities for participative and deliberative democratic models. The same pattern emerges in connection with the budget and the presence of paid staff (indicator of professionalization). Wealthier and more professionalized organizations are much less oriented towards participative and deliberative democratic models. Better said, large budgets and paid staff require delegation of power within the organization and the adoption of majoritarian rules in the decision-making process. The number of volunteers does not mitigate these tendencies: also their presence is inversely related with internal models that encourage participation and deliberation.

Table 31. Role of the organization (Kendall's Tau B)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	*DEPENDENT VARIABLE – INTERNAL DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES*			
Organizational Structure	Main decision-making body (0=executive)	Decision-making method of the main body (0=majority)	Presence of an executive committee (0=no)	Democratic Model
Type of member	n.s.	n.s.	-0.154*	n.s.
Number of individual members	-0.372**	-0.367**	0.454**	-0.449**
Number of collective members	n.s.	-0.268*	0.291**	-0.316**
Budget	-0.277**	-0.278**	0.440**	-0.312**
Presence of paid staff (dummy)	-0.347**	-0.296**	0.568**	-0.396**
Number of volunteers	-0.197**	-0.320**	0.259**	-0.334**
Total (N)	73-204	66-189	73-204	63-179

Legenda - level of significance: ** = 0.01 (2-tailed); * = 0.05 (2-tailed); n.s. = non significant.

Summarizing, our data tend to confirm the hypotheses concerning the impact of organizational variables on internal organizational functioning.

5.4.2. Internal and external democracy

A second set of variables tests hypotheses concerning the impact of relationships with institutions on the internal democratic functioning of an organization. As Zald and McCarthy observed (1987, 45): "Social movements are not created outside of the traditions and institutional bases of the larger society in which they are nested. Instead, the cadre and networks of adherents and activists grow out of, build upon, and use the

repertoires of action, the institutional forms and physical facilities of the larger society". According to neoinstitutional theory, growing similarity in organizational forms derives from institutional isomorphism linked to either coercion (political influence), imitation, or professionalization (DiMaggio and Powell 1991b, 67). Organizational structures can be imposed, authorized, induced, acquired, imprinted, incorporated or bypassed (Scott 1991, 170). Dependence from state agencies would increase pressure to isomorphism (ibid., 74); more specifically, "The greater the extent to which the organizations in a field transact with agencies of the state, the greater the extent of isomorphism in the field as a whole" (ibid., 76). The conditions governing access to public and private funding, tax exemption or advantageous postage rates influence the organizational structure of groups who wish to benefit from these possibilities.[8] The establishment of a working relation with the authorities, however, also has ambivalent implications for the development of SMOs: "On the one hand, public recognition, access to decision-making procedures and public subsidies may provide crucial resources and represent important successes for the SMO; on the other hand, the integration into the established system of interest intermediation may impose limits on the mobilisation capacity of the SMO and alienate important parts of its constituency, with the consequence of weakening it in the long run" (Kriesi 1996, 155-6).

Table 32 – Role of relationship with institutions (Kendall's Tau B)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	*DEPENDENT VARIABLE – INTERNAL DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES*			
Relationships with institutions	Main decision-making body	Decision-making method of the main body	Presence of an executive committee	Democratic model
Collaboration with international institutions (dummy)	-0.381**	-0.213**	0.394**	-0.345**
Collaboration with national institutions (dummy)	-0.370**	-0.262**	0.415**	-0.371**
Collaboration with local institutions (dummy)	-0.264**	n.s.	0.229**	-0.162*
Perception of public decision-making (dummy)	-0.195*	n.s.	0.251**	-0.182*
Evaluation of public decision-making	-0.370**	n.s.	0.232**	-0.310**
Governative fundings (dummy)	n.s.	n.s.	0.204**	n.s.
Total (N)	115-203	105-187	114-202	106-179

Legenda - level of significance: ** = 0.01 (2-tailed); * = 0.05 (2-tailed); n.s. = non significant.

Some of the mentioned variables proved in fact useful in explaining internal democratic practices of our groups (see table 32). While collaboration with local institutions is not significantly correlated with our set of dependent variables,

[8] See the concepts of 'funded' SMOs in McCarthy and Zald 1987a, 358ff. or 'registered' SMOs in McCarthy, Britt and Wolfson 1991, 68.

collaborating with international and national institutions is associated with hierarchical organizations (where the executive is the main decision-making body) and with majoritarian rules of decision-making. In both cases the collaboration with institutions characterizes organizations with a democratic model based on principles of high delegation and low deliberation. The perception of experiments of public decision-making is not related with internal democratic practices, while the variable concerning evaluation of such experiments provides more interesting results. In fact, less hierarchical organizations tend to have more negative views on this type of experiments, while the presence of an executive committee is associated with positive judgments. Consistently with this result, the more the internal democratic model is based on principles of participation and deliberation, the more critical is the evaluation of experiments in participatory public decision-making. This result can be explained by the fact that the associational democratic conception fits better within democratic experiments promoted by institutions that often require some elements of internal delegation and formal representativity. More innovative democratic conceptions tend instead to fuel mistrust in this kind of experiments, considered as ineffective and instrumental. Although the participatory budgeting, imported from Porto Alegre, has been usually perceived with more sympathies, it just started to develop in Europe, and few of our organizations have participated in it. Unsurprisingly, receiving funds from governmental sources is associated with the presence of an executive committee and with internal democratic models characterized by low deliberation and high delegation.

Summarizing, the hypothesis concerning the impact of relationships with insttutions on internal organizational functioning seems to be confirmed by our data.

5.4.3. Repertoires of action and organizational repertoires

A third set of variables tests hypotheses concerning the impact of organizational strategies on the internal democratic functioning of an organization.

Social movement studies have addressed the issue of the relationship between organizational models and organizational values, but with not very conclusive results. In principle, the choice of an organizational model is an important part of a group identity. As noted above, new social movement approaches stressed the non-strategic function of social movement organization: its orientation to identity building and solidarity-expressive behavior (Cohen 1985; Melucci 1985). In the words of Alberto Melucci (1984, 830) “The new organizational form of contemporary social movements is not just ‘instrumental’ for their goals. It is a goal in itself”. It has therefore been stressed that “Studies of SMOs … require an approach which is cognizant of the value component attached to social organizations by the participants” (Brown 1989, 238). Within social movement organizations, judgments on organizational strategies are made not so much on their efficiency or efficacy, but more on their symbolic appropriateness. According to Bert Klandermans (1989b, 219) “In many SMOs, democratic, egalitarian values have generated such arrangements as rotating, distributed, and multiple leadership … deliberately designed to prevent SMOs from becoming bureaucratic organizations”. In fact, decision-making power apparently lies at the top of the organization, but its

effectiveness depends upon degree of compliance by rank and file members (Hartley 1989).

Organizational goals are therefore expected to influence organizational strategies: instrumental and inclusive organizations (that is, organizations that allow for multi-membership) are said to promote formal structures; expressive and exclusive ones are said to be more oriented towards informal small-group structures (Curtis and Zurcher 1974). Also, organizations that pursue policy change are more centralized and bureaucratized than those aiming at societal change (Knoke 1989). Expressive movements are decentralized; those aiming at institutional change more centralized (Rucht 1984). SMOs that are exclusive and/or oriented to individual changes are said to be less susceptible to pressure for organizational maintenance (Zald and Ash 1987, 127). In the environmental movement, different environmentalist frames are related with different organizational forms (Brulle 1996; 2000). Non-profit organizations are more likely to be informal, at least in comparison with for-profit firms (Gaffney 1984) or, even if formal, relatively free from state surveillance and control (McCarthy *et al.* 1991). Organizational formats vary for advocacy, service and protest oriented groups (Minkoff 1995, see also McCarthy 2005).

A main cleavage has been set between organizations oriented to mobilizing funds and those mobilizing people: "The problem of mobilizing money is very different from the problem of mobilizing action, and there are inherent organizational tensions created by trying to do both" (Oliver and Furman 1989, 156). "The basic alternative is therefore between the mobilization of "time" (activism) or "money" (Oliver and Marwell, 1992). The two aims are often in reciprocal tension as they require different "mobilization technologies" and, therefore, different organizational models (Oliver and Marwell 1992; Schwartz and Paul 1992; see della Porta and Diani 2006 for a summary). Emotional messages which provide a clear-cut definition of a movement's identity and opponents are essential to mobilizing core activists (Gamson, 1992), but radicalism may alienate sectors of sympathizers and prospective supporters with less clear-cut orientations and motivations (Friedman and McAdam 1992) and also sympathies within institutions.[9] If these studies stressed the impact of instrumental versus symbolic organizational conceptions, other research indicated that "There are no uniform or definite correlations between particular issues and structures" (Rucht 1989, 73, on ecologist organizations).

For our cases, only some of these dimensions help explaining internal democratic models (see table 33). Confirming the relevance of the action repertoire, the use of lobbying as a strategy is strongly correlated with the set of variables concerning the organizational structure (number of individual and collective members, budget, presence of paid staff, and number of volunteers): richer, bigger (in terms of members and volunteers) and more professionalized organizations are more likely to adopt a strategy of direct pressure on public decision-makers. The use of lobbying is also associated with a central role of the executive, the use of non consensual decision-making methods, and therefore with democratic models based on high delegation and low deliberation. Radical forms of action such as occupation of buildings and civil disobedience present an

[9] Instrumental versus affective motivations also play a role in individual exit; as noted by van der Veen and Klandermans (1989, 195), "depending on the characteristics displayed by a social movement, 'exit' behavior is explicable in terms of either cost/benefit theory or commitment theory".

opposite trend, being correlated with a central role of the assembly, absence of an executive committee and participative and deliberative democratic models.

Table 33 – Role of organizational strategies (Kendall's Tau B)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE *Organizational Strategies*	*DEPENDENT VARIABLE – INTERNAL DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES*			
	Main decision-making body	Decision-making method of the main body	Presence of an executive committee	Democratic Model
Protest	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Building alternatives	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Lobbying	-0.229**	-0.165*	0.268**	-0.187**
Political education	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Overlapping strategies	-0.134*	-0.147*	0.209**	-0.137*
Petition	n.s.	n.s.	0.176*	n.s.
Demonstration	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Strike	n.s.	-0.158*	n.s.	n.s.
Boycott	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Blockade	0.154*	n.s.	-0.163*	0.189*
Occupation of buildings	0.250**	n.s.	-0.224**	0.290**
Civil disobedience	0.201**	n.s.	n.s.	0.222**
Artistic/cultural performance	0.166*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Internet's impact on p.a.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Internet's impact on media	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Internet's impact on members	-0.257**	n.s.	0.153*	-0.155*
Total (N)	116-202 157-209	150-210 144-193	142-193 156-209	134-181 139-184

Legenda - level of significance: ** = 0.01 (2-tailed); * = 0.05 (2-tailed); n.s. = non significant.

As for communicative strategies, the expansion of both printed and electronic means of communication has permitted the 'externalization' of certain costs (Tarrow 1994, 143-5). If previously highly structured organizations were required to get a message across, today even lightweight organizations can gain media attention. Websites spread information, mobilize activists, and increase identification (Rosenkrands 2004, 72-3; della Porta and Mosca 2006b). In some cases, Computer-Mediated Communication simply expands the capacity to act of already solid organizations such as Greenpeace or Oxfam; in other cases, however, it brings together networks of activists with very informal organizational structures, if any. New technologies have increased the capacity for coordinated action; their effects of "deverticalization" have been noticed not only on social movement organizations, but also on corporations (Davies and Zald 2005). In

social movements, it allowed for "rapid, synchronous, decentralized movement activities" (ibid., 343). Our data, however, while confirming that Internet is considered as an important instrument of communication with generally positive results on the internal functioning of the organizations do not show any impact of the perceptions on the use of Internet on the organizational model. It seems therefore that organizations adopting different internal democratic models use and assess Internet according to different communicative strategies (see della Porta and Mosca 2006b).

While the use of some action repertoires seems to constrain the choices concerning the organizational model, according to our data the issues on which a group focuses has no relevant effect on the way in which the group is organized. This seems to confirm the transissue character of our groups, as well as the weak effects of previous thematic distinctions of social movements (environmental versus labour, or national versus international) in accounting for the organizational models adopted.

5.4.4. Networking and internal democracy

A fourth set of variables tests the hypotheses concerning the impact of relationships with the movement on the internal democratic functioning of an organization.

Interactions within the social movement sector have been considered as very important for social movement dynamics. An organizational environment has been defined as a "population", i.e. groups of organizations viewed as similar, or an "interorganizational (or multiorganizational) field", i.e. based upon actual relations, or sectors (Scott and Meyer 1983, 130-131). Interorganizational environments can be of various types and quality: they range from instrumental exchanges to shared identities (see also Diani and Bison 2004) and from occasional to stable, in certain cases leading to the foundation of new organizations (Diani 1995a; Zald and McCarthy 1980, 10ff). The degree of internal competition versus cooperation also varies (della Porta and Diani 2006, chap. 5; Staggenborg 1986). Networking tends to intensify in periods of mobilization, and an intensification of networking has been has been underlined for the recent period: "The most dramatic change in the TSMOs [transnational SMOs] population over the past three decades is that these groups are adopting the more decentralized and informal coalition form" (Smith 2005, 235). Moreover, there is an increase in multiissue TSMOs (from 7% in 1973 to 17% in 2000) and in those active on global justice/environmental issues (from 4 to 11%) (ibid., 233). A high tendency to cooperate, which we observed for our population, might be related with the diffusion of inclusive values. Research in social movements has indeed stressed that inclusive organizations (with low requests to their members) are more likely to participate in coalitions, and competition for resources among them tends to be less intense (Zald and Ash 1987, 133; Zald and McCarthy 1987b, 165). From a micro perspective, "The more SMOs have overlapping constituencies, the more they should be constrained towards cooperation" (Zald and McCarthy 1987b, 174). Variety can increase mobilization capacity: especially when the potential basis of support is heterogeneous, "a protest campaign … is best served when several competitive but cooperative SMOs are permitted to play different roles and are encouraged to pursue different strategic possibilities" (Mushaben 1989, 296). However, the differences in the organizational models adopted might impact on coalition building (Warren 2001) and

federation forms (such as those of "franchising") have the problem of "insuring the integrity and uniformity of the organizational product" (McCarthy 2005, 221).

Table 34 – Role of relationship with the movement (Kendall's Tau B)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	*DEPENDENT VARIABLE – INTERNAL DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES*			
Relationship with the movement	Main decision-making body	Decision-making method of the main body	Presence of an executive committee	Democratic model
Participation in WSF/ESF	-0.223**	-0.180*	0.282**	-0.221**
Participation in NSF/LSF	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Participation in counter-summits	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Participation in GDA	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Sense of belonging	n.s.	0.192**	n.s.	0.146*
Total (N)	202-209	186-193	202-209	177-184

Legenda - level of significance: ** = 0.01 (2-tailed); * = 0.05 (2-tailed); n.s. = non significant.

According to our data (see table 34), participation in the social forum process (especially at the transnational level) is associated with a central role of the executive, majoritarian types of decision-making and less participative and deliberative democratic models. We can hypothesize that bigger and wealthier organizations have more opportunities (and resources) to travel and to participate in this type of transnational events. The lack of significant correlation coefficients concerning participation in other types of movement events and in movement campaigns/networks, seems to indicate the spread of networking as a general value independently from the organizational model adopted. The sense of belonging to the movement is associated with consensual types of decision-making and with participative and deliberative democratic models: the more one organization feels part of the movement, the more its internal democratic functioning is oriented toward consensus. While therefore the organizations that participate more often in social forums (at least at the transnational level) are more oriented towards traditional democratic models, the groups identifying more strongly with the movement are more oriented towards innovative consensus-based democratic models.

Summarizing, the participation in social forums (at least at the transnational level) tends to increase for more formal organizations while the sense of belonging to the movement is stronger in organizations that privilege participation and consensual methods. All organizations, no matter their internal democratic style, equally mobilize in national and local social forum, countersummits, and global days of action.

5.4.5. Path dependency, institutional isomorphism and democratic model

We used a fifth set of variables to test hypotheses concerning the impact of environmental characteristics on the internal democratic functioning of an organization.

In particular, we considered the national characteristics of the Global Justice Movement in the different countries[10] and the founding period of the selected organizations.

The environment in which an organization develops is considered as particularly relevant for its organizational choices. In general, organizational decision-making is influenced by the degree of scarcity of some resources in the organizational environment as well as the information flows from the external environment (Knoke 1989). There is however also an issue of organizational legitimacy, linked to the resonance of some organizational models in a cultural environment (Scott 1991, 170): "Organizations that incorporate societally legitimized rationalized elements in their formal structures maximize their legitimacy and increase their resources and survival capabilities" (Meyer and Rowan 1983, 34). In an environment characterized by high support for bureaucratic models (or "rational myths") formal organizations will be privileged (ibid., 42).[11] Looking at isomorphism between SMOs and national political opportunities, it has been observed that the openness of institutional structures may favor the development of formal organizations (Rucht 1994). As for territorial assets, "The extent to which a political system is centralized or decentralized shapes social movements by presenting different targets for social movement activities" (Ash and Zald 1987, 309). However, it was also observed that we cannot generalize the argument that an open institutional system, offering resources to citizens' organizations, results necessarily in formal organizations positively integrated within the system: First of all, "often, formal, hierarchical structures have been established to better fight a hostile state apparatus. … Conversely, an open, decentralized political system may also facilitate similar trends towards decentralization and informality among movement organizations" (della Porta and Diani 2006, 153; see also Rucht 1996). Rather than assuming a rigid relationship between the form that social movement activists give to their organizations, and the characteristics of the institutional system in which they operate, it has been recognized that multiple organizational forms may be accommodated within the same system. This underlines the margins of choice that social movement actors have when trying to adapt creatively to their environment, instead of being determined by it, even if these margins are constrained by historically-specific repertoires of forms of organization (Clemens 1996). In any given country and at any given time, that repertoire is restricted; although it can be expanded by borrowing ideas from other countries or domains, such transformations are slow. The adoption of a particular organizational model becomes

[10] For the statistical analysis, we used a dummy variable attributing value 0 to Germany, UK and Switzerland and value 1 to France, Italy and Spain. The findings from other parts of our research pointed at the existence of two different constellation of the GJM in the countries covered, i.e. a Northern European and a Southern European one (see chapter 2; della Porta 2007). The 30 cases concerning the transnational level were excluded.

[11] In neoinstitutional approaches, isomorphism is understood as deriving from either technologic selection or shared social reality (Meyer and Rowan 1983). Myths are "generated by particular organizational practices and diffused through relational networks" (ibid., 29). For instance, "In modern society an important category of the rules and belief system as well as relational networks that arise are sets of 'rational myths'… these beliefs are myths in the sense that they depend for their efficacy, for their reality, on the fact that they are widely shared, or are promulgated by individuals or groups that have been granted the right to determine such matters" (Scott 1983a, 14). The rational myth comprises assumptions about a definable purpose, means-ends relationship, resources in the environment, and organizational control (Meyer 1983, 267).

more likely "to the extent that the proposed model of organization is believed to work, involves practices and organizational relations that are already familiar, and is consonant with the organization of the rest of those individuals' social worlds" (Clemens 1996, 211).

In this sense, the observed evolution towards a more inclusive network format resonates with a general shift. Since the 1990s, in fact, not only in social movements, bureaucratic models have been contrasted with emerging network models, "based on the independence of the single components, horizontal integration, flexibility in goals and strategies, multiple levels of interaction with the possibility of communitarian elements" (della Porta and Diani 2006, 159; on network structures see also Powell 1990; Podolny and Page 1998; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999; Castells 1996, Diani 2003). In parallel, in organizational sociology a shift has been noticed from a vision of organizations as centralized and hierarchical to a vision of them as embedded in non-hierarchical networks of relationship (Clemens 2005, 355).

This change might be reflected in the democratic values of our organizations according to their "generation" (measured by the year of foundation). In social movement analysis the effect of time on organizations has been addressed first of all in terms of life cycle. Herbert Blumer (1951, 203), for example, distinguished four stages in the typical social movement lifecycle. The first, or 'social ferment', stage is characterized by unorganized, unfocused agitation during which great attention is paid to the propaganda of 'agitators'. In the second phase, of 'popular excitement', the underlying causes of discontent and the objectives of action are more clearly defined. In the third 'formalization' phase, disciplined participation and coordination of strategies for achieving the movement's aims are obtained by creating a formal organization. Finally, in the 'institutionalization' stage the movement becomes an organic part of society and crystallizes into a professional structure. Alternatively, it was suggested that "organizations are shaped by logics that shift over time" (Lounsbury 2005, 74). Changes in organizational models are related to "critical junctures—that is, major shocks and crises that disrupt the status quo and trigger fundamental changes" (Campbell 2005, 60).

Concerning the context variable, as we already noticed in other parts of this research project (see in particular della Porta and Reiter 2005), in the selected countries the format and density of organizational networks tend to vary generating two different constellations of social movements that correspond with Northern and Southern Europe (della Porta 2007b). Social movement networks have different formats (more integrated in the French, Italian and Spanish case; more polarized in the German, Swiss and, to a lesser extent, in the British case); different organizational structures (more horizontal in the first group, more vertical in the second one) and a different attitude toward non conventional collective action (more oriented towards protest in the first group, more oriented towards lobbying in the second one).

As for the organizational "generation", the age of the selected organizations was recoded attributing the groups to different generations of social movements (see also della Porta and Reiter 2006, 65). As we have observed in paragraph 5.3.2, many groups already existed before the emergence of the GJM, having been founded during previous waves of protest and on different concerns: some are labour movement organizations or charities born a long time ago, others were founded in the wave of the '68 movement/s;

still others emerged with the "new" social movement of the last two decades. As with previous waves of mobilization, however, also the one that started at the turn of the millennium produced new organizations.

As table 35 illustrates, groups belonging to Southern European movements are more likely to attribute a central role to the assembly and to adopt a deliberative participative model of democratic functioning. However, correlation coefficients are very low even if significant. As for the age of the organizations, our data seem to confirm a mechanism of path dependency: the "younger" organizations are more likely to recognize a central role to the assembly, to employ consensus-based methods, to avoid the presence of an executive committee, and to adopt democratic models based on participation and deliberation.

Table 35 – Role of environmental characteristics (Kendall's Tau B)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	*DEPENDENT VARIABLE – INTERNAL DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES*			
Environmental characteristics	Main decision-making body	Decision-making method of the main body	Presence of an executive committee	Democratic model
National constellation of movements	0.198*	n.s.	n.s.	0.167*
Generation	0.234**	0.395**	-0.427**	0.285**
Total (N)	172-182	160-170	171-182	154-165

Legenda - level of significance: ** = 0.01 (2-tailed); * = 0.05 (2-tailed); n.s. = non significant.

Summarizing, our data seem to confirm the hypotheses concerning the impact of environmental characteristics like national constellation of the GJM and founding period of a group on internal organizational functioning.

CHAPTER 6. GLOBAL ACTIVISTS: CONCEPTIONS AND PRACTICES OF DEMOCRACY IN THE EUROPEANSOCIAL FORUMS[1]

> "We, women and men from social movements across Europe, came to Athens after years of common experiences, fighting against war, neoliberalism, all forms of imperialism, colonialism, racism, discrimination and exploitation, against all the risks of an ecological catastrophe" (Declaration of the Assembly of the Movements of the 4th European Social Forum, Athens 7th May 2006).

With these words, the activists who participated in the Assembly of the Movements of the European Social Forum (ESF) in Athens presented themselves, remembering "years of common experiences". The ESF in Athens was the fourth social forum held at the European scale, with the aim of providing a space for the encounter of hundreds of social movement organizations and thousands of activists. In the declaration of the Assembly of the Movements, the activists claim to have been part of a successful fight against neoliberalism: "This year has been significant in that a number of social struggles and campaigns have been successful in stopping neoliberal projects such as the proposed European Constitution Treaty, the EU Ports Directive, and the CPE in France". The targets of this struggle are singled out in a number of IGOs, including the EU: "Movements of opposition to neoliberalism are growing and are clashing against the power of trans-national corporations, the G8 and organizations such as the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank, as well the neo-liberal policies of the states and the European Union" (ibid.). This discourse resonates with the one put forward already at the first ESF in Florence, in 2002, where the Call of the European Social Movements stated: "We have come together from the social and citizens movements from all the regions of Europe, East and West, North and South. We have come together through a long process: the demonstrations of Amsterdam, Seattle, Prague, Nice, Gothenburg, Genoa, Brussels, Barcelona, the big mobilisations against neoliberalism as well as the general strikes for the defence of social rights and all the mobilisations against war, show the will to build another Europe". In a similar way, stressing the internal diversity as an enriching characteristic of their movement, the Declaration of the assembly of the movements at the third ESF, held in London in 2004, had claimed: "We come from all the campaigns and social movements, 'no vox' organisations, trade unions, human rights organisations, international solidarity organisations, anti-war and peace and feminist movements. We come from every region in Europe to gather in London for the third European Social Forum. We are many, and our strength is our diversity".

[1] This chapter is based the introductory chapter of the Demos WP5 Report, authored by Donatella della Porta, and some of the results presented in other chapters of the report (see della Porta and Andretta 2007). The report includes thematic chapters authored by Lorenzo Mosca and Isabelle Sommier (The ESF organizational process in a diachronic perspective), Massimiliano Andretta and Donatella della Porta (Models of democracy: how activists see democracy in the movement), Donatella della Porta and Marco Giugni (Democracy from below: activists and institutions), Massimiliano Andretta, Moarco Bandler, Nicolas Haeringer, Ilhame Hajji, Manuel Jiménez, and Isabelle Sommier (The socio-demography of global activism), Clare Saunders, Massimiliano Andretta, Nicolas Haeringer, Ilhame Hajji, and Isabelle Sommier (The European Social Forum and the organizational dimension), Massimiliano Andretta, Iosif Botetzagias, Moses Boudourides, Olga Kioufegi, and Mundo Yang (How deliberative democracy networks), Marco Giugni, Alessandro Nai and Herbert Reiter (Protest and the Forum), Lorenszo Mosca, Dieter Rucht, Simon Teune and Sara Lopez Martin (Communicating the Forum), Massimiliano Andretta and Herbert Reiter (The European Left and the Forum).

In the following chapter, we will discuss, first, why and how the issue of democracy is relevant in research on contemporary social movements. Second, we will explain why the European Social Forum is a significant (and "critical") case study. We will then present the results of a research based mainly upon a survey of activists at the 4th European Social Forum in Athens in 2006 in order to analyse the activists' conceptions of democracy within and without the social movement itself.

6.1. Democracy and/in contemporary social movements: where is the challenge

6.1.1. From organizational to individual conceptions of democracy

The basic assumption of our research is that the reflection about democracy plays an important role in social movement organizations and that, conversely, social movements are important actors in contemporary democracies. Although their activities are not limited to the political system, social movement organizations often interact with it: by protesting, they present claims to various levels of governance; they encounter "street level bureaucrats" such as police officers; they lobby various branches of the public administration; (more and more often) public services addressed to specific constituencies (women, migrants etc.) are contracted out to them.

Beyond addressing demands to decision makers, social movements express a fundamental critique of conventional politics, thus shifting their endeavours from politics itself to meta-politics (Offe 1985). Since the 1970s, the "new social movements" have been said to present important innovations also vis-à-vis dominant conceptions in the workers' movement; among them are decentralised and participatory organisational structures; defence of interpersonal solidarity against state and corporate bureaucracies; and the claiming of autonomous spaces, rather than material advantages (ibid.). In doing this, social movement organizations develop proposals—ranging from limited reforms to ambitious utopias—for alternative democratic practices. The dimension of internal democracy is all the more important for collective actors that have little material incentives to distribute and must therefore gain and keep the commitment of their members on the bases of shared beliefs. This is especially challenging for a basis of activists that appear as very exigent, critical and self-critical when issues of internal democracy are at stake.

Social movement organisations are also self-reflexive actors insofar as they tend to debate the issue of democracy as it applies to their internal lives (Melucci 1989). Recent research confirmed the high degree of critical debate on democracy present in social movements: internal democracy emerges as an important topic of discussion for the activists (della Porta 2005a). Past experiences are reflected upon, showing important learning processes, although no satisfactory solution seemed ready yet to address the main organizational dilemma (e.g. participation versus efficacy, equality versus specialization, etc.). As a sociologist who has studied the evolution of participatory democratic practices in American movements notes, "a 60s activist would be surprised by the procedural machinery that today accompanies the democratic deciding process. There are formal roles – timekeepers, facilitators, observers of feelings – and a sophisticated range of gestures. Raising moving fingers as if playing a piano indicates support for a point; making a triangle in the air with fore-finger and thumb of both hands indicates concern with respect for rules of the deliberative process; a raised fist indicates an intention to veto the decision" (Polletta 2002, 190-91).

On both the external and the internal dimensions of democracy social movements have been said to affirm the legitimacy (if not the primacy) of alternatives to representative democracy, criticising both liberal democracy and the 'organised democracy' of political parties. Their ideas resonate with 'an ancient element of democratic theory that calls for an organisation of collective decision-making referred to in varying ways as classical, populist, communitarian, strong, grass-roots, or direct democracy against a democratic practice in contemporary democracies labelled as realist, liberal, elite, republican, or representative democracy' (Kitschelt 1993, 15).

To these (more traditional) participatory values, some emerging ones have been linked, such as attention to communication, practices of consensus building, the emphasis on the inclusion of diverse groups and, especially, the respect for this diversity (see chapter 4 and 5; della Porta 2004b; della Porta and Reiter 2005 and 2006). These aspects resonate with the emerging debate in political theory and social sciences in general on the so-called discursive or deliberative democracy, especially with the approaches locating democratic deliberation in voluntary groups (Cohen 1989), social movements (Dryzek 2000), protest arenas (Young 2003, 119) or, more in general, enclaves free from institutional power (Mansbridge 1996). Investigating recent movements, Francesca Polletta (2002, 7) stressed in fact the use by activists of deliberative talk: "they expected each other to provide legitimate reasons for preferring one option to another. They strove to recognize the merits of each other's reasons for favoring a particular option… the goal was not unanimity, so much as discourse. But it was a particular kind of discourse, governed by norms of openness and mutual respect".

Given external and internal challenges, we assume that the issue of democracy is particularly relevant for the GJM. First, the GJM reacts to deep transformations in representative systems that include power shifts from the national to the international level as well as from the state to the market (della Porta 2005a). Internal democracy is particularly relevant for a multifaceted, heterogeneous movement (which has significantly defined itself a "movement of movements") that incorporates many social, generational and ideological groups as well as movement organizations from different countries. As the first studies on this subject have pointed out, this movement has a more pluralistic identity, loosely connected organizational structure, and more multiform action repertoire than those characteristic of previous movements (Andretta, della Porta, Mosca and Reiter 2002 and 2003; della Porta and Mosca 2003). Moreover, the global justice activists develop "tolerant" identities as opposed to the "totalitarian", or at least organizational, identities of the past (della Porta 2004b). Other parts of the Demos research project confirmed that the issue of democracy continues to be a very relevant one for social movements (see chapters 4 and 5).

Recognizing the importance of social movements in and for democracy, social movement research has traditionally focused more on the external than on the internal dimension, and more on the effects of representative democracy on social movement characteristics than vice-versa (see above, 4, 53, 64). The main (although not the only) questions asked in the last decades have therefore focused on macro-causes for movements, and the instrumental role of movement organizations in mobilizing environmental resources. These relevant questions will remain central also for contemporary movements. However, contemporary movements also brought about the perception of a need to re-focus our attention from social movements as dependent variables to social movements as independent and conscious actors, producing changes not only outside, but also inside them. Internal communication and democratic practices are all relevant

angles for addressing a movement that is innovative and plural. In this sense, we want to move attention towards what we can define as the emergent properties of protest. In his call for an "eventful temporality", Sewell (1996) suggests to consider the capacity of some events to interrupt or challenge the existing structures. Research on the GJM started in fact to pay attention to a sort of cross-fertilization ("contamination" in the Italian neologism) in action recognizing some of the emerging characteristics of collective action. Action-campaigns and the networking structure of the GJM produce a situation of intense interaction between various individuals and organizations. This creates a process of contamination in action through mechanisms of multiplication of individual belonging and organizational networking, which in turn facilitates frame-bridging, the transformation of identities and the creation of informal links (della Porta and Mosca 2006a).

With its focus on conceptions and practices of democracy within social movements, our research aims at an innovative contribution to a long-lasting and important debate. Summarizing, we look at social movements as spaces for the elaboration of conceptions of democracy and first experimentation with them. If our concern with democracy within the GJM remained stable in all parts of our project, a specificity of the following is the focus on the micro-dimension. While in fact in the other parts of our research the unit of analysis are the social movement organizations, in this part we focus (although not exclusively) on individual conceptions and experiences.

Research on activists has addressed both social background and political attitudes and behaviour. Social science research on political participation has traditionally stressed a class divide in political participation: political participation emerges in fact as limited and selective, since it increases with social status. Research on social movements also looked at the social characteristics of activists, reaching some similar conclusions. First, it has often been observed that the new social movements recruit in a specific social base, mainly made of some components of the middle-class (Kriesi 1993). Second, in order to account for the overrepresentation of young and student activists, the concept of biographical availability was used to point at the circumstances that increase free-time and limit family responsibilities, reducing constraints against participation in movement actions (see McAdam 1988). The increase in unconventional forms of participation had only a limited equalizing effect as far as gender, age and education are considered (Topf 1995, 78).

Questions about support for protest have re-emerged in the social science discussion of contemporary global social movements, prompted by the apparent heterogeneity in the social background of activists of protest campaigns on issues of debt relief, international trade rules and barriers, global taxation, fair trade, peace etc.. Research on the GJM contributed some useful information on the social background of activists. The prediction of the hypothesis on the "social centrality" that individual resources increase propensity to mobilize is only partially useful to explain the social background of our activists, that emerged as well-educated and predominantly middle-class, but also with a high component of workers and no overrepresentation of male and middle-aged groups of the population. Additionally, for a "movement of movements" the inclusiveness towards the social groups the movement aims at representing is a relevant issue (Doerr 2006a and 2006b; Haug 2006).

A second important set of questions refer to the political background of participants, their values and previous experiences. Especially with the growth of political participation and the enlargement of the research on unconventional forms of action, the debate about the degree and sources of selectivity re-emerged, with however a new focus on the role of collective identities in

overcoming individual lack of resources. Alessandro Pizzorno (1966) had already noted that the characteristic of politics is to refer to systems of solidarity that are at the basis of the very definition of interest: interests can in fact be singled out only with reference to a specific value system, and values push individuals to identify with wider groups in the society, providing a sense of belonging to them and the willingness to mobilize for them. In this perspective, participation is an action in solidarity with others that aims at protecting or transforming the dominant values and interest systems (ibid.). The process of participation requires therefore the construction of solidarity communities within which individuals perceive themselves and are recognized as equals. Identification as awareness of being part of a collective facilitates political participation. Additionally, research on participation in protest events has stressed the role of social networks in mobilizing activists (Klandermans 1997). Participation is therefore explained not only by individual resources, but also by collective and relational resources.

In this direction, research on the activists of the GJM has already contributed important knowledge on the role of multiple memberships, previous experiences of mobilization as well as individual networks in the paths towards and within political activism. In fact, the social background of our activists was linked to their participation in previous waves of protest and the civil society groups that developed from these protests: students had often experiences in student groups, women in feminist collectives, workers in trade unions. The social bases of the "global" protest seem, indeed, to reflect the range of political cleavages already mobilized, without the clear emergence of a "new cleavage"—e.g. between "winners" and "loosers" of globalization. Indeed, the dominant identification with the "left" of the political spectrum seems to testify for the reemergence of conflicts on social inequalities that were considered as mainly pacified (della Porta 2005c). Also here, more research is needed in order to compare these patterns in time and space.

Contributing to these debates, this research aims however to go beyond these sets of questions focusing on the role that these different dimensions of participation have on conceptions and practices of democracy. As for the social basis of our protest, we aim at discussing to which extent new generations, women, middle classes or precarious workers are carriers of specific visions of democracy. In terms of political careers, we will observe to which extent different paths of political socialization, multiple belongings, degree of identification and commitment to the movements as well as the judgments upon representative institutions are linked to the democratic conceptions of the activists. As with the other part of our research, a main assumption is that the general principles of democracy such as power (kratos) by/from/for the people (demos) can be combined in different forms and with different balances: representative versus participatory, majority versus deliberative, etc..

6.1.2. The activist survey as a research instrument

In the few cases in which structured questionnaires have been used, social movement activists have been surveyed in particular during demonstrations. A recent assessment of the social science literature in the field mentions only three surveys of protest events before the late nineties: a comparison of four rallies that were held in 1970 and 1973 in the US (Seidler et al. 1976; Meyer, Seidler and MacGilivray 1977; Meyer and Seidler 1978); a survey of demonstrators at a national antinuclear rally held in Washington D.C. in 1979 (Ladd et al. 1983); a survey at a demonstration in Sheffield against the visit of the then Prime Minister Margaret

Thatcher (Waddington et al. 1988). It was instead in the 1990s that surveys at demonstrations begun to spread, with three surveys at protest marches in France conducted in 1994 (see Favre, Fillieule and Meyer 1997; Fillieule 1997), four at marches in Belgium in 1998 (va Aelst and Walgrave, 2001). It is however in the years 2000 that surveys at protest events have been used more and more often in the wave of the global cycle of protest that became visible in Seattle in 1999. Among others, the Gruppo di Ricerca sull'Azione Collettiva in Europa (Grace) at the university of Florence surveyed participants at the anti-G8 protest in Genoa, the Peace March Perugia-Assisi in 2001, and the first European Social Forum in Florence in 2002 (Andretta et al. 2002; della Porta et al 2003, della Porta et al 2006); The Groupe de recherches sur l'activisme altermondialiste (GRAAL, University of Paris Sorbonne) and the Centre de Recherche sur l'Action Politique (CRAPUL, University of Lausanne Suisse) have covered the anti-G8 protest in the French-Swiss region of Evian-Lausanne-Geneva and the 2nd European Social Forum in Paris, both in 2003 (Fillieule, Blanchard et al. 2005; Fillieule and Blanchard 2005; Agrikoliansky and Sommier 2005). A survey has been conducted in 8 countries during the 15 February 2003 Global Day of Action against the war in Iraq (Walgrave and Rucht 2008). Additionally, Bedoyan, Van Aelst and Walgrave (2004) surveyed a protest march in Brussels on December 14th 2001, Roth and Rucht protests against unemployment in four German cities, Eggert and Giugni protest events in Zurich and Davos in 2004. Beyond providing data on the sociographic and political background of the activists as well as individual attitudes and behaviors, the mentioned research helped raising some main methodological caveats in this specific use of survey.

We shall start by acknowledging the general limits of surveys as heuristic devices. In terms of representativity, the surveys have to address problems related to the sampling error (not all members of the population have the same chances of being included in the sample); drop-out errors (related with the specific characteristics of those who refuse to be interviewed); understanding errors (respondents answer without understanding the questions); missing errors (a certain percent does not respond to specific questions). For well-known reasons, surveys focus on individuals: they are indeed not the best way to analyze either concrete organizational praxis or organizational values (Dryzek 2004). Additionally, they have to be used with care (and possibly triangulated with other, more qualitative techniques), when we want to study values or motivations in-depth. In fact, the very instrument of the survey discourages the active participation of interviewee and interviewer, reducing creativity and flexifility in the search for homogeneity and standardization. Besides the difficulty of assessing the influence of the interviewees attempts to provide "socially desiderable answers or rationalization", surveys tend to produce superficial or very standardized responses: "feelings and emotions, people's uncertainties, doubts, and fears, all the inconsistencies and the complexities of social interactions and belief systems are matters that are not easily rapped with survey questionnaires" (Klandermans and Smith 2002, 27). We tried to take into accounts these limits by triangulating the information collected through the survey with those coming from other methods (among which in depth interviews and participant observation, see below).

Another question, with implications for the representativity of the sample, concerns the status of the specific surveyed demonstrations vis-à-vis the social movement to be investigated. While in fact social movements are complex networks of networks, characterized by a changing degree of density, social movement events rarely involve all components equally. Additionally, given the high material and psychological cost of traveling, national and, especially, local activists are largely over-represented: at the first ESF, for instance, the largest component of

participants was from Tuscany, and Italians in general were more numerous than non-Italians. Samples that fairly well respect the composition of a certain event do not therefore reflect the characteristics of national and (even less) transnational movements. The counter-summits targeting the EU are expected to reflect the characteristics of the national movements that organized and hosted them: a demonstration targeting the EU in pro-EU Belgium will have different social and political bases than a similar one in Euro-skeptic Sweden (see, e.g., Bédoyan and van Aelst 2003 on the EU countersummit in Brussels at the end of 2001 and Peterson 2006 on the EU countersummit in Gothenburg in 2002).

Additionally, especially among the locals, protest events attract also first-comers as well as people who are only marginally involved in a movement. Surveys at protest events address situations in which "participation is generally not submitted to any condition. People do not need to be a member of an organization, they usually do not have to register (apart from the case of Social fora where you have to pay fees), etc. That means that the reference population, the crowd itself, can be composed of core militants, sympathisers, bystanders, sight-seers, lost people, tourists and sometimes opponents! A crowd can't be considered as equal to a social movement constituency. Its heterogeneity is far more important and different in nature" (Blanchard and Filleiule 2006). The sample therefore represented the specific characteristics of these subsamples of the movement population. The variety in terms of degree of commitment, identification and previous experience is actually enriching the possibility of analysis, but one should be cautious in generalizing results to the smaller circles of the most-committed activists. In our research, we shall address these concerns by comparing the Athens ESF with other protest events that have been previously surveyed. Additionally, we shall compare subsamples of the population with different degrees of commitment to the GJM.

A further problem refers to the representativity of the sample. Pierre Favre, Olivier Fillieule and Nonna Mayer (Favre et al 1997) have been among the first scholars to devise a method to randomly sample demonstrators. As Blanchard and Fillieule (2006) recently summarized, "Since it is not possible to use a sampling strategy based on quotas, one has to use a probabilistic method, that is to say, to guarantee that all possible participants would have equal opportunity of being interviewed". In order to device a technique that would implement this aim the researcher has to take into account the symbolic allocation of spaces in a demonstration, as well as demonstrators' habits. As Fillieule pointed out, at demonstrations: "people do assemble at a meeting point, march under a banner, depending on multiple belongings, following a march order that is predetermined by organizers. Others are more erratic, travelling from one group to another, from the very heart of the demonstration to its margins. These numerous spatial and temporal distributions have a clear consequence: one must use two different methods, depending on which stage of a demonstration is concerned, the assembling phase or the march itself" (Fillieule 1997, methodological appendix).

Taking into account this "use" of the marches by participants, a two step sampling procedures has been proposed. A first step involves the distributions of questionnaires at the gathering space:

> "The gathering space (generally a square and its adjacent streets) is divided in advance into sectors clearly identified by some spatial distinguishing marks. One generally knows in advance where the different groups are due to assemble under their banners, carts etc. For big events, the press will even publish maps indicating the different meeting points. It is also sometimes possible to have in advance an idea of the rough number of people per

> group or cluster of groups. In each cell, interviewers (the number of which is defined depending on the expected density of demonstrators per cells) must randomly select interviewees. As usually in probabilistic methods, the only criterion for the selection of the respondents is randomness. This can best be achieved by relying on a counting system always taking, for example, the Xth person in a group. Two persons who stand alongside may not be interviewed both. In case of refusal, on the contrary, one should try to interview the nearest person in the group" (Blanchard and Fillieule 2006; see also Fillieule and Sainte-Marie 1996).

In a second phase, questionnaires are administered during the protest march itself. Here, according to Blanchard and Fillieule,

> "the best solution is to divide the interviewers in two squads. One is placed at the front of the demonstration and the other at the end of it. The first group starts its interviews at the head of the march and gradually comes down the demonstration to the end of it. The second group starts at the end (and must then wait for the end of the procession to leave the gathering place) and walk up to the head of the demonstration. Depending on the available resources, it is always possible to multiply the number of squads as long as they are intervening in a symmetrical way in the procession. Each squad of interviewers is ruled by two head persons whose mission is to offer spatial points of reference on each side of the demonstration and to decide who will be interviewed by whom and in what row (that rule could be of an utmost importance, especially if the interviewers are not professional staff or specifically trained personnel)" (ibidem).

In order to offer all participants equal chances to be interviewed, also other surveys at demonstrations have usually sampled the Nth person in every Nth row of a march (e.g. Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). This sampling method proved however difficult to implement at very large demonstrations. At the Global Days of Action against the war on Iraq, activists interviewed during a cross national research project were mainly selected at the beginning and the end of the marches (in some cases involving between half a million and two millions participants), paying attention to select randomly in different sectors of the squares or parks where demonstrators converged (see Walgrave and Rucht 2008). Still different criteria were used in order to select interview partners at social forum, e.g. static events. The sample for a survey conducted during the days of the anti-G8 protest in Genoa in 2001 included people selected randomly over the various initiatives ("theme-based piazzas", debates, campsites etc.), so as to be able to construct a representative sample of the various "souls" of the movement (Andretta et al. 2002). Similarly constructed was the sample for a survey of the first European Social Forum in Florence in 2002 (della Porta et al. 2006), and the one of a countersummit against the G8 meeting at Evian that involved a cross-border demonstration between France and Switzerland (Fillieule et al. 2004). This is also the strategy we have used at the Athens ESF, trying to exploit the nature of the event as a long-lasting meeting, during which it was possible to find time to complete and return the questionnaire.

In all these cases, since purely random sampling is impossible given the lack of knowledge on the universe of participants, the representativity of the sampled interviewees is a critical issue, to be monitored in relation to the known dimensions of the universe. For the Genoa anti-G8 survey, the composition of the surveyed sample by organizational areas was compared with the estimates of number of participants from the different networks provided by the

organizers on the eve of the protests.[2] For the 1st ESF survey, the distribution of the sample according to nationality was compared with that of those enrolled at the Forum (della Porta et al 2006). For our survey, we collected similar information on the country distribution.

Especially for transnational protest events, basic decisions affecting the representativity of the sample refer to the language used in the questionnaires. Since activists may be expected to be more willing to respond to a questionnaire in their mother tongue the decision if and in how many and which languages to translate the questionnaire has an effect on the final sample. For instance, although using more or less the same techniques for sampling, the choice of distributing questionnaires only in Italian at an anti-G8 survey was reflected in a sample almost entirely composed of Italians, while the translation in English, French, Spanish and German of the questionnaire distributed at the first ESF produced a multinational sample (della Porta et al. 2006). In our case, we have translated our questionnaire in all the languages of the countries involved in the Demos project and, additionally, in Greek.

A fourth element affecting representativity are return rates. Due to logistic difficulties, interviews can rarely be done face-to-face. Respondents are in fact asked either to give back the questionnaire at a collecting point, or to fill in the questionnaires and mail them back. The return rate of questionnaires distributed at the February 15th global day of action varied for instance between the 37% of the questionnaires distributed at the Spanish march and the 54% of those distributed in the Netherlands (Walgrave and Verlhulst 2004; see also Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). The peculiarities of the respondents in terms of age, gender and education can of course bias the results. Two possible ways to address this issue have been suggested. First, a comparison between results of interviews run face-to-face and returned questionnaires in postal surveys; second, the recording of some information on those who refuse taking the questionnaire. As Blanchard and Fillieule (2006) summarized, “By doing that, the researcher can at a minimum determine whether the pool of respondents over-represents particular organizational affiliations, demographics, or any other pertinent categories. This knowledge can improve the validity of one’s conclusions from an imperfect sample by allowing a more accurate interpretation of survey results”.

Specific to surveys at demonstration is moreover the highly emotionally charged environment where they are distributed (and, possibly, collected): the march. As Blanchard and Fillieule (2006) noted, “People attending a protest event or a political rally are by nature in an expressive situation. They do actually express their feelings and their opinions, if only by being there, by chanting and shouting slogans, by raising their fists, by wearing masks or costumes, by holding banners or placards. Two consequences follow. One is that people's willingness to participate is generally optimal, apart for those groups and individuals who reject as a whole poll techniques and sociological surveys as being part of the ‘dominant order’. The other is that in case of face-to-face interviews, people will certainly pay little attention to the questions since they are engaged at the same time in a collective action, surrounded by colleagues, friends, relatives and the whole crowd”. Additionally, the filling in of questionnaires can become a collective action, and the pressure to adhere to the group values is strong. This problems of validity can be considered in designing the questionnaire (avoiding long and complex questions,

[2] Since the figures were used for logistical purposes (such as finding lodging for the incoming activists), they were expected to be quite reliable.

keeping the completion time low, focusing on actual behaviors) as well as, of course, in the interpretation of the data.

We tried to take into account these caveats in the preparation of our research, the distribution of the questionnaires and the interpretation of the results. First, we devoted time and energy to designing a questionnaire which was short enough to discourage drop outs, and with clear questions (valid indicators). In particular, taking into account previous experiences with surveys, we used some already tested questions focused on the socio-demographic characteristics, trust in institutions and previous experiences of participation of the activists— that is, variables that we expected to affect decision-making processes and the development of deliberative processes. We had instead to develop new questions on the much less studied dimensions of democracy inside and outside movements.

Our interest in the micro-dimension of conceptions and practices of democracy is reflected in the activists' survey we carried out during the 4th European Social Forum in Athens on May 3-6, 2006. The idea was to design a questionnaire focusing on respondents' normative conceptions and actual perceptions of democratic practices, at the three levels of the group, the movement and political institutions in general. Since ours was the first attempt to develop a questionnaire on conceptions and practices of democracy, we devoted a long and intense time to questionnaire testing and redrafting. Different versions of the questionnaire were tested in the UK and Germany in 2005, and twice in Italy in 2006. In Britain, a pre-test was run at the anti-G8 protest at Gleneagles in July 2005, where the British team undertook short face-to-face interviews with 493 participants in the Make Poverty History march, and distributed 2.000 longer self-completion questionnaires to marchers (with a response rate of 28%). In Germany, a revised questionnaire was used to survey participants at the first national Social Forum in Erfurt, 21 – 24 July 2005, where 785 questionnaires were handed out in the registration area and 310 returned (response rate of app. 40%). A still different version of the questionnaire was tested by the EUI team during the march against the Bolkestein directive, which, in parallel with marches in other European cities, was held in Rome on October 15th 2005. During this event we distributed 723 questionnaires, 475 (65.6%) of which were fully completed and returned. These tests indicated that the questionnaire had to be shortened and that some variables/values needed to be rephrased, cut or substituted. A final draft of the questionnaire was once again tested in Italy in April 2006 with satisfying results: about 30 participants in a seminar organized by Italian NGOs (a conference by Serge Latouche in Florence) filled the questionnaire in a complete way.[3]

Most members of the Demos team plus some additional collaborators (for a total of 19 researchers) participated in the distribution and collection of the questionnaires that took place as planned at the 4th European Social Forum in Athens on May 3-6 2006. The questionnaires (translated into English, Italian, Spanish, German, French and Greek) were distributed at the main entrance of the Forum, in the common spaces and during the workshops. We used a double sampling strategy, the main one being random, the second one over-sampling the activists coming from the countries selected for the Demos project. About 1200 questionnaires (a return rate of more than 30%) were returned at our Demos-desk at the entrance of the ESF premises. Given the logistical challenges of our survey, this return rate — similar to those obtained in previous research – can be considered as satisfactory (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). Considering that the number of filled questionnaires for several countries is too low to be

[3] The questionnaire can be downloaded at: http://demos.eui.eu/PDFfiles/Instruments/WP5_Questionnaire.pdf.

analyze as separate national cases, we decided to use only the whole data set for this part of our research.

In the following, we will aim at analyzing the ESF under different angles. Although keeping a special focus on the 4th ESF in Athens, we will also consider information on the other European Social Forums, using surveys conducted at the ESFs in Florence and Paris. Moreover, when possible, we compare those data with those coming from other surveys on protest events (like the 15th of February 2003) or the whole population (European value survey, European social survey, Eurobarometer). Taking into account the methodological limitations of the survey, we also triangulated survey results with additional material such as the programs of the Forums; the press coverage of the Forums; interviews with organizers. Accounts from participant observation at the 2nd, 3rd and 4th ESF are also used.

6.2. Democracy in the European Social Forum: a Critical Case Study

This chapter will focus on the European Social Forum, using as far as possible a cross-time perspective that takes into account the evolution and transformations along the four forums. The Social Forums have been an innovative experiment promoted by the global justice movement. Counter-summits against the official summits of International Governmental Organizations (especially the G8, World Bank and IMF, WTO, and the EU) represented the more conflictual forms of protest at the transnational level. Differently from a countersummit, that is mainly oriented to public protest, the Social Forum is set up as a space of debate among activists. Although originally oriented to indirectly "counter" another summit — the World Social Forum (WSF) was organized on the same date and in alternative to the World Economic Forum (WEF) held in Davos (Switzerland) – the WSF presented itself as an independent space for encounters among civil society organizations and citizens. The first WSF in Porto Alegre in January 2001 was attended by about 20.000 participants from over 100 countries, among them thousands of delegates of NGOs and social movement organizations. Its main aim was the discussion of "Another possible globalization" (Schoenleitner 2003). Since then the number of organizers and participants as well as the organizational efforts of the following WSFs (in Porto Alegre in 2002 and 2003, than in Mumbay in 2004, and again in Porto Alegre in 2005) increased exponentially (see Table 2). The WSF also gained a large media attention. According to the organizers, the WSF in 2002 attracted 3.000 journalists (from 467 newspapers and 304 radio or TV-stations), a figure which doubled to more than 6,800 in 2005 (Rucht 2005, 294-5). As Dieter Rucht (2005, 291) observed,

> "During its relatively short existence, the WSF has become an institution in its own right and can be seen as a kind of huge showcase for a large number of issues, groups, and claims. It can also be interpreted as a barometer that signals both strengths and weaknesses of global justice movements, general trends, learning processes, potential and actual cleavages, etc… Within their short period of their existence, WSFs have become a trademark that has begun to overshadow its competitor, the World Economic Forum, in respect to public attention. It is also a structure that, according to its slogan 'Another world is possible', raises many hopes, energizes many participants, links large numbers of issues and groups, and – last but not least – contributes to the creation of an overarching identity and community as expressed in the vision of a meeting place for the global civil society."

Table 1. Basic figures on the World Social Forums

	Estimated number participants	Delegates from NGOs and movements groups	Number of countries	Budget
Porto Alegre **2001**	20.000	4,700	117	?
Porto Alegre 2002	50.000	12,274 from 4.009 groups	123	1,55 Mio. Euros from official sources
Porto Alegre 2003	120.000	20,763 from 5.171 groups	123	4 Mio. Euros
Mumbai 2004	111.000	1,653 groups	117	2,9 Mio. Euros
Porto Alegre 2005	155.000	6,588 groups	135	?

Source: Rucht 2005, 292 (from "FSM en números", press release of the WSF, January 2005).

The common basic feature of the social forum is the conception of an open and inclusive public space. Participation is open to all civil society groups, with the exception of those advocating racist ideas and those using terrorist means. Political parties as such are also excluded. The charter of the WSF defines it as an "open meeting place". Its functioning, with hundreds of workshops and dozens of conferences (with invited experts), testifies for the importance given (at least in principle) to knowledge. In fact, the WSF has been defined as "a market place for (sometime competing) causes and an 'ideas fair' for exchanging information, ideas and experiences horizontally" (Schoenleitner 2003, 140). In the words of one of its organizers, the WSFs promote exchanges in order "to think more broadly and to construct together a more ample perspective" (ibid., 141). Notwithstanding some tensions about the decision-making process as well as the financing of the initiatives (Rucht 2005), the idea of open arenas for discussion, not immediately oriented to action and decisions, has spread in the global justice movement.

Since 2001, social forums developed also at macro-regional, national and local level. Pan-Amazonean Social Forums were held in Brasil and Venezuela, African Social Forums in Mali and Ethiopia, Asiatic Social Forums in India (Sommier 2005, 21). Among them, the European Social Forum (ESF) played a most important role in the elaboration of activists' attitudes towards the European Union, as well as the formation of a European identity.

The first ESF took place in Florence on November 6-9, 2002. Notwithstanding the tensions before the meeting, the ESF in Florence was a success.[4] Not only was there not a single act of violence, but participation went beyond the most optimistic expectations. Sixty thousand participants – more than three times the expected number – attended the 30 plenary conferences, 160 seminars, and 180 workshops organized at the Fortezza da Basso; even more attend the 75

[4] Center-right politicians, but also many opinion leaders had expressed a strong fear of violence in a city considered particularly fragile because of its artistic value (to the point of suggesting limitations to the right of demonstration in the "città d'arte").

cultural events in various parts of the city. About one million participated in the march that closed the forum. The international nature of the event is not disputable. More than 20.000 delegates of 426 associations arrived from 105 countries – among others, 24 buses from Barcelona; a special train from France and another one from Austria; a special ship from Greece. Up to four hundred interpreters worked without charge in order to ensure simultaneous translations. A year later, as many as a thousand Florentines and 3000 Italians went to Paris for the second ESF.

Since 2002, activists have met yearly in European Social Forums to debate Europeanisation and its limits. The second ESF was held in Paris in 2003, involving up to 60.000 individual participants, 1.800 groups, 270 seminars, 260 working groups and 55 plenary sessions (with about 1.500 participants in each), and 300 organizations signing the call, among which 70 unions, 3.000 volunteers, 1.000 interpreters. According to the organizers, 150.000 participated in the final march. The third ESF, in London in 2004, involved about 25.000 participants and 2,500 speakers in 150 seminars, 220 working groups and 30 plenary sessions, as well as up to 100.000 participants at the final march). The third ESF in Athens in 2006 had 278 seminars and workshops, and 104 cultural activities listed in the official program, 35.000 registered participants and up to 80.000 at the final march[5].

The choice of the ESF as a case study is related to its peculiar nature of an experiment with alternative practices of democracy. In this sense, we are not selecting an average protest event, but a critical moment when participants are aware that democracy is a central stake in the internal life of the movement as well as in the society at large. Not by chance, the ESF is presented in the press as "an exchange on concrete experiences" ("La Stampa, 10/11/2003), "an agora" ("Liberazione", 14/11/2003), a kermesse ("Europa" 3/11/2003), a "tour-de-force of debates, seminars and demonstrations by the new globals" ("L'Espresso" 13/11/2003), "a sort of university, where you learn, discuss and exchange ideas" ("La Repubblica" 17/10/2004), "a supranational public space, a real popular university, but especially the place where to build European nets" (in "Liberazione" 12/10/2004). The spokesperson of the Genoa Social Forum (that organized the anti-G8 protest in 2001), Vittorio Agnoletto, writes of the ESF as a "non-place": "it is not an academic conference, even though there are professors. It is not a party international, even though there are party militants and party leaders among the delegates. It is not a federation of NGOs and unions, although they have been the main material organizers of the meetings. The utopian dimension of the forum is in the active and pragmatic testimony that another globalization is possible" ("Il manifesto" 12/11/2003). References to "academic seminars" are also present in the activists' comments on single meetings published online (see e.g. http://www.lokabass.com/scriba/eventi.php?id_eve=12, accessed 20/12/2006). Writing on the ESF in Paris, the sociologists Agrikoliansky and Cardon (2005, 47) stressed its plural nature:

> "Even if it re-articulates traditional formats of mobilizations, the form of the 'forum' has properties that are innovative enough to consider it as a new entry in the repertoire of collective action. … An event like the ESF in Paris indeed does not resemble anything already clearly identified. It is not really a conference, even if we find a program, debates and paper-givers. It is not a congress, even if there are tribunes, militants and mots d'ordre. It is not just a demonstration, even if there are marches, occupations and actions

[5] Data on participation are taken from the entry European social forum in Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European _social_forum, accessed December 2006).

> in the street. It is neither a political festival, even if we find stands, leaflets and recreational activities. The social forums concentrate in a unit of time and space such a large diversity of forms of commitment that exhaustive participation to all of them is impossible".

What unifies these different activities is the aim of providing a meeting space for the loosely connected, huge number of groups that form the archipelagos of the GJM. Its aims include enlarging the number of individuals and groups involved but also providing a ground for a broader mutual understanding. Far from aiming at eliminating differences, the open debates should help to increase awareness of each others concerns and beliefs. The purpose of networking (through debating) was in fact openly stated already in the first ESF in Florence, where the Declaration of the European social movements reads:

> "We have come together to strengthen and enlarge our alliances because the construction of another Europe and another world is now urgent. … We have come together to discuss alternatives but we must continue to enlarge our networks and to plan the campaigns and struggles that together can make this different future possible. Great movements and struggles have begun across Europe: the European social movements are representing a new and concrete possibility to build up another Europe for another world".

Democracy in the forum is an important issue of discussion, with tensions between different models (horizontal versus vertical, but also action oriented versus discussion oriented) testified for by the different structures present within the forums. Again in Agrikoliansky and Cardon's words, "in order to avoid the destructuration typical of these types of reticular spaces, the 'central' organizational structures try to give coherence and a meaning to the alter-mondialist movement. This effort at coordination is implemented on different terrains and especially in the architecture of the places of debates and exchanges, that constitute the very body of the ESF" (ibid. 48). Similar to scientific conferences or party congresses, the plenary conferences offer a central focus, but also choreographically confirm the division between a stage for the few and the stalls for the crowds.

Very differently structured, the seminars and the ateliers — with people mostly seated in circles and intervening in a more informal way and as individuals more than as representatives of an organization — should instead allow for the development of European networks from below on specific issues, an aim testified for by the exchange of addresses at the end of each session (ibid. 70). The openness towards "the others" is considered in some activists' comments as a very relevant attitude in order to "build nets from the local, to the national to the supranational" (see e.g. http://www.lokabass.com/scriba/eventi.php?id_eve=62, accessed 20/12/2006). In this sense, social forums belong to emerging forms of action that stress, by their very nature, plurality and inclusion. Similar forms of action that favour networking and successively "contamination" (or cross-fertilization) are the "solidarity assemblies", a series of assemblies where multiple and heterogeneous organizations active on similar issues are called to participate with their particular experiences[6] or the "fairs on concrete alternatives" whose aim it is to link various groups presenting alternatives to market economy ranging from fair trade to environmental protection (della Porta and Mosca 2006c). Degrees of structuration, inclusiveness and representation are always at the center of the discussion.

[6] An Italian activist defined these solidarity assemblies as "a 'logistical pot' in which everyone puts their ingredients" (int. 20, p. 3, in della Porta and Mosca 2006c).

Keeping this function of an encounter of many and heterogeneous groups and activists, the ESF is however a dynamic process. The focus of the initiatives in part changed, in part expanded from one ESF edition to the next. In the second edition, in Paris, there was an increasing attention to define a position towards the European Union, with the call for a "Europe of the citizens and the peoples" and the criticism of the form and the result of the European Convention and the EU policies on agriculture, migration and social issues. More attention was given to gender issues, unemployment and precarious work, housing and the rights of the most excluded (Sommier 2005, 25). The choice of London for the third edition was justified, among others, by the peculiarity of the British movements "struggling at the heart of the neo-liberal power" vis-à-vis the continental ones. The third ESF saw a growing focus on the issue of the war in Iraq and the position towards migrants and Muslim citizens in Europe and in the world. In Athens, the large presence of Turkish activists and Eastern Europeans reflected an emerging attention towards the people and movements at the EU "periphery".

In this process, also the organizational formula and practices changed. In the history of the ESF, the internal debate between those who supported "vertical" versus "horizontal" conceptions of democracy developed already since the first edition in Florence. There the representatives of local social forums called for rootedness in the territory, the creation of open assemblies and a fluid structure, stressing the importance of the non-organized (see, e.g. http://www.lokabass.com/scriba/eventi.php?id_eve=12, accessed 20/12/2006). In Paris, the ESF had been accompanied by the Forum of the European trade unions and the Forum of the local authorities (with more than 200 participants). Especially in the press, institutional actors had become very visible (also the unions, including their European federation ETUC). The event in fact had much more resonance in the national press than the following two editions. Although many articles stressed the plurality of the movement, voice was given especially to the mayors that hosted the forum, as well as to the representatives of political parties, unions and local governments that were present at the ESF. The organization of the second forum was criticized not only for the fragmentation of the events in five distant places, but also for the decision of the municipalities to rent for the forum buildings from private firms, and to hire private policemen that prohibited entrance once the seats were taken. Already in this period, also the criticism of a tendency of the participants in the organizational process to ally along national lines emerged.

The tension between "horizontals" and "verticals" increased in London, where the former openly contested the final plenary session, accusing the organizers to be dominated by "an oligarchy of parties and unions" and denouncing the aggressive attitudes of the organizers' marshal body and the police at the final march ("La Repubblica", Bologna, 19/10/2004). A press release of the radical Italian union Cobas criticized the attitudes of the British Organizing committee (in particular the Socialist Worker Party, Socialist Action and some unions) accused of having monopolized the speech after the final march and repressed internal contestation. Another radical union, Sin Cobas, criticized the "traditional closure of British politics, that involves also the radical left" as responsible for the incapacity to involve in the forum the "multitudes of the less-well structured groups". Widely discussed was the "problem of democracy and efficacy": some activists lamented that only few people decided and those who spoke in the assemblies were "always male, white and 50 years old" ("Liberazione" 19/10/2004).

The criticism of the organization of the ESF produced some structural change. In particular, the plenary sessions were reduced in London, and then abolished in Athens, in order to leave more space for "bottom up" networking, with specific assemblies (of women, of

precarious workers, of migrants, of young people) oriented to building common initiatives. Additionally, "parallel" spaces for the critical groups were semi-institutionalized (although with different agreements) in the organization of the forum.

These transformations also interacted with some apparent change in the participants to the various events. Surveys of the first, second and fourth ESFs indicate first of all a large presence of activists with previous experience of participation in events promoted by the GJM. The data (see table 2) indicate a clear growth of this category between Paris (slightly more than half) and Athens (almost four-fifths; although the growth is not so significant in comparison with the Florentine event). Looking at the frequency of participation in this type of events, in Athens there was a dramatic growth of the veterans of GJM events, with about 40% having participated often (10 times and more). These data reflect the longer history of the GJM in 2006, but also indicate the increasing number of strongly committed activists in the ESF. These results are coherent with the trend in the degree of identification in the GJM (see table 3), characterized by an important increase in the percentage of those who declare to identify strongly with the GJM (from 24% in Florence to 39% in Athens, although the peak here is in Paris) and a parallel decline in those who identify not at all or only a little (from 23% in Florence to 16% in Paris to 13% in Athens).

Table 2. Frequency of previous participation at events of the global social movement of ESF Participants in Florence, Paris, Athens, valid cases only

	Florence 2002**		**Paris 2003**		**Athens 2006**	
Frequency of Participation*	%	N	%	N	%	N
Never	36.5	622	42.0	924	20.3	243
Seldom	16.0	272	17.5	385	11.2	134
Sometimes	27.5	468	28.5	627	28.6	342
Often	20.0	340	11.9	262	39.8	476
Total	100	1702	100	2198	100	1195

N B - Missing: Florence not available; Paris N = 0; Athens N = 10
* The questions of the Athens questionnaire and the Paris questionnaire have been translated in the following way: 'once' → 'seldom'; '2-5 times' → 'sometimes';' 5-10 times' and '10 and more times'→ 'often'
** Only Italian respondents of the Italian version of the questionnaire.

Table 3. Level of identification with the GJM of ESF participants in Florence, Paris, and Athens, valid cases only

Level of identification	Florence 2002*		Paris 2003		Athens 2006	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
None	3.8	91	2.7	56	0.9	10
Little	19.0	452	13.7	282	12.4	146
Quite a lot	53.3	1270	41.0	846	47.4	557
Very much	24.0	571	42.6	879	39.4	463
Total	100	2384	100	2063	100	1176

NB - Missing: Florence N = 195; Paris N = 135; Athens N = 29

6.3. Democracy in the Forums

6.3.1. Debating democracy at the ESFs

The ESF has been an arena of debate and networking, but also a space where different conceptions of democracy have emerged. Calls for a fluid, open and inclusive organizational structure had emerged already in the first ESF in Florence (see, e.g. http://www.lokabass.com/scriba/eventi.php?id_eve=12, accessed 20/12/2006). The Florence ESF was prepared by four assemblies and, between the first and the second ESF, the preparatory assembly met five times, in meetings open to those who wanted (and could) attend. Among the 213 delegates present at one of these meetings, in Brussels, the largest number was French (91), followed by Belgians (26) and Italians, Greeks, British, Spanish and Germans (a dozen each; see Sommier 2005, 27). At this meeting, in view of the upcoming Paris ESF the role of the French activists in decisions referring to the speakers at plenary sessions and final encounters was discussed (for the next ESFs, it would be the role of the British and then the Greek activists). Already for the second ESF, a main criticism addressed the role of the more "institutional" organizations, accused of imposing a hierarchical and non-transparent structure on what was supposed to be an open and consensual process (ibid., 29 ff.). In particular the local social forums criticized a "top down" approach, going from the national to the local. Autonomous spaces also emerged, testifying for the search for alternative, horizontal forms of action. During the Parisian ESF, these took the form of a libertarian and anarchist social forum and of a self-managed village, organized by the No vox and the Réseau Intergalactique and visited by about 6.000 activists (ibid., 38).

The internal debate in the GJM between "horizontal" and "vertical" conceptions of democracy took more dramatic forms at the third ESF in London, where the local London Social Forum together with other informal groups accused the main organizers (among which the Socialist Workers Party, Globalize Resistance, Socialist Action, and some unions) of having imposed main organizational decisions. The tensions at the London ESF led to an open contestation of the final events and to some arrests among the autonomous activists. These developments represented a turning point in the evolution of the ESF process. Already before the

London ESF, one of the prominent speakers of the GJM, Susan George, praising the decision of the WSF to abolish plenaries, had written:

> "I was disappointed, on the other hand, that the 2004 European Social Forum in London still clings to the supposed necessity of plenaries even though there will be fewer than in previous years. Sorting out who gets to speak on what platform on what subject and with whom; how many speakers are allotted to each country and to each organisation; mixing them carefully according to gender, hue, hemispheric origin and I suppose religious profession, sexual orientation, height, weight and God knows what else; requiring each year long and multiple meetings all over Europe – all this has proven, as far as I can tell, a colossal waste of everyone's time and money. Let's get serious, people… in future Social Forums I would hope we could stop the silly jockeying for speech slots, refrain from endless repetition and ceremonial condemnation, determine what issues we really need to talk about, get organised beforehand to do so, then hit the ground running" (*Taking the Movement forward*, in *Anti-capitalism: Where now?* Bookmarks publications, October 2004).

In an on line forum to discuss the event, the London ESF was in fact judged a success, but "with many internal problems, with difficulties, delays". It was said to have been characterized by "many young people, a lot of desire to participate - not always fulfilled - a great desire not to throw away the most interesting political novelty of the first few years of this century" (Salvatore Cannavò of the Italian daily "Liberazione"[7]). Others spoke of "a lack of curiosity of the organizers to look beyond Blair and ones' own ideological borders, beyond the opposition to the war", and underlined the "feeling that the great majority of the alter-mondialist people are fed up with the call for 'bringing politics back to the front, of the war between organizations, of the tricks to have the last word" (Anna Pizzo, of the Italian weekly "Carta"). There was specific criticism of the centralization of the preparatory process, in the hands of "a dictatorship–-the idea that those who have a say are the ones who can afford the air of the Easyjetters' fare to international meetings". According to a collective assessment published by the London Social Forum, "local social forums had an inadequate part in the official programme". indifferently from the arrangements at the Paris ESF, the costs of setting up networking 'spaces' for them were not covered by the London ESF ticket price or venue-finding arrangements. Apart from one seminar at Alexandra Palace, local social forums had to make their own arrangements in the `alternative' spaces. The document "A Different ESF is Possible", issued by participants in the UK Local Social Forum Network, declared that "The British process to build for the ESF has been, from the proposal to have it in London onwards, organized without an open, democratic, inclusive process". Especially, the involvement of the Greater London Authority (GLA) in the process was considered a challenge for the democratic quality of the process. According to British activist and editor of Red Pepper, Hilary Wainwright, "they are led by a small group of people from Socialist Action, one of the somewhat conservative factions of the Fourth International. They work according to an explicit managerial philosophy and an interpretation of democracy which is in many ways quite the opposite of the participatory democracy of Porto Alegre. This small group - no more than around 12 - of political managers has disproportionate power because, although Livingstone is formally a member of the Labour Party, he is not under

[7] This and the following quotes are taken from documents published online in "ESF: Debating the challenges for its future", Newsletter collecting articles and reflections on the third ESF (http://www.euromovements.info/newsletter/index.htm, accessed December 2006).

any live democratic party pressure like the mayors of Florence, Paris and Porto Alegre … for the political managers of the GLA the way to implement the will of the democratically elected mayor is through tough professional management and a minimisation of the layers of mediation between the mayor's senior management and the delivery of the service". Praising the "Florentine miracle" of harmonious collaboration between different groups, also the Italian alternative union Cobas stigmatized the "authoritarian, hegemonic, and exclusive practices" of several British groups (from the SWP to the unions), that had created strong tensions with the "horizontal" groups.

Even more fundamental was the criticism of the lack of transparency of the whole decision-making process. In the words of a young unionist from Attac Denmark, Lars Bohn, "on democratic terms, I will have to say we failed. And that is serious. We claim to want to create another world, and even that this is possible. But if we can't even create a trustworthy democratic alternative within our own ranks, how can we expect people from the outside to trust us to create the conditions for a more democratic world?". This activist, who had participated in the European Preparatory Assembly, criticized the lack of transparency of the process (the lack of information on the agenda and of minutes on the decisions taken). He also spoke of a breach of trust by the British organizers about the decision to call the final march under the slogan "No to Bush, no to war" while "it was a clear decision of the ESF preparatory assembly that the main slogans of the demo should be some that covered the whole ESF: war, privatization, racism". He sadly concludes, "Maybe that's how democracy works in England. But seen from at least a Scandinavian point of view this is a major break of trust. If this had happened here, the group behind it would surely be excluded from further participation in any kind of common cooperation. Not by an authoritarian body, but just because nobody would have enough trust to cooperate with them anymore". Similarly, Attac groups from several countries stressed that "the guiding principle has to be striving for a process building from below, in the sense that it has to start from the considerations of different movements and organisations, including the many who are currently not following the process, but nevertheless consider it most important". The European Preparatory Assembly (EPA) had struggled for "openness and inclusivity, while transparency and accountability for decision-making has been neglected".

The challenge of building up a common model of democracy for diverse groups and people is recognized in the movement. Defending the organization of the London ESF, one of the organizers from the SWP, Alex Callinicos, stated: "One difficulty in this process has certainly been that participants have very different conceptions of democracy and often showed little tolerance of definitions different from their own". According to him, while in Italy and France the activists of the various areas of the GJM had already come together in common struggles, building links of reciprocal trust, in the UK they had started their collaboration with the organization of the ESF.[8]

[8] As Callinicos explained, "At different stages this process embraced a very wide range of forces - stretching from the Trade Union Congress and mainstream NGOs to autonomist groups with a history of intermittent violence such as the Wombles. Holding this coalition together would have been difficult in any circumstances. Of course, the Italian and French comrades also have developed very broad coalitions, but it was probably an advantage that these had been constructed well in advance of actually organizing the ESF, so that people had an experience of working together. In Britain, by contrast, the altermondialiste networks that had participated in the earlier Forums were relatively weak. A coalition had to be created from scratch to organize the London ESF. This involved bringing together very diverse organizations with no history of working together and huge differences in political culture. Working together would have been hard in any circumstances" (see note 7 on source).

Without plenaries, the Athens ESF has been considered in general an improvement upon the previous edition—as an Italian activist stressed in a mailing list, "less ideological and more concrete", with more capacity to build up transnational networks on specific issues. Here as well, however, it was recognized that the quality of the debate in the (well participated) final Assembly of the social movements was not very deliberative, with "all those who intervene who think they have something fundamental to say, even though they almost never succeeded, or were interested, in following up the line of reasoning and of the previous intervention". The launching of common initiatives derived especially from the informal meetings in the previous days.

Along with criticism of what does not work in the ESF decision-making and the proposals for improving it, different conceptions of democracy emerge within the ESFs. During the seminar "A la recherché de la démocratie perdue" at the second ESF, politics was defined as "a common good, as air, water, or peace", which "does not have to be delegated only to professional politicians". In parallel, democracy was considered as "a concrete practice, not a theory" and the need of building counter-expertise through the common work of experts and citizens was stressed. In the debate on "La politique: bien commun?", instead, the ideology of expertise was stigmatized, but also the conception of the party as vanguard. Tension emerged, however, between a more traditional political approach and one stressing more the autonomy of social instances. Although the existing (present and past) left-wing governments were criticized for their support of the privatization of public services and for the destruction of social rights, the role of political parties was discussed, with some participants stressing the link between the old labour movement and contemporary alter-globalists (see http://workspace.fse-esf.org/mem/Act2340/doc407). The seminar on "Comment gagner les majorités aux idées du mouvement altermondialiste?" also discussed the relationship between movements and parties in a moment of "crisis of political representation". In the debate on "Quelles perspectives pour le movement altermondialiste", participants praised the mobilization capacity of the GJM in activating protest and convincing the public, but also stigmatized its failure in influencing institutional decisions. If influencing power seems most important to some activists, others insist on the necessity to avoid power. At the seminar on "Résister est crèer l'utopie, ici et maintenant" the role of spiritual and utopian bases for the development of individual imagination and freedom was emphasized. In several meetings, religiously motivated participants, engaged in social movements, addressed the articulation between political commitment and spiritual beliefs, proposing inter-religious dialogue, the refusal of the use of religion as an instrument of power and domination, and spiritual resistance to liberal globalization.

The debates on power also addressed inequalities within the ESF itself. In the debate "Tous les citoyens pour une Europe qui refuse la misére" for instance voices criticized the lack of space left to very poor people in the movement. The debate "Democratie partecipative et exclusion" discussed the preconditions for a real participation of people "in conditions of exclusions". In the presentation of the seminar titled "Le movement altermondialiste réfléchit à ses mots, à ses symbols et aux problème de langue" we read:

> "The alter-mondialist movement developed gradually as a full actor. This undeniable force depends on its capacity to aggregate the most different cultures and streams, stating diversity as intrinsic richness. Yes, but… coexistence and cooperation in the largest diversity (of cultures and practices, codes and references, or even values) easily implies the return to logics of power, and can develop into the practical inability to manage

> diversity… The movement has to face the dialectics between the will to preserve and promote diversity and the desire (and need) to build alternatives to the dominant system, and therefore to adopt a profile to a certain extent 'unitary'".

A reflection on communication was suggested as a way to produce "a fertile diversity", taking as a starting point a debate on the very way in which the movement is called in the different countries: from altermondialist or counterglobalist in France to movement "of movements", "against liberal globalization" or "for another possible world" in Italy; anti- or alter-globalization in Spain. Different conceptions of democracy are linked to different protest strategies, including conferences, exemplary action, lobbying, local street festivals, free universities and encyclopedias from below, laboratories, theatres, movies, and alternative experiments (such as social enterprises, fair trade).

6.3.2. Democratic ideals and practices of GJM activists

Reflecting on these different conceptions (and dimensions) of democracy within the ESF (and the global justice movement more in general), a main purpose of our research is the analysis of models of democracy as they are elaborated "from below" and implemented both in the internal organization of social movements and in experiments of participatory and deliberative decision-making. In previous parts of our research, we analyzed democratic ideals and practices of organizations active in the GJM, presenting a typology of the different models of democracy that are present, in a more or less 'pure' form, in GJM organizations and processes (see chapter 4 and 5). In particular, debates tend to develop within the movements on two main dimensions. On a first one, participatory conceptions that stress inclusiveness of equals (high participation) are contrasted with those based upon delegation of power to representatives (low participation). A second dimension refers to consensus/deliberation and looks at the emphasis on decision-making methods that assign a special role to public discussion, common good, rational arguments and transformation of preferences. We singled out four conceptions of internal democracy (or models of internal democracy). In the associational model, the assembly is composed by delegates and/or everyday politics is delegated to an executive committee; decisions are taken by majority vote. When delegates make decisions on a consensual basis, we speak of deliberative representation. In the case of an assembly composed by all members of the group, and in the absence of an executive committee, we speak of an assembleary model when decisions are taken by majority, and of deliberative participation when decisions are taken by consensus. Our research confirmed that in the GJM various types of organizational decision-making are present. However, we concluded that (to varying degrees) both participation and deliberation appear as much supported by GJM organizations.

This emerges also from an analysis of the normative models of democracy proposed by the activists we surveyed at the Athens ESF (see table 4). Only one fifth of these activists support an associational model of democracy, and only 8.2% a deliberative representative one. From the normative point of view, the surveyed ESF participants are instead attracted by either an assembleary or a deliberative-participative model (about one third each). Participation and deliberation are considered therefore as main values for another-democracy.

Table 4. Normative democratic models of the activists (N. 1055)

Decision-making method: Consensus	Decision-making body: delegation of power	
	High	Low
Low	Associational (19.1%)	Assembleary (35.9%)
High	Deliberative representative (8.2%)	Deliberative participative (36.7%)

In order to locate these results on the normative models of democracy in a broader picture of the activists' appreciation of how democracy works in different contexts, we have to consider first of all if the activists perceive these models as implemented in their own group and the GJM in general. When norms have to meet practices, the activists emerge as quite critical of their own group and especially of the movement in general. Participation in decision-making is in fact considered as limited to a limited number of activists, at least for 40% of respondents regarding meetings of their own groups and 60% of respondents regarding the meetings of the GJM in general (see table 5).

Table 5. Participation in decision-making in own group and in the GJM

	Who decide in…	
	In the meeting of the group	In the meetings of the GJM
Few participants	13.1	21.4
Enough participants	27.9	38.1
Almost all participants	30.3	26.1
All participants	28.6	14.3
Total N	**857**	**970**
Missing values	28.8	19.5

As far as decision-making procedures are concerned, activists see the meetings of the GJM as more consensual than those of their own groups. In both, however, they recognize a tendency towards either decisively privileging consensus (in about a quarter for their own group and about one fifth for the GJM in general) or mixing voting and consensus (in slightly less than half of the responses on meetings of their group and about two thirds of the responses on meetings of the GJM).

Table 6. Decision-making procedures in own group and in the GJM

	How are decisions taken in…	
	In the meetings of the group	In the meetings of the GJM
Voting	30.1	17.3
Sometimes voting	20.5	31.3
Sometimes consensus	24.5	32.2
Consensus	24.9	19.4
Total N	**854**	**1205**
Missing values	29.1	22.9

Table 7. Degree of satisfaction with decision-making in selected institutions

Degree of satisfaction	Satisfied with decision-making process in				
	Your group	GJM	National political system	EU	UN
Very unsatisfied	2.6	5.2	65.0	65.0	66.2
Moderately unsatisfied	12.7	24.6	24.9	25.4	26.5
Moderately satisfied	54.1	64.0	8.3	8.7	6.1
Very satisfied	30.6	6.2	1.7	0.9	1.2
Total	**937**	**1031**	**1107**	**1105**	**1096**
Missing	22.2	15.9	8.1	8.3	9.0

Notwithstanding this incongruence between norms and practices, the activists express high degrees of satisfaction with the decision-making processes in their own group and in the movement, especially if compared with the very critical judgment on the practices in other types of actors (see table 7). Satisfaction with decision-making processes in the groups is very high, with a tiny minority of either very unsatisfied or moderately unsatisfied--although (confirming the self-reflexive nature of activism) about half of the sample express moderate satisfaction, as much as one third is totally satisfied. All in all, activists express satisfaction also with decision-making within the GJM, although in this case moderate satisfaction prevails (in about two thirds of respondents) and about one forth is moderately unsatisfied. Degrees of satisfaction are instead very low when we move to attitudes towards public institutions: here dissatisfaction is virtually unanimous (with about two third very unsatisfied and one fourth of moderately unsatisfied) and addresses equally the national political system, the EU and the UN.

We can expect that models of democracy interact with the degree of previous participation in movement events: the more a person believes in participation and consensus building the more likely s/he should be to make his/her voice heard. We had asked our respondents to which extent they had taken part in previous events organized by the GJM. The

sample had high variance on this: only about one fifth was a first-timer, and another 11% had participated only once, while about one third had participated between 2 and 5 times and as many as 40% more than 5 times. First timers are indeed less likely to emphasize consensus, while those with more previous experiences of participation stress both consensus and participation (see table 8). Although statistically significant, the correlation coefficient however is not very high, indicating that consensus and deliberation are values that spread beyond the most active participants.

Table 8. Activists' participation in GJM events and their normative models of democracy

Normative models of democracy	**Participation in other GJM events before Athens**			**Total (100%)**	*Dichoto.* [9]	*Mean*[10]
	Never before	2-5 times	More than 5			
Associational	25.2	36.6	38.1	202	74.8	5.16
Deliberative representative	15.1	43.0	41.9	86	84.9	5.98
Assembleary	21.3	45.6	33.1	375	78.7	4.78
Deliberative participative	14.6	37.8	47.7	384	85.4	6.20
Total row %	**19.1**	**40.8**	**40.1**	**1.047**	**80.9**	**5.47**
Measures of association	Cramer's V= .11***				Cr.'s V=.11**	ETA= .14 ***

Cosmopolitanism, as indicated by experiences in protest and demonstrations in other countries, might also increase trust in consensus building and participation, values that have emerged as particularly widespread in transnational events (see e.g. Doerr and Haug 2006). Our sample, with participants equally divided between those who did and those who did not participate in protest events abroad, in fact confirms that "cosmopolitan" activists are more attracted by deliberative and participative models of democracy. Here as well the correlation coefficient indicates a statistically significant but not particularly strong relation between the two variables (see table 9). If cosmopolitans are more supportive of consensus and participation, also the other activists tend to support very similar values.

[9] Percentage of participants in at least one event before Athens.

[10] The mean of the participation in GJM events before Athens has been calculated by assigning to each original category of the question the mean of its range. Thus, while the categories "never before" and "only 1 time" have been recoded as "0" and "1", respectively, the third category "between 2 and 5 times" was recoded as "3.5", the fourth category "between 6 and 10 times", as "8", and the last category "more than 10 times", as "12".

Table 9. Activists' participation in GJM events outside their own country and their normative models of democracy

Normative models of democracy	**Participation in other GJM events outside one's own country**	
	Yes	*Total*
Associational	47.3	201
Deliberative representative	49.4	85
Assembleary	43.7	375
Deliberative participative	57.9	385
Total (of positive answers)	**50.1**	**1.046**
Cramer's V	.12***	

Together with experiences of participation in protest events, at home and abroad, also the subjective degree of identification with the GJM might be expected to influence attitudes towards democracy. In particular, those who identify more with the movement can be expected to express more support for those values that emerged as particularly relevant for GJM organizations—inclusiveness, participation, consensus are among them (della Porta and Reiter 2006). Our data from the ESF in Athens indicate, first of all, a very high degree of identification with the GJM among our respondents. Only less than 1% declared that they did not identify, and a very low 12.4% identified only a little. The remaining part identified either quite a lot (47.4%) or very much (39.4). Crossing degree of identification with normative conceptions of democracy indicates a statistically significant correlation: with the growth of identification support for consensual and participatory decision-making increases (see table 10). Here as well, however, the correlation is not particularly strong, indicating quite widespread support for participatory and deliberative values.

Table 10. Identification with GJM by activists' normative models of democracy

Normative models of democracy	**Identification with GJM**			**Total 100%**	**Dichotomy**[11]	**Mean (0-3)**
	No or little	Enough	Much			
Associational	21.0	43.0	36.0	200	79.0	2.13
Deliberative representative	12.8	57.0	30.2	86	87.2	2.16
Assembleary	13.7	48.8	37.5	371	86.3	2.23
Deliberative participative	9.1	49.1	41.8	383	90.9	2.32
Total row %	13.4	48.5	38.2	1.040	86.6	2.24
Measures of association	Cramer's V= .10**				Cr.'s V= .12 ***	ETA= .11**

[11] Percentage of enough or much identification.

6.4. Democracy from below: activists and institutions

> "Although the EU is one of the richest areas of the world, tens of millions of people are living in poverty, either because of mass unemployment or the casualization of labour. The policies of the EU based on the unending extension of competition within and outside Europe constitute an attack on employment, workers and welfare rights, public services, education, the health system and so on. The EU is planning the reduction of workers' wages and employment benefits as well as the generalization of casualization. We reject this neo-liberal Europe and any efforts to re-launch the rejected Constitutional Treaty; we are fighting for another Europe, a feminist, ecological, open Europe, a Europe of peace, social justice, sustainable life, food sovereignty and solidarity, respecting minorities' right and the self-determination of peoples".

The Declaration of the Assembly of the Movements of the 4th European Social Forum, Athens 7th May 2006 so addresses the European Union. It does not reject the need neither for a European level of governance, nor for a European identity (that goes beyond the borders of the EU), but criticizes the EU policies asking for "another Europe": a feminist, ecological, open, solidaristic, just Europe. Similarly, the previous Assembly of the Movements, held at the third ESF, stated:

> "We are fighting for another Europe. Our mobilisations bring hope of a Europe where job insecurity and unemployment are not part of the agenda. We are fighting for a viable agriculture controlled by the farmers themselves, an agriculture that preserves jobs, and defends the quality of environment and food products as public assets. We want to open Europe to the world, with the right to asylum, free movement of people and citizenship for everyone in the country they live in. We demand real social equality between men and women, and equal pay. Our Europe will respect and promote cultural and linguistic diversity and respect the right of peoples to self-determination and allow all the different peoples of Europe to decide upon their futures democratically. We are struggling for another Europe, which is respectful of workers' rights and guarantees a decent salary and a high level of social protection. We are struggling against any laws that establish insecurity through new ways of subcontracting work".

In these statements, as in many others, the GJM confirms attention to interactions (although challenging ones) with the institutions of global, multilevel governance. In the following, we will focus on these positions.

Research on social movements has often stressed the relationship between "conventional" and "unconventional" politics—or challengers and polity members, to use Tilly's (1978) expression. A main contribution of the "political process" approach to social movements has been its stress on the continuities in various forms of political participation in general, and the interaction between the characteristics of democratic regimes and the forms of protest in particular. Not only does democracy rise from "disorder" (Tarrow 1989), but institutions shape social movements, their strength and strategies. In fact, studies on social movements have often highlighted the role of political opportunities in facilitating participation, the underlying assumption being that it increases as access to public decision-making becomes at least in part more open, the administrative units more decentralised and the legislative, executive and judiciary powers more distinct. Furthermore, the availability of allies, divisions within the

government, or institutional reforms making bottom-up access easier are said to facilitate collective mobilisation (Tarrow 1994; della Porta and Diani 2006).

The attention to the "external dimension" of democracy is also linked to the strategic need to address some challenges to democracy, as it has traditionally been implemented in representative, liberal democracies. The movement for a globalization from below grew at a time of dramatic changes in the political process that have in fact affected the protest. First, the growth of international governmental institutions challenges the principles and institutions of representative democracy that have been built up around the nation state (Held and McGrew, 1999). Second, neoliberal economic policies, by increasing the power of multinational corporations, have reduced the capacity of traditional state institution to control the market (Pizzorno 2001; Crouch 2004).

Beyond suggesting policy changes, in a more reformist or radical fashion, the GJM is addressing these challenges through a critique of representative forms of democracy. In this endeavour, the movement is redrawing the boundaries of politics, broadening them in a participatory direction (della Porta et al. 2006). The self-definition as a "movement for a globalization from below" stresses the fundamental criticism of "top-down" representative democracy. The GJM has criticized supranational institutions not only because of the specific policies they adopt, but also for their deficit in terms of democratic accountability. Also national representative democracy is however stigmatized for being powerless or at best inadequate to guide globalization, and for the growing insufficiency of mechanisms of electoral accountability face to the greater power of the executive vis-à-vis parliament as well as the personalization of politics through manipulative use of the mass-media (della Porta and Tarrow 2004)

In this part of the chapter, we are going to address the "external" dimension of the democratic conceptions in the ESF by focusing on three main dimensions: a) trust in different types of institutions; b) linked to this, solutions envisioned for "another democracy", with particular attention to the territorial level of governance; and, finally, c) preferences for a strategy of political mobilization, with interactions with the various public institutions, or focus upon more autonomy and the construction of free space.

6.4.1. Multilevel governance and trust in institutions: localist, nationalist or cosmopolitan?

Previous surveys have confirmed the activists' criticism of representative democracy. Among the demonstrators against the G8 in Genoa in 2001, trust in representative institutions tended to be low with however significant differences regarding the single institutions (Andretta, della Porta, Mosca and Reiter 2002). In general, some international organizations (especially the EU and the United Nations) were seen by activists as more worthy of respect than their national government but less so than institutions of local government. Research on the first ESF confirmed that diffidence by activists in the institutions of representative democracy is cross-nationally spread, although particularly pronounced where national governments are either right-wing (Italy and Spain at the time), or perceived as hostile to the GJM's claims (as in the UK). Not even national parliaments, supposedly the main instrument of representative democracy, were trusted while there was markedly greater trust in local bodies (especially in Italy and France), and, albeit somewhat lower, in the United Nations. The EU scored a trust level among activists barely higher than national governments (except, in this case, for the more trustful Italians). The data on the second ESF and the fourth ESF confirm the general mistrust in representative democratic

institutions, although with some specification (see table 11). The higher trust in national governments in Paris and Athens compared to Florence can be explained by the peculiar state of the Berlusconi government, which the Italian activists strongly stigmatized in 2002. The declining trust in the EU reflects the growing criticism of EU policy and institutions, with a politicization and polarization of positions during and after the French referendum on the European constitutional treaty (della Porta 2007b; della Porta and Caiani 2006, 2007). Similarly, the decline of trust in the UN between Florence (similar in Paris) and Athens seems to indicate a growing dismay also among more moderate movement organizations that had once trusted that institution.

Among other actors and institutions, we notice a strongly declining trust in the church and the mass media, as well as in the unions in general and a stable (low) trust in the judiciary and (even lower) in political parties. Activists continue instead to trust social movements (and to a lesser extent NGOs) as actors of a democracy from below.

Table 11. Trust in institutions of ESF participants in Florence, Paris, and Athens (valid cases only)

Type of institution*	Florence 2002		Paris 2003		Athens 2006	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
Local institutions	46.1	2365	43.1	2034	26.6	1122
National government	6.1	2451	11.6	1997	11.5	1126
National parliament	14.9	2428	-	-	20.5	1130
European Union	26.9	2444	17.3	2002	14.5	1141
United Nations	29.6	2444	31.7	1985	18.1	1136
Political parties	20.4	2423	23.0	2007	21.2	1120
Unions	69.5**	**	57.5	2025	49.0	1122
Social movements	-	-	90.0	2067	85.7	1139
NGOs	-	-	77.3	2002	66.8	1132
Both	89.4	2464	-	-	-	-
Church	17.2	2441	15.5	1987	9.1	1135
Mass media	12.4	2449	9.3	2010	3.9	1142
Judiciary	36.7	2429	-	-	33.8	1136
Police	7.3	2454	-	-	10.7	1132

*The degree of trust was translated into a dichotomous variable in the following way: 'not at all' and 'little' = 'no'; 'a fair amount' and 'a lot' = 'yes'

** The Italian version of the Florence questionnaire gave respondents the opportunity to specify trust in a specific union, while for the non Italian activists the question asked for trust in unions in general. For the non Italian activists the percentage of trust in trade unions was 56.8%. Of the Italian activists, 13.6% expressed trust in the moderate CISL/UIL trade unions, 64.5% in the traditional left-wing union CGIL, and 58.9% in the radical grassroots trade unions. A new variable was constructed that considers the overall proportion of activists' trust in any kind of trade union, by isolating those non Italians who expressed at least enough trust in trade unions in general and those Italians who expressed at least enough trust in at least one kind of trade union. However, it should be noticed that the way in which the question was drafted for the Italians could raise the probability of expressing trust. In fact, if we consider the new variable, the percentage of trust for the non Italians is much more in line with the results of the other surveys than the percentage of trust for the Italians: 54.7% and 75.9% respectively.

As far as national institutions are concerned, there is first of all widespread belief that they are ineffective in combating neoliberal globalization. As an Italian activist stated during a focus group, "for better or worse, many of us who believed we were living in a democracy have woken up. We've realized we were not even valued properly, we were not even really electors,

we were no use to anything or anyone, since these agreements did without government bodies or especially parliaments" (cit. in della Porta 2004b, 194). Moreover, national institutions are considered as more and more distant from the concerns of the people.

Local institutions are instead perceived as closer and therefore more approachable. In particular, left-wing local governments (especially those characterized by a stronger presence of the Communist parties in Italy and France) have offered logistic support and symbolic legitimation to the ESFs. At various levels (World Social Forums, European Social Forums), the parallel forums held by representatives of local institutions attest to this greater trust.

The greater delegation of power at supranational level to institutions with no democratic accountability is considered, instead, as particularly dangerous for democracy. The GJM emerged in fact from campaigns against international institutions, like the WTO but also the World Bank and the IMF, accused of imposing their will on national governments by "conditioning" loans to the implementation of neoliberal policies or imposing sanctions against protectionist policies. In Seattle in 1999 the GJM became globally visible with the contestation of the Millennium Round of negotiations in the WTO. On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of Bretton Woods the "Fifty Years is enough" campaign denounced the worldwide failure of the IMF and the WB, demanding not only a radical reform of their policies but also a democratisation of their structure.

International financial institutions are perceived as the main promoters of neoliberal globalization, and therefore a main target for the GJM, but trust in IGOs in general is low. The United Nations, whose summits on environment, development and human rights acted as a coral reef for the formation of the GJM in the 1980s and 1990s, are perceived as inefficient and un-accountable. In fact, main campaigns demanded a deep reform of the UN. In May 2000, the INGO Millennium Forum urged the United Nations "to reform and democratize all levels of decision-making in the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO and integrate them fully into the United Nations system, making these institutions accountable to the Economic and Social Council". Moreover, the Forum demanded "to ensure greater transparency and democracy and to support the establishment of a consultative mechanism with civil society". In order to democratize the economy and reclaim "political control over companies, finance and international institutions", the third assembly of the United Nations of Peoples held at Perugia in 1999 proposed entrusting "to a reformed United Nations – instead of to groups of wealthy countries like the G7 – the task of administering interdependence with an eye to the 'common good' so that it may intervene in economic decisions which are at the root of world problems" (in Pianta 2001a, 152). Proposals for a reform of the United Nations frequently put forward at movement events include the institution of a parliamentary assembly and of a congress of local powers of the UN, the strengthening of the status of the NGOs and the tripartite composition (government, parliament, non-governmental associations) of the national delegations to the various organs of the United Nations, the strengthening of the systems of guarantees, starting with the international court of justice, as well as the reform of the security council in order to make it really democratic and representative.

The activists also mistrust the EU, accused of using competences on market competition and free trade (the so-called "negative integration") to impose neoliberal economic policy while the restrictive budgetary policies set by the Maastricht parameters are stigmatized as jeopardizing welfare policies. Already in the first ESF, EU policies were criticised for being essentially neoliberal. Under the slogan 'another Europe is possible' various proposals were tabled

including 'taxation of capital' and the Tobin Tax. Demands were also made for cuts in indirect taxation and assistance for weaker social groups, as well as for strengthening of public services such as education and health care. Beyond policy choices, the institutional structure of the EU is also criticized, in particular the weakness of the parliament *vis-à-vis* the commission and the council, and the lack of transparency in the *modus operandi* of the so-called "Eurocracies". During the ESFs of Florence and Paris proposals were tabled for a democratization of EU institutions—in order to make hem not only electorally accountable but also more open to participation "from below". The European constitutional process, in fact, is not seen as resolving the fundamental problem of the lack of democratic accountability within the EU.

Social issues and democracy are strictly linked. In Paris, the WIDE-European NGO Network together with the Rosa Luxemburg foundations asked for basic services and goods, such as education, health and water, to be subordinated to democratic decisions, involving the local communities. The EU constitutional treaty was stigmatized as the "constitutionalization of neoliberalism". A participant at the seminar "Pour une Europe démocratique, des droits et de la citoyenneté", claimed that "The first part of the text is similar to a constitution. But the third one, which focuses on the implementation of concrete policies, goes beyond the normal frame of a constitution. It constitutionalizes competition rights. Making rigid the policies to be followed, it takes away from the citizens all possibilities to change the rules. It is an unacceptable practice because it is anti-democratic. Anyway, all changes are made impossible by the need to obtain a unanimous vote by 25 states".

Criticism of conceptions of democracy at the EU level also refers to foreign and security policies, with a call for a Europe of "freedoms and justice" against a Europe "sécuritaire et policière". In the first ESF, EU stances in foreign policies were considered as subordinated to the US, environmental issues as dominated by the environmental-unfriendly demands of corporations, and migration policy as oriented to building a xenophobic "Fortress Europe". In the second ESF, the construction of a European judicial space was defined as a way to control police power. In particular, EU legislation on terrorism is criticized as criminalizing such categories as young, refugees, Muslims. The official lists of "terrorist organizations" are considered as arbitrary (including groups that had already been funded by European institutions). Repressive measures are also criticized as ineffective, and the need for political solutions stressed. As for the EU foreign policy, there is criticism of the subordination of humanitarian politics and developmental help to commercial and security aims. Solidarity groups denounce aggressive EU trade policies and the asymmetric negotiations of commercial treaty. In terms of defence policies, proposal range from "a Europe without Nato, EU-army and US bases" to calls for multilateralism and for the introduction into the EU constitutional treaty of an article stating, "Europe refuses war as an instrument of conflict resolution".

6.4.2. Multilevel governance. Which solutions?

Activists present at the various ESFs share these criticisms of EU politics and policies. Respondents at the first ESF in Florence were convinced that the EU strengthens neoliberal globalization (32% responded "some" and 56% "very much"), and that it is unable to mitigate the negative effects of globalisation (44% "not at all" and 37% "a little") and safeguard a different social model of welfare (54% "not at all" and 37% "a little"). While Italians expressed greater trust in the EU, and British activists were more euro-sceptic (followed by French and

Spanish activists), the differences were however altogether small. Respondents in Athens confirmed a widely shared scepticism that strengthening the national governments would help to tame neo-liberal globalization (only about one fifth of the activists responded positively). Confirming the trends already observed on the battery of questions on trust in institutions, between the first and the fourth ESF there was a decline in those who support a strengthening of the EU (from 43% to 35%) and/or the UN (from 57% to 48%) (see table 12).

Table 12. Opinion of ESF participants in Florence and Athens on which institutions should be strengthen to achieve the GJM's goals (valid cases only)*

Type of institution**	Florence 2002		Athens 2006	
	%	N	%	N
Strengthen national governments	22.0	2362	25.6	1066
Strengthen European Union***	43.2	2383	34.9	1073
Strengthen United Nations	56.6	2405	48.4	1056
Building institutions of world governance****	64.6	2400	92.5	1127

* Question of the Florence questionnaire: "In your opinion, to achieve the goals of the movement would it be necessary to strengthen …. "; question of the Athens questionnaire: "In your opinion, what should be done to tame neo-liberal globalization? Strengthen …"
** The level of disagreement/ agreement was translated into a dichotomous variable in the following way: 'strongly disagree' and 'disagree'= 'no'; 'agree' and 'strongly agree' = 'yes'
*** The Florence questionnaire asked for the strengthening of EU or other international super-national institutions.
****The Athens questionnaire asked about the building new institutions that involve the civil society on the international level; the Florence questionnaire asked about the building of new institutions of world governance

In general, the GJM activists seem however aware of the need for supranational (macroregional and/or global) institutions of governance. At one of the plenary assemblies of the second edition of the ESF, Italian activist Franco Russo stated: "There is a real desire for Europe… but not for any Europe. The European citizens ask for a Europe of rights: social, environmental, of peace. But does this Constitution respond to our desire for Europe?". And the French representative of the trade union federation G10 Solidaires, Pierre Khalfa, declared that the Constitutional treaty "is a document to be rejected… the discussion of the project is the occasion for a Europe-wide mobilization" (in "Liberazione" 14/11/2003). In a comment on the second ESF, the Italian daily "L'Unità" (17/11/2003), near to the centre-left "Democratici di sinistra", praised the definition of a common line on Europe as "an innovation that puts the movement in a advantageous position vis-à-vis the majority of the traditional political forces".

The image of "another Europe" (instead of "no Europe") is often stressed in the debates. During the second ESF, the Assembly of the unemployed and precarious workers in struggle proclaimed that "For the European union, Europe is only a large free-exchange area. We want a Europe based upon democracy, citizenship, equality, peace, a job and a revenue to live. Another Europe for another World. … In order to build another Europe we must put the democratic transformation of institutions at the centre of elaboration and mobilization. We can, we should have great political ambition for Europe… *Cessons de subir l'Europe: prenons la en mains*" (http://workspace.fse-esf.org/mem/Act2223, accessed 20/12/2006). Unions and other groups

active on public services declared the European level as the pertinent level of resistance, among others against national decisions. The "No to the Constitutional draft" is combined with demands for a legitimate European constitution, produced through a public consultation, "a European constitution constructed from below". The demands for "more Europe" are linked not only to a reduction of the democratic deficit of the EU, but to a different democracy. A participant in the seminar "Pour une Europe démocratique, des droits et de la citoyenneté" stated: "The Europe we have to build is the Europe of rights and of participatory democracy which must be its engine. A constitutional project is tabled. Is it a text for 'the Europe we want'? … For building a democratic Europe, we have to discuss of its construction and make the ESF an actor for a new constitution." In this vision, "the European social forum constitutes the peoples as the constitutional power, the only legitimate power". The challenge is to "dare" imagining a more ambitious future for Europe. In a report on the seminar "Our vision for the future of Europe" we read, "Lacking a clear and far reaching vision the EU-governments are stumbling from conference to conference. In this manner the EU will not survive the challenges of the upcoming decades! Too many basic problems have been avoided for lack of a profound strategic position. In our vision we outlined an alternative model for the future of Europe. It contains a clear long range positioning for Europe, making a clear choice for the improvement of the quality of life for all and for responsible and peaceful development" (http://workspace.fse-esf.org/mem/Act2106/doc295).

The activists of the first ESF already expressed strong interest in the building of new institutions of world governance: 70% of the respondents were quite or very much in favour of this, including strengthening the United Nations, an option supported by about half the sample. Furthermore, about one third of the activists surveyed at Florence agreed that in order to achieve the goals of the movement a stronger EU and/or other regional institutions were necessary (with higher support for the EU among Italian activists, and very low support among the British activists). In Athens, the support for building (alternative) institutions of world governance became virtually unanimous (93% of the respondents), whereas that for strengthening the EU went from almost half (43%) to about one third, and for strengthening the UN from more than half (57%) to less than half (48%) of the respondents.

Notwithstanding this criticism of EU institutions, the activists of the first European Social Forum expressed quite a high level of affective identification with Europe: about half of the activists feel enough or strong attachment to Europe, with also in this case less support from British and Spanish activists and more from French, Germans and Italians (see table 13).

Table 13. To what extent do you feel attached to Europe?

	Italy	France	Germany	Spain	Great Britain	Total ESF
not at all	17.9	9.1	12.8	20.7	27.8	18.2
a little	29.3	31.8	29.5	49.5	31.9	34.2
enough	45.7	43.9	37.2	28.8	26.4	36.5
very much	7.1	15.2	20.5	0.9	13.9	11.1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	140	132	78	111	144	605

The activists of the global justice movement therefore do not seem to be euro-sceptics, wanting a return to an almighty nation state, but "critical Europeanists" or "critical globalist", convinced that transnational institution of governance are necessary, but that they should be built from below.

As we have seen above, these positions are in line with the debates in the ESFs, that do not usually question Europe as a relevant polity, but aim at developing "another Europe". Already in the first ESF in Florence, concrete proposals to improve the quality of the democratic outcome went from the reduction of import taxes on medicines to the increase in the use of nonconventional medicine (seminar on "Health in Europe: equity and access"); from the introduction of the right to asylum in the European constitution to the regularization of all "undocumented" migrants (workshop on Right to migrate, right to asylum); from a European social charter recognizing the right to decent housing to the occupation of empty buildings (workshop on "Housing rights in Europe: towards a trans-European network of struggles and alternatives"); from the dialogue with local authorities to grassroots participation in the development of international experiences of cooperation (workshop on "Decentralized cooperation: a dialogue between territories as a response to global challenges"); from the quality control of hard drugs to the liberalization of light ones (Workshop on "Perfect enemies: the penal governance of poverty and differences"). Specific proposals for changes in EU policies come from networks of social movement organizations and NGOs, often already active on specific issues. The European Assembly of the unemployed and precarious workers in struggle stressed the importance of developing claims at the EU level (e.g. a minimum salary of 50% of the average revenue); ethnic minority associations put forward linguistic and cultural rights; the European social consult asked to "strengthen and widen the European social fabric in a network that should be participatory, horizontal and decentralized, as much in the taking of the decisions as in the realizations of actions" (http://workspace.fse-esf.org/mem/Act2303/doc448). Proposals for economic reform are developed by the European union for research in economic democracy. Humanitarian NGOs debate measures against religious and ethnic discrimination, including the potentials of EU directives and national legislations.

Europe remained similarly central at the fourth edition of the Forum where seminars (that in large majority had "Europe" in the title) discussed at the European level issues as diverse as the fight against poverty and institutional racism, the Charter of common principles of another Europe and the restriction of liberties, health systems and Nato, camps for migrants and the Ocalan case, education and relations with Southern Mediterranean countries, corporate politics and labour rights, relations with Latin America and with the UN, the populist Right and new oppositional actors, left-wing journalisms and housing problems, the Bolkestein directive and precarious workers, the Lisbon and Bologna strategies and constitution building, local governance and the WTO, taxation and Islamophobia, violence against women and students' mobility, linguistic equality and basic income, Roma's rights and the US military bases, agricultural policy and madhouses, human trafficking and sanctions against Israel, monotheistic religions and position towards Cuba.

These disparate themes are however bridged within a common discourse. In the Call of the European Social Movements in Florence the various issues were all framed under the label of a struggle against neoliberism: "We have gathered in Florence to express our opposition to a European order based on corporate power and neoliberalism. This market model leads to constant attacks on the conditions and rights of workers, social inequalities, and oppression of

ethnic minorities, and social exclusion of the unemployed and migrants. It leads to environmental degradation, privatisation and job insecurity. It drives powerful countries to try and dominate the economies of weaker countries, often to deny them real self determination. Once more it is leading to war".

Substantive policy proposals are linked within a vision of a multiterritorial democracy. The discourse on public good (such as water) is framed as oriented to overcome the culture of merchandizing, but also of a national sovereignty that rejects solidarity with the external world. At the same time, there is the attempt to enlarge the notion of Europe beyond the European Union and the fear of an exclusive European identity as representing the "civilized" culture against the non-European civilization. The Declaration of the Assembly of the Movements of the 4th European Social Forum stigmatizes the dangers of a polarization of the global citizens along the line of a "clash of civilization", which would justify a further discrimination against the people of the South. "Conservative forces in the north and the south are encouraging a "clash of civilization" aimed at dividing oppressed people, which is in turn producing unacceptable violence, barbarism and additional attacks on the rights and dignity of migrants and minorities".

Beyond concrete policy proposals, demands are elaborated for participatory democracy. The Assembly of the third ESF asked, among others, for more participation "from below" in the construction of "another Europe":

> "At a time when the draft for the European Constitutional treaty is about to be ratified, we must state that the peoples of Europe need to be consulted directly. The draft does not meet our aspirations. This constitutional treaty consecrates neo-liberalism as the official doctrine of the EU; it makes competition the basis for European community law, and indeed for all human activity; it completely ignores the objectives of ecologically sustainable society. This constitutional treaty does not grant equal rights, the free movement of people and citizenship for everyone in the country they live in, whatever their nationality; it gives NATO a role in European foreign policy and defence, and pushes for the militarization of the EU. Finally it puts the market first by marginalising the social sphere, and hence accelerating the destruction of public services".

6.4.2. Politics, antipolitics, alterpolitics: how to change the world?

Beyond discussing the territorial dimension of power, the data on trust/mistrust in different political and social actors also help addressing another relevant issue. Social movements have been traditionally classified in political versus culturally oriented, or seeking power versus personal change. The GJM is pragmatic in the development of proposals for policy changes, but also expresses a lack of interest in "taking power" and instead a search for the construction of alternative, free spaces.

Movement politics is in fact conceived as alternative to the institutional one and based on interaction between society and politics. As an Italian activist declared during a focus group, "I never went in for politics, but before I always did voluntary stuff … according to me there's now this merger between voluntary work and politics in the strict sense … and this is maybe the novelty that gives the impetus, the fuel that makes the forces of two worlds that were perhaps a bit separate before come together" (in della Porta 2004b, 193).

In general, we have to consider that our activists are well endowed with experiences of political participation in various forms. In particular, activism or previous activism in political parties increased from Florence to Athens, attesting to the growing interest of more institutional actors (see table 14). Experiences with direct forms of action such as occupations and blockages decreased instead, a trend that can be linked to both the higher participation in these forms of direct action in Italy (della Porta et al 2006) as well as to the progressive detachment from the forum of the more radical and "horizontal" groups, that in Athens attended parallel events.

Table 14. Previous political activities of ESF participants in Athens, Florence, and Paris (valid cases only)

Type of activity	**Florence 2002**		**Paris 2003**		**Athens 2006**	
	%	**N**	%	N	**%**	**N**
Persuaded so. to vote for a political party	51.8	2494	-	-	54.1	1193
Active for a political party	33.5	2496	-	-	41.2	1193
Signed a petition/ public letter/ referendum*	88.8	2509	96.3	2102	84.2	1194
Distribution of leaflets	73.4	2498	74.0	1970	70.9	1194
Assembly/ discussion group**	91.3	2512	83.3	2010	-	-
Symbolic action	-	-	64.9	1885	-	-
Non-violent direct action	-	-			54.7	1193
Cultural	-	-			58.2	1194
Demonstration march	-	-	95.5	2080	92.6	1194
Strike	86.0	2507	71.2	1950	56.7	1194
Boycott of products	65.8	2494	74.7	2003	68.8	1194
Blockade/ Sit-in	67.9	2480	47.7	1865	31.2	1193
Occupation of a public building	68.0	2509	39.2	1904	33.5	1193
Occupation of abandoned homes/ land	25.9	2488	-	-	12.1	1193
Violent attack on property	8.4	2494	6.0	1830	6.3	1193

* The Florence questionnaire asked activists whether they had signed a petition/public letter/referendum; the Paris questionnaire whether they had signed a petition; the Athens questionnaire whether they had signed a petition/ public letter.

** The Paris questionnaire asked activists whether they had participated in a reflection or discussion group; the Florence questionnaire whether they had participated in an assembly or congress.

In order to better understand the conceptions of politics in the GJM, we asked participants of the Athens ESF to rank strategies the GJM should use in order to enhance democracy according to their perceived importance (see table 15). Our data attest to the activists' search for alternative conceptions of politics and democracy. The most traditional form of political participation, contacting political leaders, has the lowest level of support. This reflects the mentioned mistrust of parties and the belief that representative institutions are further and further detached from citizens. The critique of parties – especially those potentially closest – concerns the conception of politics as an activity for professionals, even more than opposition to specific policy choices. The movement is said by an activist to stress "a completely different model of self-representation, etc., that doesn't fit, doesn't gel with a party's way of selection

from above" (in della Porta 2004b, 196). The demand for politics coincides with a demand for participation face to parties that have become bureaucracies founded upon delegation, stressing the (wrong) idea of politics as done by professionals, interested at most in electorally exploiting the movement, while continuing to deny its political nature.

Table 15. Strategies the GJM should use in order to enhance democracy

	Practice democracy in group life	Take to the streets	Spread information to public	Promote alternative models	Contact political leaders
Most important	27.6	15.8	26.7	35.7	7.4
Second most important	18.1	15.3	31.5	27.1	10.6
Third most important	21.5	22.1	24.9	18.4	9.3
Fourth most Important	22.7	30.2	13.9	13.5	13.9
Fifth most important	10.2	16.6	3.0	5.2	58.9
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	1072	1064	1073	1080	1060

Although significantly more supported, also the participatory option of reliance upon protest as a main means to put pressure upon decision-making is considered a priority by less than one third of the activists (first or second option). The movement's principle objective is in fact to "make the world aware": in the words of an activist, it "does not have the objective of taking power, but of changing society in its relationships, in feelings, in relations with people, of building a different world; and a different world is built from below" (ibid.).

Respondents in fact consider as more relevant than contacting politicians or taking to the streets the spreading of information to the public—which in other parts of our research indeed emerged as a privileged strategy also for the GJMOs (see chapters 4 and 5; della Porta and Mosca 2006a; della Porta and Reiter 2006). If the New Left in the 1970s was fascinated by a possible revolutionary seizure of power, activists of the GJM tend instead to present their action as oriented to a slow and gradual change. In this sense, an activist compared the movement to a river, and "the broader the river, the slower it flows … sometimes it even seems as if it flows underground, just because it's so broad … the movement is like water permeating and flowing everywhere, so that when it knocks the wall down it already owns the field …" (in della Porta 2004b, 196).

In particular, however, the activists stress the relevance of building alternative spheres of political engagement and discussion. They rank as most important to practice democracy in group life and, above all, to promote alternative social and economic models. In the activists' perception, politics involves the search, through debates, for an emerging conception of the common good. In fact, the construction of "convergence spaces", "that facilitate the forging of an associational politics that constitutes a diverse, contested coalition of place-specific social movements", has been noticed (Routledge 2003, 345). Particularly relevant for the GJM is the "forum" quality of some arena, that is the presence of places where "critically collective discussion about members' interests and collective identities" develops (Lichterman 1999, 104). The importance of forming open spaces and concrete alternatives is in fact stressed also in organizational documents. The coordination of the European Social Forum presents itself as

having the task of constructing "a wider public space in which the nets, associations, movements, social forums, the different social actors, can debate with each other and intertwine their contents, practices and campaigns. A space that belongs to all" (quoted in Fruci 2003, 187). The Italian local social forums define themselves as open, public arenas for permanent discussion: a forum is, in this interpretation, "a tribune for the local civil society" (ibid., 174).

This criticism of institutional politics is confirmed by the attitudes towards and the experiences of participation in experiments of participatory democracy, promoted especially at the local level. In the last decade so-called deliberative arenas developed, especially at the local level, based on the principle of participation of "normal citizens" in public arenas for debates, empowered by information and rules for high quality communication. Deliberative arenas have been promoted in the forms of Citizens' Juries in Great Britain and Spain; Planungszelle in Germany; Consensus Conference in Denmark, Conferences de citoyens in France, as well as Agenda 21 and various experiments in strategic urban planning. Experiments as diverse as the participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, the Chicago inner-city neighbourhood governance councils for policing and public schools, joint labour-management efforts to manage industrial labour markets, stakeholder development of ecosystem governance arrangements under the US Endangered Species Act, village governance in West Bengal India are presented as part of an "Empowered Deliberative Democracy" model centered on participation, quality of discourse, and citizens' empowerment (Fung and Wright 2001). The focus of these experiments is the solution of specific problems by involving ordinary, affected people. This implies the creation of new institutions and devolution of decision-making power, with however a coordination with representative institutions. The institutional objectives of these institutions include effective problem-solving; equitable solutions; broad, deep and sustained participation. Actors associated with social movements intervened in the development of some of these processes, sometimes as critical participants, sometimes as external opponents. In particular, the participatory budget, sponsored by various groups involved in the GJM, has been credited to create a positive context for the development of associations, fostering greater activism, greater interconnectedness of associations, and a city-wide orientation (Baiocchi 2002). As our Athens survey shows, one third of the activists (30.7%) strongly believe that these experiments will improve the quality of decision-making, while 42.5 are moderately optimist, and 14.3 disagree (of which, 2.6% strongly).

6.5. Summarizing

In this chapter we addressed the democratic normative dimension of GJM activists. We underlined that although the GJM has promoted a normative idea of democracy which values both full participation and consensus, the ESF process has often been criticized because of its democratic practices. An internal conflict between vertical and horizontal organizations has created dissatisfaction with the way decisions are taken when a European Social Forum is to be organized. Referring to the data of the other parts of our research, we showed that the organizations that participate in the GJM activities in our selected European countries are in fact characterized by different views of democracy. Tension emerged between delegation and participation, majority vote and consensus. The activists themselves report that in their groups, and similarly in GJM, the normatively supported principles of full participation of all members and consensual decision-making are not always met. This nonetheless, activists participating at the ESF in Athens seem to be very satisfied with th decision-making processes at the group level

and in the GJM meetings. We also found that participation in the GJM strengthens participative and deliberative visions of democracy.

In the second part of the chapter, we stressed that participants in the 2006 ESF display strong criticism and mistrust of representative institutions at various territorial levels, which are seen as entailing a democratic deficit and not capable to act effectively against the social injustices brought about by neo-liberal globalization. Compared to the results of previous surveys of ESF participants, they also are quite sceptical about strengthening existing institutions as a solution to such a democratic deficit and lack of effectiveness. The activists share however a strong cosmopolitan orientation with a homogeneous belief in the need to build new institutions of European and of global governance that involve the civil society. Refusing a "return to the nation-state", the ESF activists present instead a challenge for European institutions by asking alternative policies and a participatory politics, and demanding a "Europe of rights" conceived as a "social Europe" but also as a "Europe from Below". Finally, we have seen that their general views of democracy and politics reflect in the search for alternative strategies of political mobilization.

Chapter 7. Microanalysis of practices of deliberative democracy[1]

7.1. Introduction

In order to deepen our understanding of the way in which deliberative experiments function and what their virtues and limitations are, in a concluding part of the Demos project we studied the activities of movement organizations, with particular attention to experiences in internal decision-making and interactions with institutions at the local and supranational levels. In the project proposal we stated that "We are interested in studying the characters and the evolution of internal decision-making, the rules of participating, the relationship between the deliberation process inside the specialized group and the more general process of deliberation at the local social forum level. At the supranational level, participant observation shall be carried out during the preparation and development of supranational events". Regarding internal democracy in particular, the research focused on the ways in which communication develops within relatively small groups, how decisions are made, how (if at all) internal democracy is thematized and discussed, and which of the groups' characteristics facilitate or restrict participation and deliberation. Additionally, with respect to the external dimension of democracy, we have observed the internal debate on established political institutions, the debate on whether or not to collaborate with these institutions, and the groups' framing of local, national and global institutions of governance.

The main tool for this analysis is *participant observation*. At both the local and supranational levels, participant observation is complemented by *interviews* with group members. At the end of the observation period, the results of our analysis have been presented to and discussed with the group. Similar to *focus groups*, this last step aimed at clarifying obscure or unexpected aspects of the previous analysis and discussing with activists and institutional political actors the main problems in deliberative processes as described in our research.

In this chapter, we shall first describe the characteristics of participant observation as a method for empirical analysis, briefly discuss its implementation in research on social movements and participatory democracy, and present some general choices in our own research (part 2). We will then indicate some main themes emerging from our analysis (part 3).

7.2. Methodology and research instruments

7.2.1. Participant observation as a method

> *"By participant observation I mean a technique that wouldn't be the only technique a study would employ, it wouldn't be useful for any study, but it's a technique that you can feature in some studies. It's one of getting data, it seems to me, by subjecting your body and your own personality, and your own social situation, to the set of contingencies that*

[1] This chapter is based upon the introductory and the concluding chapters, authored by Donatella della Porta and Dieter Rucht, of the Demos WP6 Report (della Porta and Rucht 2008). The report includes country chapters authored by Hélène Combes and Isabelle Sommier (France), Simon Teune (Germany), Lorenzo Mosca (Italy), Manuel Jiménez and Angel Calle (Spain), Clare Saunders (United Kingdom), and a chapter on the transnational level authored by Raffaele Marchetti and Duccio Zola

> *play upon a set of individuals, so that you can physically and ecologically penetrate their circle of response to their social situation, or their work situation, or their ethnic situation or whatever. So that you're close to them while they are responding to what life does to them." (Goffman 1989, 125)*

In this way, Erwin Goffman presents what he considers to be the main characteristics and main focus of participant observation. First, researchers do not only observe but also participate: participant observation is a way of getting data by "subjecting your body and your own personality, and your own social situation, to the set of contingencies that play upon a set of individuals". Second, it is a technique that is used especially when researchers are interested in looking at how individuals respond, "to what life does to them", that is to the "set of contingencies" that play upon them.

In general, participant observation is linked to the ethnographic methodologies: it implies immersion in small groups and/or specific settings; detailed observations on what happens are reported in field notes; concepts and hypotheses arise from the interaction of ethnographic work and theoretical questions. The definitions of participant observation as a method usually stress two elements: a) in-depth field observations, i.e., the researcher observes "in natural loci" and to a certain degree takes part in the action being studied while the action develops; b) regular (systematic) observations of people. Part of the ethnographic approach, it "is naturalistic, in that it works with society as it is, without trying to influence or control it. The goal is to understand behaviour in its habitual context, as opposed to an abstract or laboratory setting, and to interpret how people give meaning to their experiences" (Bray 2008). Additionally, participant observation is intensive observation, its duration ranging from some months to some years.

Even within these widely shared general assumptions there are, however, also methodological choices that differentiate between various implementations of participant observation as a method. In Paul Lichterman's words, "There is more than one way of doing participant observation. Instead of one, exclusive model for a 'good' research design, participant observation encompasses several, evolving models of inquiry." (2002, 119) These choices relate in particular to the following continuums:

a) *How much participation versus observation?* In general, participant observation implies both aspects of participation and observation—"the researcher observes and to some degrees participates in the action being studied as the action is happening" (Lichterman 2002, 120). Different scholars have argued about the advantages and disadvantages of specific approaches along the continuum observation—participation. Detached observation has been praised as a choice that allows not only meeting scientific standards of neutrality, but also avoiding disturbing the observational field through the perception that the observed actors have of their observer. This position, however, has been criticized as being either impossible to implement or unethical. In the tradition of action-research, more participation (as involvement in the group life but also sharing of the group values) has been said to increase the capacity for emphatic understanding. "Observant participation" has referred to "fieldwork in contexts in which the researcher is personally involved outside the immediate context of her academic work" (Bray 2008). It has been promoted especially for its advantages for the analysis of closed milieus. Yet there is the risk of being led by ideological, political or self-interest concerns rather than by scientific criteria.

b) *How much visible versus invisible?* Participant observation might be overt, with various degrees of disclosure of information to the observed subjects about the purpose of the research and the background and intentions of the researcher. In some cases, a sort of contract can be negotiated. At the opposite pole, the researcher can work undercover, without revealing his/her own purposes. This second option could indeed avoid disturbances of the field, but it is debatable in ethical terms. In fact, it has been defended only for extreme cases, such as the observation of illegal activities or total institutions, that would not be possible otherwise, or in cases in which the observer actually plays an official role in the observed institutions (e.g. a policeperson, who is also a social scientist). Undercover observation also often happens when the object of the observation is a public space. Additionally, always debated is how much of the specific purpose of the research should be mentioned to the observed actors, without influencing their behavior.

c) *How much field-driven versus theory-driven?* Differently from statistical methods, ethnographic methods foresee a strong interaction between theory and empirical analysis, as concepts are developed during field work, and hypotheses reformulated and retested. As William Foot Whyte (1984, 27) put it, "participant observation offers the advantage of serendipity: significant discovery that were unanticipated". In fact, "participant observation lends itself much less to standardized concepts, instruments and measures than other research methods" (Lichterman 2002, 1199. Different preferences exist, however, about the extent to which the researcher has to enter the field with already a baggage of concepts and hypotheses, or, vice-versa, theory-free. The latter option has been defined as "field-driven": here "participant observers write up projects intended to elucidate an empirical unit or subject matter—a labor union, a network of anti-nuclear affinity groups, a gay community—given that the boundaries of the subject matter may take work to discern" (ibid., 122). Vice-versa, a "theory-driven" project aims "to address a theory…. A field sites or subject matter is meaningful only in the categories of a theory, since the very beginning" (ibid.). Theory-driven research facilitates accumulation of knowledge; field-driven research facilitates the development of new concepts and hypotheses.

d) *How much structured observations versus open-ended observation?* Choices about theory-driven versus field-driven observation tend to be linked with the instruments chosen for observation. In general, the ethnographic method allows for more flexible approaches to issues of conceptualization and operationalization, preferring 'sensibilizing concepts' (Blumer 1969: 148) to 'definitive concepts', which pre-determine reality: "Instead of prescribing what should be looked at, as would be the case with definitive concepts, sensibilizing concepts merely indicate the direction in which the researcher could look" (Bray 2008). Field driven approaches, especially for research carried out by individual researchers, usually produce field notes in the form of open-ended narratives. Vice-versa, the more theory-driven a project, the more necessary a check list of relevant dimensions to guide the observation.

As it is obvious for a context-sensitive technique, some of these choices have been related to specific types of observations. Some contexts (e.g. illegal activities) cannot be entered unless undercover, and the researcher cannot either adapt his/her values to those of the observed subjects or decide to observe only what s/he likes. While new areas of study invite field-driven

and unstructured observation, research on established, already well-studied questions or comparative works require a structuration of observation and better developed hypotheses. Additionally, while ethnographic work was initially intended as in-depth immersion in unknown (and strange) environments (such as indigenous communities or criminal milieus), it had then to adapt to research in contexts that are instead often part of the everyday life of the researcher.

As we are going to see in the next paragraph, the presence of an established (although not surely broad) scholarship in the field of social movement norms, as well as the need for a coordinated comparative work pushed us towards the development of a theory-driven scheme of observation that would facilitate cross-case comparison. At the same time, our knowledge of the object of our research as well as relationships of mutual trust converged with our ethical preferences for disclosed observation.

7.2.2. Participant observation and social movements

> *"While scientifically motivated, ethnographic research is carried out with a humanist emphasis, with a view to understanding the lives of people, their social world and their culture. In this way, the ethnographer provides an account of the cultural 'web of meaning' that shapes the society and the lives of its members… Ethnographic research is an exploration of a society's cosmogony, of the way in which people make sense of the world they live in and how, acting on the basis of their beliefs, they relate to each other and those outside their group. Through descriptive generalisations and the development of explanatory interpretations about how societies and cultures work, in particular contexts and time spans, the researcher seeks to account for the commonalities and variations among societies and their trajectories over time." (Bray 2008)*

As with other ethnographic (or just qualitative) methods, the use of participant observation has been usually linked to some epistemological preferences: First of all, the researcher looks at naturally occurring phenomena, privileging the observation of what happens in "real life" than in experimental settings. Although various types of interviews usually accompany participant observation, the method itself is based upon what happens without the intervention of a researcher. Although we observe behaviour, another characteristic of participant observation as a method is its focus upon the meanings that motivate and direct action. In this sense, subjectivity is a focus of analysis and preferences or motivations are endogenous to the analysis (contrary to a search for "objectivity"). In most cases, participant observation produces qualitative data (not numbers). Scholars who use it are more interested in an inductive generation of hypotheses (the so-called context of discovery) rather than in testing hypotheses. Additionally, no high degree of generalization is searched for; rather, the contextual constraints are emphasized. In fact, participant observation is often praised for allowing for an in-depth analysis of what is really happening, the collection of information on everyday life, its capacity to contribute to conceptualization and theory building. At the same time, it is criticized as producing non-representative, non-generalizable and not (strictly) replicable results. It is considered as more useful when the focus is on the micro and the meso level—that is, on "how groups and settings shape people's thoughts, feelings and interactions" (Lictherman 2002, 122)—than at the macro level; more useful for the analysis of cultural than of structural processes. A lot of interpretative work by the researcher is needed in order to develop more general explanations by "extracting the general from the unique" (Burawoy 1998, 5).

Participant observation has not been a very widespread technique in social movement studies that mainly had a focus on macro characteristics (such as political opportunities and environmental resources). There have been, however, some exceptions, with attention paid to micro-dynamics within small groups. The main theoretical foci of these studies have informed our research on the micro-practices of democracy.

First of all, we have an interest in singling out the ways in which general cultural attitudes are reflected in our small groups' dynamics. In his ethnographic work on environmental groups, Paul Lichterman (1996) has developed the theme of political commitment. Departing from the widespread assumption that the rising emphasis upon self-expression and personal feelings in the US-American culture weakens the sense of community and, therefore, political commitment, he shows how different styles of commitment might develop and interact with different conceptions of communities. An emphasis on self-expression would therefore not necessarily hamper the development of a sense of community and sustained commitment to a common cause. Additionally, differences in members' conceptions and practices of participation would not necessarily weaken a group. In our research, we shall pay attention to the effects of different conceptions of commitment on group democracy.

Observations of both frontstage, public interactions and backstage, more private ones, is also relevant in order to understand how collective conversation is influenced by the perceived grammar (Talpin 2007), which is dominant in a public space as well as in more intimate context. Relevant here are not only the degree and conditions for politicization versus avoidance of politics (Eliasoph 1998), but also the role assigned in the specific social movement culture to rational arguments versus emotions or story telling (Polletta 2006; Doerr 2007).

Another relevant concern of research that has used participant observation of social movement refers to the development of a sense of identity "in action". In his research on workers conflicts, Rick Fantasia challenged the widespread idea of a lack of class-consciousness among U.S. workers. By looking at intense moments of protest (such as strikes and occupations) he developed the concept of a "culture of solidarity" as a more dynamic substitute for "static" class consciousness. Also in our work, the observation of group meetings helps understanding how (existing and changing) cultures of solidarity influence group life.

Even more directly connected with our main focus is social science research that has used participant observation to investigate democratic practices in social movements. In a path-breaking study on the evolution of democratic conceptions of democracy in social movements from the sixties to the end of the millennium, Francesca Polletta (2002) has observed the micro-dynamics of some specific groups, focusing upon their decision-making styles, their broad normative aspirations and (to a certain extent) limited accomplishment. As she did in her study, also in our project we aimed at an in-depth description of decision-making practices, but also at an understanding of the origins of the normative conceptions of democracy prevalent in the groups as well as the conditions that facilitate or restrict their accomplishments. As suggested by the in-depth study carried out by Polletta, also in our cases we shall see the tensions created in the organizational life of the group by the dilemma between internal solidarity and external support, orientation to the process or orientation to the goal, ideological consistency and instrumental rationality, reasons and emotions.

On the basis of previous research, we assumed that a number of group characteristics would affect internal democracy: on the cultural dimension, the ideological tradition (old

left/new left, religious/secular, etc.), a single-issue or multi-issue focus, as well as the degree of internal homogeneity might play a role; on the organizational dimension, the degree of centralization, professionalization, structuration, specific rules for discussion, etc. as well as the amount and type of resources (material, human and social capital) available for the groups are to be taken into account; on the action dimension, the rejection or acceptance of violence, the use of new technologies or the emphasis on self-transformation may have an impact. Additionally, meetings could follow different patterns according to some specific characteristics such as the type of decisions to be made, their degree of technicality and divisiveness, the number and types of participants, and the setting of the meeting.

Given that the in-depth research strategy of our research did not allow for investigating the impact of all mentioned dimensions, we decided first of all to keep some dimensions constant. In particular, we focused on small groups, endowed with limited resources, and active mainly at the local level. All of them were relatively young and developed within the global justice movement, adopting some of its general values and concerns, in particular in terms of "democracy from below". The main dimension that varies between the groups is the (cultural and political) homogeneity/heterogeneity of participants, which we assume has an impact on the above mentioned conceptions of commitment and culture of solidarity.

7.2.3. Our research

Previous parts of the Demos project provided information about attitudes towards democracy and existing experiments with participatory and deliberative democracy in social movements and in public decision-making. In order to develop a better understanding of the way in which deliberative experiments function, and of their richness and limitations, here we planned to observe, at the local and supranational levels, the activities of movement organizations, with particular attention to involvement in experiences of participatory and deliberative decision-making. As mentioned, the research focuses on the ordinary and extraordinary meetings and activities of the selected groups in the period under investigation. In order to reduce the impact of the observer's presence on group behaviour and collect enough observations for comparative analysis, we attended on a regular basis the meetings of the selected groups for periods that ranged from a few months (Switzerland) to two years (France and Germany)

Given that trust is a crucial resource in this kind of research, we decided not to work undercover, i.e. hiding or even denying our role as researchers, but rather to negotiate an agreement with the group in which we clarified our interest, role, and demands from the very beginning. Most of the time, the participant observation consisted in attending situations that, in the narrow sense of the research question—decision-making practices—, were of little interest since they exhibited the routine process of the group life, e.g., exchanging information, chatting, making jokes, performing organizational tasks, etc. Participating in this ordinary group life, however, has been important in order to become familiar with the group, to understand the relationships, roles and personalities within the group, and to familiarize the group to the presence of the researcher so that he/she, after some time, might be considered as a quasi-member.

Embedded in these ordinary situations were potential or actual situations of (attempted) deliberation and related participation. These conflictual situations may last from a few minutes to a few hours and sometimes may not be easily recognizable because of a smooth or subtle

transition from one kind of communication to another. The recognition and documentation of these situations played a crucial role in our research. They are most central for the analysis because they unveil the standards and actual practices of (attempts of) deliberation. Typical elements and facets of such situations are the following: attempts (failed and successful) to participate in a discussion or a decision; complaints about inequality and (hidden) power in the group; attempts to separate personal conflicts from substantive conflicts; reflections on the standards and ways of interaction and communication (e.g. consensus principle, need to compromise, suggestions to postpone decisions); appeals to group solidarity, protection of minorities, needs to reach a decision; proposals or refusals to further arguing; propositions to vote, to exclude or disregard a minority opinion; summary of arguments or opinions in a more or less biased way, insistence on feelings or opinions instead of arguments; implicit negligence of certain speakers or arguments; meta-communication on the normative standards that undergird groups behaviour.

Our instruments of participant observation were:

- A "general group description/portrait" which is based on the whole period of participant observation.[2] It may gradually emerge during the observation but will be finalized only towards the end of the period of observation. The report is organized according to a list of items that should be covered.
- "Session reports" on the character, content and course of every meeting.[3] These reports should be written immediately after each meeting following a common scheme. The reports draw a more general picture of the group meetings and allow putting the instances of discourse into context. The report information should be entered in a structured form (on paper). Whether or not part of this information was transferred to an electronic data base was left to each team's discretion.
- "Discourse protocols" that register participation, symmetry/asymmetry, the kind of power used in a controversy and a range of other variables for controversial moments.[4]
- At a later stage of research, tape-recordings of "critical discourse moments". These moments, or at least some of these, will be analyzed in greater detail in a kind of hermeneutic qualitative analysis. The latter will serve to illustrate practices of discourse and combinations of and passages between different forms of discourse.

Unstructured observation at meetings of various social movement organizations started already in the second year of our project. Additionally, our energies in the second year focused on the development of the research instrument—in this case, participant observation—as well as some first tests of it. The German team prepared a codebook for participant observation and tested it at meetings of social movement organizations in Berlin. The draft of the codebook was discussed in May 2006 and was tested in the fall.[5]

During the third year, we have selected two cases per country and started our structured observation. The groups which have been observed (for a period of at least 6 months and until July 2007) are the following: EUI Team: National campaign on water; ATTAC- Florence; UK

[2] See http://demos.eui.eu/PDFfiles/Instruments/wp6group.decription.pdf.
[3] See http://demos.eui.eu/PDFfiles/Instruments/wp6session.report.pdf.
[4] See http://demos.eui.eu/PDFfiles/Instruments/wp6discourse.proto.pdf.
[5] The codebook can be downloaded at: http://demos.eui.eu/PDFfiles/Instruments/wp6Codebook.pdf.

Team: ai Faversham; World Development Movement; London Social Forum; German Team: Attac Berlin Financial Markets Group; Berlin Social Forum; French Team: No-Vox Network; Solidaires; Spanish Team: Córdoba Solidaria; Ecologistas en Acción Córdoba; Swiss Team: Attac Geneva; Forum Social Lemanique; Urbino Team: Reclaim our UN Campaign.

Regarding each of these groups we have combined participant observation with in-depth and/or more casual interviews and analysis of group documents. Groups have been contacted through key informants and informed about the purposes of our research. In most of the cases, the groups had no objection to our participation. In the beginning of our observation we took narrative field notes which (among others) helped us developing a more structured codebook. We then continued the observation according to the instructions for coding critical moments (i.e., controversies). At the end of the observation period, the results were presented to and discussed with the observed group.

7.3. The main themes

As for the analysis of the data, the main issues that we planned to address include: sources, types and practices of power in social movements; the empirical study of power, leadership and democracy in (global justice) movements; patterns of participation (distribution of kinds of speech acts according to certain criteria e.g. founder, newcomer, issue, gender, etc.); cleavages and patterns of conflict handling (typical and exceptional matters of conflict; empirical distribution of types of power); minorities and dissenters (the making of minorities/dissenters; the strategies and reactions of minorities/dissenters); conflict resolution and decision-making (modes of avoidance and resolution; the advantages and problems of these modes; what comes after the resolution?); meta-communication (explicit and implicit norms of communication; justification of norms); emotions in deliberation (individual and contextual dimensions; when is emotional communication more likely? What are the effects of emotional communication?); how participatory and deliberative are Global Justice Movements? (assessment of the degree/type of participation; assessment of degree/type of deliberation). In following, we limit ourselves to a range of observations that in one way or another relate to the theme of power and democracy in small group settings of the GJMs.

7.3.1. The spectre of observed groups

Although we aimed for selecting small local groups that could be neatly attributed to GJMs, it turned out that the spectre of the actually studied group is more heterogeneous than we initially expected. There is no doubt that most of groups under study can be clearly attributed to the GJMs. This is reflected by their self-understanding, their aims, their ties to other groups, and their participation in broader campaigns of these movements. However, our sample also includes two groups which, though having sympathies and partial thematic overlaps with the GJMs, at least according to their self-conception, cannot be seen as an integral part of these movements. This applies to one British case (Conscious Consumers at the University of Kent) and, probably to a lesser extent, to the Spanish Córdoba Solidaria, a network created to facilitate the flow of information and coordination among a large variety of locally-based groups in this area.

In four out of the six countries, Attac groups were studied, allowing for some cross-national comparison of the groups belonging to the same umbrella organization. In the French

case, the Attac group under investigation was not a local chapter but the national board. Due to its specific role as a nation-wide steering committee composed of elected members, this group differs in many ways from the strictly locally-based Attac groups in the three other countries. Also the second French group under study is specific insofar as it is, nominally, a network of groups from many countries whose probably most important circles happen to meet in Paris.

While in the initial research proposal we have suggested to study at least one group per country, we later opted for studying two groups, if possible, preferably one of a homogeneous and one of a heterogeneous shape (the latter consisting of members/delegates from different autonomous groups). This criterion could be largely met in Switzerland and Spain. In Germany, while from an initial viewpoint the selected groups also seemed to conform to this criterion, it turned out that the formerly rather heterogeneous group (Berlin Social Forum) gradually turned into a homogenous one. Hence in this regard it became rather similar to the second group studied in Germany. In the remaining countries, for various reasons (e.g., familiarity with the group, easy access) this selection criterion was overruled – not to the disadvantage of our overall research, as it can be seen in retrospect because some parameters (local vs. non-local; local chapter vs. national board of the same organization) obviously had an impact on the patterns of communication and related internal problems of the group. Because our selection was never intended to be representative, we are quite happy about the great variety of the investigated groups. From a theoretical viewpoint, this variety enriches our perspective and draws theoretical attention to aspects that otherwise would have been overlooked. The same applies to the study of the transnational campaign which, by its very nature, offers a contrast to the eleven local groups which meet on a regular basis in the same place.

7.3.2. The observation

Interestingly, access to the groups was much less of a problem than we expected. To be sure, some groups asked detailed questions abut the purpose of the research and, more particularly, on the financing institution (which provoked critical comments in at least one case). But none of the approached groups flatly denied access. It seemed that after a while the observer simply became part of the group although differences to the “regular” members remained.

The period of participant observation was generally in 2006 and/or 2007, though with considerable differences in the length of the observation period. Actually, it ranged from four months (Attac Florence) to almost two years (Attac group “Financial Markets” in Berlin). Accordingly, also the number of observed sessions varied greatly, with 3 sessions in the case of the Swiss Lemanic Social Forum and national meetings of the Italian water campaign to 14 sessions of the British student group Conscious Consumers. Also the frequency of regular meetings differed. It was weekly (in the case of Attac Florence for most of the observation period) but only every four to six weeks for both of the French groups. Meetings tended to be relatively short for some groups but lasting, as a rule, for eight hours or more in the case of the French Attac board – a group which is fraught with a densely packed agenda and the expectation to take a series of decisions at every session. In addition to the time consuming participant observation, researchers usually conducted a number of informal and/or more formal interviews. In some instances, particularly in the British case, most of these interviews were tape recorded. Moreover, in several cases, additional interviews were carried out with people in the immediate

environment of the groups. Not in all cases research results were fed back to and discussed with the group under study.

All in all, the decision to conduct participant observation in combination with interviews proved to be a fruitful research strategy. It provided us with many insights that otherwise we would have been completely missed. Only some of these results will be presented in the remainder of this chapter.

7.3.3. Group structures

When looking at the kind of groups under study, it becomes clear that they also differ widely in terms of their structure, though most of them are fairly small. The two largest groups, measured by the regular number of participants in its meetings, are the French Attac board with 42 elected members (plus two staff and a varying number of guests of whom, interestingly, most are researchers), and the nation-wide meetings of the Italian water campaign with up to 85 participants. The majority of groups, however, has only around ten participants or even less.

While some groups include people who all became involved into politics roughly at the same time and therefore had a similar level of experience, other groups involve both a generation of oldtimers and a generation of newcomers. As several examples demonstrate, however, this does not necessarily lead to a hierarchy on the basis of varying experience. In one case, it was a newcomer full of energy who revitalized the group and quickly became an informal coordinator. In most other cases, the more experienced activists are usually those who also have a greater impact on the agenda and on matters that are discussed, or even decided, in between group meetings. As a rule, this does not provoke any criticism and opposition as long the group does not feel to be ignored or overruled by its informal leader or coordinator.

Almost all groups are dominated by middle class people with a high educational background. This even applies to No Vox (France), an organization fighting for the rights of marginalized and excluded people. One of the British groups is campus-based and composed of students only. Other groups are more variegated in terms of age and occupation. Overall, the groups include, particularly when compared to more formal associations such as trade unions and political parties, a large proportion of women, usually ranging around 40% but reaching in one case even 60% (Thanet Friends of the Earth). An exception was a meeting of a local group meeting of the Italian water campaign where among 12 participants only was female.

Participation can be based on formal election (French Attac board), formal or informal delegation (Córdoba Solidaria), formal (due paying) membership and/or simply personal interest, hence without any formal requirement. In one British case formal membership of a certain number of people is required (in order to be recognized by the student union) but does not play a role in practice.

The oldest group (Córdoba solidaria) under study was created in 1994. The two youngest groups (both from Britain) did come into existence only in 2006, shortly before the participant observation began.

All groups tend to be open, though some of them do not seem to attract newcomers but tend to shrink. Some groups have an elected chair; others have informal coordinators (usually those who spend most time for the group); still others have a rotating facilitator or none of these

roles. Yet even in those latter groups some people take a lead in some situations, usually based on their experience, know how, or valuable contacts to other groups.

7.3.4. Group atmosphere

Conflict per se is rarely perceived to be negative but rather a "natural" element both within the group and with regard to other groups. With the exception of the French Attac board which was shaken by a deep organizational crisis of the overall French organization (culminating in a complaint about electoral fraud), the atmosphere of the remaining groups tended to be very relaxed and mostly friendly. In some groups, news on personal issues (e.g., job problems, illness, travel tours) are an integral part of the communication. Notably in the French No Vox, communication is not structured along a prefabricated agenda and by the desire to take decisions.

Even when people disagree, they rarely attack each other at a personal level. In some cases of disagreement or conflict, ironic comments did even provoke laughter on both sides of the conflict line. Yet there were also a few examples of pejorative speech acts and of serious criticism that caused some participants not to show up in the subsequent meetings. Generally, participants tend to be very keen on maintaining a spirit of friendliness and respect even when there is a particular member who speaks too much and too long or who, at some occasions, tends to be stubborn.

7.3.5. Power, participation and equality

Generally speaking, the groups are extremely sensitive to aspects of power and inequality within their own ranks. In one Spanish group this seemed to be even the overriding concern, considering the group not as a mean to reach a political goal, but as a goal in itself, namely to practise (radical) democratic. We also observe the phenomenon of “reluctant leaders”, i.e. group members who effectively have acquired a kind of leading role without really wanting it. These leaders tend to invite other members to take the initiative or they make offers for a division of labour, including, for example, a rotating chair. It is also a common practise in some groups to initiate a “go around” at the beginning of a new issue or when there is the feeling that the discussion is stuck. Clearly, one of the two British cases (Conscious Consumers) is at the opposite side of the spectrum with little reflection on group structure, discussions, decision-making.

Two groups (Attac France and Córdoba solidaria) have elected presidents who, therefore, are “naturally” accepted to chair the sessions. Due to the specific, though different, roles of both groups (one as a decision-making body, the other as a coordinator and facilitator without a distinct political agenda), these chairs are not questioned as such. This, however, did not prevent some group members of Attac France to criticise the “presidential style” of the chair. All the other groups have either widely accepted coordinators (formal in the case of Thanet Friends of the Earth, informal in the case of the two German groups and the Conscious Consumers in Britain) or no such a role at all (the Spanish Ecologistas en Acción).

As a rule, younger but deeply committed activists, especially women, are more critical towards the negative aspects of formal and informal power than the older activists who, in quite many cases, have been politically socialized in trade unions, political parties and other established organizations. It also appears that those groups that are rather at the margins of the

GJMs (the two British groups and Córdoba solidaria) are less concerned with internal power structures and the issue of equality than those groups who belong to the movements' core. While these latter groups recurrently struggle to reduce imbalances of power and occasionally make it a particular issue of discussion, the French No Vox does not seem to be hampered by this question at all. It has no formal rules, little if any informal leadership and hierarchy. Moreover, its casual habits (meetings start up to one hour later than scheduled), its erratic way of discussion (without a prior agenda and a frequent back and forth between different topics) which an outsider may perceive as chaotic is not seen as a problem by the group's members but rather as an asset. These erratic and unstructured discussions contribute to a "common micro-culture" which seems to be appreciated by all members. Contrary to these practices, in two other groups some members have articulated dissatisfaction with unstructured discussions that do not lead to clear decisions and actions, hence being a "waste of time" (e.g., Conscious Consumers). In this latter case, means and ends are clearly separated. Internal group affairs are not regarded as political acts in their own right but as a means of achieving political acts.

7.3.6. Conflicts, deliberation, and decision-making

When it comes to express dissent within the group, again the British Conscious Consumers and Thanet Friends of the Earth – the two groups which are probably most detached from the GJMs - are exceptions. Several group members tend to remain quiet when they disagree with something – a behaviour that would be unusual in all the other groups. Of course, also in the other groups dissenting members may become silent at some point of time (because they feel that they are isolated or because they do not want to prevent a joint decision). But they do so only after having expressed their views.

Occasional conflicts are far from being rare. Mostly however, they are restricted to a brief signal or remark. Yet there are also controversies as defined in our code book. As far as numbers have been provided in the country reports, up to every third agenda item registered by the observer can be, or can turn into, a controversy (26 controversies out of 76 agenda items in the case of Attac Geneva). On the other end of the spectrum, the proportion of controversies can be lower than ten percent (Conscious Consumers).

Deliberation (as defined in the code book) actually occurs. This is by no means evident, since there are voices among theorists arguing that deliberation is simply a dream but never occurs in reality. There are instances when people initially disagree but finally, based on the exchange of arguments and viewpoints, reach a consensus (as opposed to a compromise) everybody feels happy with, regardless of his or her initial position.

However, deliberation in the strict sense of the term remains a relatively rare event. Whether based on deliberation or other forms of communication, mostly groups eventually decide on the basis of tacit agreement or nodding. This is particularly true for groups which explicitly value the consensus principle (as opposed to voting or especially the majority rule). Even a relatively formal group such as Thanet Friends of the Earth did not practise, at least during the period of observation, the majority rule. This kind of implicit decision-making usually requires strong ties among the group members. The more these members feel to belong to the same "family" and trust each other, the less they feel a need to make explicit decisions. In this regard, No Vox is an impressive example. The group explicitly refuses to vote. It stresses, similar to Attac Florence, Ecologistas en Accion and the Lemanic Social Forum, the process,

allowing at best the role of a facilitator in group discussions. Quite telling is the statement of one participant who, when asked what the group will decide, answered “the discussion will decide”. In other words: No Vox is "socialization-oriented" (French report), whereas most other groups are more action-oriented or decision-oriented.

Whether or not consensus is reached is not always clear. Sometimes, this may lead a participant to ask what eventually the agreement was (Conscious Consumers). Sometimes, group members wrongly assume to have reached a consensus but afterwards become aware that differences have remained. In some instances, a group member may explicitly asks his/her comrades if everybody “can live” with the outcome of a discussion or if somebody disagrees. In other instances or other groups, a kind of test voting is done simply to see that a supposed unanimity does indeed exist. Some groups, however, do not shy away from taking a majority vote either as a common habit (Attac France board) or as an exception (Conscious Consumers).

The high appreciation of the consensus principle usually goes hand in hand with some scepticism regarding the principle of delegation. This was very explicit in the case of Attac Florence where representation and delegation are considered as part of the traditional established mechanisms that have to be overcome. Even the French Attac board as a group designed to make decisions prefers consensus though it often resorts to votes, particularly because it has a very pronounced and vital minority faction within its own ranks.

7.3.7. Meta-communication

Meta-communication, i.e. communication about the ways and rules to communicate, does not seem to appear as a consciously applied tool in debates. In some groups -- particularly those acting on the basis of a pre-set agenda, formal roles and rules (chair, majority vote) -- meta-communication does not appear to occur at all. In other groups, particularly when a situation of deep conflict and stalemate emerges, meta-communication is used to find out, for example, whether there is a hidden agenda in a particular conflict, whether personal tensions are underlying an allegedly factual or value-oriented conflict, or which are the boundaries that all group members should definitely respect. Such a communication may be limited to very brief remarks (e.g., “this comment on me is mean”; “I better not react to this insult”; “Let's not all talk at the same time”). Yet it may also lead to a more elaborated discussion about the need to listen to minority voices, about the legitimacy of certain techniques, if not tricks, to push a certain viewpoint, or about the need for a better organization of group discussions by nominating a moderator or facilitator, setting an binding agenda before or at the beginning of a sessions, etc.).

7.3.8. The group context

Almost all the observed groups, regardless of being completely autonomous or a section of a larger organization, define themselves as part of a broader movement, though in some cases (especially the British ones) more implicitly than explicitly. Accordingly, in their meetings the groups occasionally reflect on the overall situation of the movement on all levels, ranging from the local to the global. It appears that the overall situation of the movements, at least with regard to the national level, is perceived in very different ways. While in Spain, from the viewpoint of the two groups under study, a rather optimistic perspective seems to prevail, just the opposite

holds for Italy where the movement is perceived to be "in crisis" and signs of frustration and demobilization are repeatedly mentioned.

In general, the groups under study have a complicated and highly ambivalent relationship with potential allies, in particular with trade unions and political parties. This becomes very clear in the case of the French groups and of Attac Florence. Some members of these groups are at the same time members or sympathizers of such more formal associations and therefore promote alliances and cooperation with these associations. On the other hand, because these associations tend to pursue their own political agenda and sometimes to instrumentalize autonomous movement groups, the latter are very careful in keeping their potential partners at arm length.

Moreover, close collaboration with one particular union or party may estrange other group members who are closer to a "rival" union or party. For No Vox, even collaboration with informal core groups of the GJMs is perceived to be highly problematic because even these groups, in spite of all their rhetoric of solidarity and justice, tend to marginalize the "movements des sans".

More generally, it seems that among GJM groups there is a strong tendency to remain independent and autonomous, though cooperation is accepted or even sought for specific campaigns. Particularly those movement groups which favour grass roots democracy, "horizontal" structures and the consensus principle tend to distrust the more formal organizations not because of their goals but because of their structures.

All the more a critical view on the established ways of representative democracy prevails at the large (national) scale. The groups tend to view this kind of democracy as dominated by power games instead of substantive political goals such as intense participation, equality, solidarity and justice. In other words: These groups are extremely sensitive to the *forms* of politics, the way of discussing, organizing and decision-making at all levels. To them, democracy has to be learned and practiced first of all at a small scale, that is in the movement groups. If democratic principles failed to be realized at that level, there would be little hope to meet these principles at the larger scale, let alone the global level.

7.3.9. The role of action

For all groups, political action seems however to play a fundamental role in keeping them together, stimulating commitment and solidarity, which in fact tend to grow during periods of intense activities. An orientation to action seems common to all groups observed, although actions could mean different things, from street protest to educational campaigns, from lobbying to participation in institutional politics. Even though it includes different forms, action seems therefore important not only for its "public", i.e. visible side and its external effects, but also for the intensification of interactions and emotional involvement inside the group. In particular at the transnational level, a main effect of the protest campaigns seems to be the cross-fertilization in terms of themes and the building of links of reciprocal knowledge and trust. At the same time, however, the perceived urgency of action can reduce the time devoted to deliberation and therefore the quality of communication.

7.4. Similarities and differences: some concluding remarks

Summarizing, we noticed some striking similarities in the democratic functioning of the groups. By and large, we found a significant degree of participation as well as good standards of communication. Participants tend to respect each other and welcome the full deployment of individual skills and propensity. In general, attitudes are inclusive and a strong sense of autonomy in the choices of actions prevails even within groups that are formally a chapter of a national or supranational organization. Consensus is a widely supported principle; taking a vote is rare. Additionally, various rules (facilitator and note-taker roles, distribution of information, anti-hierarchical settings) develop in order to improve communication and participation.

At the same time, however, informal leaders tend to emerge (even involuntarily, as "reluctant leaders"). A main source of informal power is commitment, with a tacit recognition of decision-making power of those who invest more time and energy in the group. Additionally, all groups seem to have some difficulty in getting new people involved, as disagreement often tends to be expressed in terms of exit instead of voice. The frequent conclusion of discussion through (assumption of) tacit agreement often makes such decision-making procedures intransparent and results in unclear decisions.

In their activities most groups are outward-oriented, addressing institutions at different levels. In interactions with institutional politics—from the student councils to the UN—the groups under study express a strong critique of organizations that follow a logic of delegation and majority rule. Interactions are framed within a strong criticism for what is perceived as a misfit between the way in which these institutions function, and the democratic ideals of the groups. Interactions are therefore only accepted to the extent that they are considered as necessary in order to make "another world possible".

Other observations refer, however, to some differences we noticed in particular along two main dimensions: the degree of homogeneity and the territorial level of the group. As for the degree of homogeneity, it appears that divergent opinions are more easily expressed in groups which are homogeneous in their ideological and cultural conceptions as well as the generational and social background of their activists. Instead, the perception of heterogeneity generates reluctance to express a dissent which is perceived as potentially more disruptive. Often, homogeneity also comes along with more frequent meetings and an interaction of political and social ties. Also, a trade-off was found between internal solidarity and the involuntary exclusion of potential new comers. The groups we studied tend to be stabilized by a small and consistent core of very committed activists. This core is complemented by a fluctuating circle of supporters that tend to rise in number in times of protest campaigns. In heterogeneous groups, the (formal or informal) recognition of more influence of the founders can reflect a search for integration (e.g. in Attac-France).

In terms of the territorial level of activities, strong differences emerge between the mostly local groups studied at the national level and the transnational organizations. In a transnational campaign, in particular, different circles of committed activists seem to emerge among the organizations that participated in the network. In general, more decision-making power is implicitly granted to those groups that invest more time than others in the specific campaigns. Large degrees of heterogeneity are reflected in a much higher tendency of members to dropping out rather than voicing their dissent.

CHAPTER 8. DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE AND THE MOBILIZATION OF THE SOCIETY: A SUMMARY OF RESULTS[1]

The results of the DEMOS research project underline the relevance of the global justice movement (GJM) as a political actor, innovative in participants, organizational form and claims. The importance emerges of opening multiple channels of communication and participation, with special attention to demands for policy reform advancing the cause of justice (economic, social, political, and environmental) among and between peoples across the globe.

- Developing in political conditions shaped by challenges to the nation-state and representative democracy, the global justice movement (GJM) emerged as a relevant political actor, imposing the theme of justice (economic, social, political, and environmental) among and between peoples across the globe on the public sphere, producing independent expertise and presenting alternatives to existing forms of global governance.
- The emergence of a global movement with transnational identity and concerns did not lead to the disappearance of specific national movement characteristics nor did it translate into an exclusive preoccupation with international issues. It did, however, bring about the framing of concerns emerging on different territorial levels in a global context.
- The GJM developed innovative organizational features, in particular close networking across traditional barriers of national and political cultures and in spite of heterogeneous characteristics of the associations involved (tradition, age, size, etc.).
- Organizations and individuals active in the GJM show a high level of identification with the movement and a common basis of shared values and beliefs, enabling the movement to pursue a cross issue approach in which specific concerns are bridged by the common demands for social justice and democracy from below as well as the rejection of neoliberal forms of globalization.
- Organizations and individuals active in the GJM show variegated strategies and action repertoires, often combing conventional and unconventional forms of political participation (e.g. lobbying and protest). They attribute special value to the spreading of information about global problems and the promotion of alternative social and economic models.
- Critical of existing forms of global governance and representative democracy, organizations and individuals active in the GJM experiment and propose new forms of democracy from below, attempting to construct participatory and deliberative arenas and to implement participation and deliberation in group life.
- Notwithstanding their critique of existing forms of global governance and of representative democracy, GJM organizations interact with political institutions, albeit

[1] This reproduces the Demos WP7 report (executive summary), edited by Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter (della Porta and Reiter 2008).

often in a critical and selective way. In the case of institutionally sponsored experiments of participatory democracy, activists and their organizations point out the shortcomings of top down models with uncertain citizen empowerment.

- Playing a role of "critical collaboration" or "democratic control", the organizations and individuals active in the GJM may be crucial for the emergence of a contested public sphere at the transnational and in particular the European level, fundamental for the creation of a supranational democracy.
- The conceptions and practices of democracy that have developed in the GJM, with reference to both the *internal organization of social movements* and *public decision-making*, constitute important contributions to the experiments in creating transnational, national and local participatory and deliberative arenas that regard citizens as actors of politics.

In what follows, we shall address these points in some more details.

Developing in political conditions shaped by challenges to the nation-state and representative democracy, the global justice movement (GJM) emerged as a relevant political actor, imposing the theme of justice (economic, social, political, and environmental) among and between peoples across the globe on the public sphere, producing independent expertise and presenting alternatives to existing forms of global governance.

The GJM developed in political conditions shaped by challenges to the nation-state and representative democracy, in particular the development of (closed) international governmental organizations (IGOs) and the decline of the (identifying functions of) national political parties. Without implying a demise of the nation state or the end of representative democracy, the transformations in both the boundaries of the polity and the main political actors have affected the traditional functioning of the democratic state and have defined the context for the new forms of contentious politics.

The emergence of global issues and the growing role of international governmental institutions (IGOs) have facilitated the development of transnational networks of social movement organizations as well as experiences of international and inter-issue collaboration. At the transnational level, however, the institutional system is particularly closed, leaving limited if any access "from below". Indeed, if the movement stresses the need for political governance of globalization it sees existing IGOs as gravely deficient in democratic standards, a position expressed in the opening slogan for the international parade at Genoa: "You G8, we 6 billion".

Moreover, not only on the transnational but also on the national and local level the problem of finding alliances in the political and institutional system presented itself in new terms. While the interactions between institutional politics and politics from below continue to be important, the image of a division of labor between (especially left-wing) parties and movements – with movements pointing out a problem and parties developing a political solution – is turning more and more problematic. In modern representative democracies politics increasingly becomes an exclusive activity for professional politicians, who take decisions legitimated by electoral investiture. The GJM not only articulates a demand for politics but also

advances a proposal for “different politics”; that is, for participatory politics carried out in arenas open to citizens regarded as subjects and actors of politics.

While the political conditions therefore seemed unfavourable to the birth of a movement on issues of globalization – openness of the political system and the availability of allies among institutional political actors have been regarded as decisive for collective mobilization and its success – the movement has made major inroads towards redrawing the boundaries of politics, broadening them to include a public opinion increasingly receptive to criticism of globalization. It seems as though changes in public debate where criticism of neoliberal globalization have encountered growing sympathies, have counted for more in the birth and consolidation of the movement than codified political opportunities.

The GJM emerged as a relevant political actor in particular by imposing the theme of justice (economic, social, political, and environmental) among and between peoples across the globe on the public sphere – as the American weekly “Newsweek” wrote (13/12/1999, 36): “one of the most important lessons of Seattle is that there are now two visions of globalization on offer, one led by commerce, one by social activism”. Not limiting itself to pointing out negative repercussions of globalization processes, the movement was also instrumental in fomenting the discussion on alternatives, producing independent expertise and pushing concrete counter proposals. In fact, in interviews we conducted with representatives of more than 200 organizations active in the social forum process the role of the GJM in the building of alternatives was particularly stressed.

The emergence of a global movement with transnational identity and concerns did not lead to the disappearance of specific national movement characteristics nor did it translate into an exclusive preoccupation with international issues. It did, however, bring about the framing of concerns emerging on different territorial levels in a global context.

After Seattle, ever more frequent mention was made of a *global* movement. Although the majority of demonstrators at Seattle were North American (some estimated 20-25 thousand from Washington state, 15-20 thousand from elsewhere in the USA, and an additional 3-5 thousand from Canada), the international nature of the event is confirmed by the parallel initiatives organized in more than a hundred cities in the world's north and south for the “Global Action Day”. Subsequently, the transnational character of the GJM found expression in particular in the organization of successive World, European, Asian, African and American Social Forums.

The establishment of a global movement requires groups to frame their action in terms of global *identity and concerns*: identifying themselves as part of a “global movement” and targeting “global enemies” within a global field of action. It should be stressed, however, that global concerns do not translate into an exclusive concentration on international politics, but into the framing of concerns emerging on different territorial levels in a global context. In this sense, the GJM pursues objectives on the local, the national, the European and the global level (e.g. the popular initiative for a new regional law on water in Tuscany; the French initiative to tax flights; the mobilization against the Bolkestein directive; the proposal of the Tobin tax).

Moreover, the emergence of a global movement did not lead to the disappearance of national movement characteristics. In our research we addressed the network of the GJM by

looking at linkages among transnational, national, and local groups that have mobilized on global justice issues. Even if local and national organizations interact transnationally, reacting to supranational institutions of governance, they remain embedded in national traditions and opportunities. At the risk of some simplification, we have singled out the presence of *two different constellations of the GJM* in the countries under study: on the one hand, a *Southern European constellation* (Italy, France and Spain) where protest dynamics appear as dominant, with a greater political content of mobilisations and a greater role of trade unions in the GJM (both traditional ones and grassroots unions of recent formation). In general, the political opportunities appear as closed, and forms of action more radical; the GJM is stronger in terms of its capacity to mobilise in the street, more heterogeneous and decentralised, framing the struggle against neo-liberalism at home within a global discourse. In *the Northern European constellation* (Germany, Switzerland, and the UK), the role of associations and Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is more visible, critical unions are weak and traditional unions remain more distant from the GJM. With more open political opportunities, the GJM tends to prefer moderate, conventional forms of action, relying less on street mobilisation. The global justice issues are framed especially (although not exclusively) in terms of solidarity with the South.

The GJM developed innovative organizational features, in particular close networking across traditional barriers of national and political cultures and in spite of heterogeneous characteristics of the associations involved (tradition, age, size, etc.).

In all countries under review (France, Germany, Britain, Italy, Spain and Switzerland), we observed the convergence of new social movements, NGOs and solidarity organizations, trade unions, left-wing groups, and grassroots organizations. The global justice movement is in fact a "movement of movements", linking different types of organizations, belonging to various movement traditions.

Our analysis of more than 200 organizations involved in the social forum process confirms their pluralistic and heterogeneous nature. These organizations cover a wide range in terms of *size of membership*: about 50% declare (individual) membership of up to 1000 individuals and about one third of more than 10.000; those organizations that allow for collective membership, often involve quite a large number of groups (more than 25 in half of the cases). Also the *age* of the organizations varies: about one third of the organizations in our sample were founded before 1990 (13% before 1968), one third between 1990 and 1999 and one third after the year 2000. As far as *organizational resources* are concerned, 16.7% declare a variable or limited *budget*, and a quarter a budget of less than €50.000. The remaining part is equally divided among those who declare between €50.000 and €500.000 and those who declare more than €500.000. Similar variation exists on the presence of *paid staff*, with only one third of our groups that have none, 44.4% up to sixteen, 14.1% between sixteen and 100 and 11.2 more than 100. On the number of *volunteers*, the groups are equally divided between those who declare less than 16, those who declare between 16 and 100 and those who declare more than 100. The organizations of our sample also present different levels of *formalization, centralization, formal accountability,* and *autonomy from external actors*.

Heterogeneity, however, is not seen as a weakness within the GJM. To the contrary, in their fundamental documents 47% of the organizations analyzed mention

difference/plurality/heterogeneity as a positive value. The inclusive structure already typical of other movements (especially the women's and peace movements) appears in the GJM in a more highly networked version. The new communication technologies – primarily the Internet – have not only steadily reduced the costs of mobilization, allowing slim, flexible structures, but also facilitated transversal interaction among different areas and movements. Close networking is also aided by multiple membership of movement activists, in organizations also of different tradition and thematic orientation.

A common characteristic of the organizations we analyzed is in fact a high degree of *reticularity*. In their fundamental documents, as many as about 80% of the organizations analyzed mention *collaboration/networking* with other organizations at the national level and about the same percent also at the transnational level. Among those who mention this information, about one third (slightly more at the transnational level) point at the relevance of collaboration with groups working on other issues than themselves, but sharing the same values. Consequently, in the interviews we conducted the representatives of the sampled organizations declared to perceive the GJM first of all as an area for encounters, exchanges, networking, and collective mobilization.

Organizations and individuals active in the GJM show a high level of identification with the movement and a common basis of shared values and beliefs, enabling the movement to pursue a cross issue approach in which specific concerns are bridged by the common demands for social justice and democracy from below as well as the rejection of neoliberal forms of globalization.

Both organizations and individuals active in the GJM show a high level of identification with the movement as a whole, and not only with single organizations or movement sectors. As far as activists are concerned, according to a survey conducted at the first European Social Forum (ESF) in Florence in 2002, 75% identified with the GJM as a whole. Of the activists we surveyed at the Athens ESF in 2006, 39.4% declared to identify very much with the GJM and a further 47.4% quite a lot. A high level of identification with the GJM emerged also for the organizations we analyzed. Almost 80% of the representatives of the sampled organizations we interviewed declared that their organization identified fully with the movement, while only very few groups (less than 10%) don't perceive themselves as being part of a GJM or don't have a shared view on the question.

However, in politics as well as in social science the opinion has been voiced that we are confronted with varying coalitions mobilising on different global justice themes rather than with a movement characterized by shared concerns, values and beliefs. The expression of feelings of belonging to this "movement of movements" might not be sufficient for assessing to which extent diverse actors and campaigns do conform to an analytic definition of social movements that stresses the qualifying characteristic of "shared beliefs".

The responses to open questions about the main aims and strategies of the GJM in our interviews with representatives of the sampled organizations allow us to address this issue. First of all, organizations tend to perceive the GJM as a space in which their own specific concerns (including social issues, international concerns, ecological values, women's rights, migrant rights, peace, etc.) can find a larger audience. These, however, are not understood as "single

issue" concerns, but as core topics to be put on the agenda of a complex movement. In addition, if the language used is often resonant of the different ideological and political traditions represented within the movement, there are three main bridging themes located at the basis of the GJM that are shared also by the respondents underlining their specific core issues: social justice (perceived as a "broker frame" that connects all others), democracy from below (linked with social justice and perceived as the construction of participative and deliberative spaces), and the global nature of action (expressed in the large use of words like "global", "international", or simply "world" in the answers to the open questions). This common basis of shared values and beliefs enables the GJM to pursue a cross issue approach.

Organizations and individuals active in the GJM show variegated strategies and action repertoires, often combing conventional and unconventional forms of political participation (e.g. lobbying and protest) They attribute special value to the spreading of information about global problems and the promotion of alternative social and economic models.

Groups can employ different *strategies* to reach their goals: protest, lobbying, constructing concrete alternatives, or promoting political education and trying to raise citizens' awareness. If protest is mentioned in the fundamental documents of a large majority of the organizations we sampled (more than two thirds), a similarly large share mentions influencing the media, spreading alternative information and raising awareness as a main function of their groups, and almost half of the organizations mention the political education of the citizens. Although smaller, the significant number of groups mentioning lobbying (more than one third), the defense of specific interests (almost one fifth), political representation, advocacy, provision of services and self-help (oscillating between 11 and 22%) signals that most organizations engage in different types of activities. This multiple repertoire confirms the pluralistic nature of the movement, with a (somewhat pragmatic) orientation towards the use of multiple tactics.

In fact, according to the interviews we conducted with representatives of the sampled organizations, most groups do not limit themselves to a single strategy but try to maximize their possibility of success by employing and mixing different strategies (also depending on the political situation they face). Contrary to the assumption that lobbying and protest are opposite strategies used by different actors, we found evidence of use of both by a significant percentage of our groups. This result is consistent with most observations concerning the Seattle protests and similar events: involved organizations feel that a heterogeneous blend of tactics and strategies can multiply the opportunity to reach their objectives. Only few groups (less than 10%) focus on a single strategy. More than two thirds of the organizations employ at least three different strategies at the same time while one fifth employs two.

The activist survey we conducted at the Athens ESF gives some indication on which strategies are particularly valued within the movement. We asked participants of the Athens ESF to rank five strategies which the GJM should pursue in order to enhance democracy according to their perceived importance. The most traditional form of political participation, contacting political leaders, has the lowest level of support: for only 17.9% this is the most important or second most important option. Although significantly more supported, also the reliance upon street protests is considered a priority (first or second option) only by about one third of the activists (31.1%). Practicing democracy within their group was chosen as the most important or

second most important option by 45.7%. Above all, according to activists, the movement's objective should be to "make the world aware" and to promote alternative social and economic models. To spread information about global problems to the public is indicated by 58.2% as the most important or second most important strategy to be pursued by the GJM in order to enhance democracy. 62.9% opted instead for the promotion of alternative social and economic models.

Critical of existing forms of global governance and representative democracy, the organizations and activists of the GJM experiment and propose new forms of democracy from below, attempting to construct participatory and deliberative arenas and to implement participation and deliberation in group life.

The activist survey we conducted at the Athens ESF revealed very low degrees of satisfaction with existing forms of global governance and representative democracy Looking at the overall results for single institutions, international organizations, in particular the EU (14.5%) and the UN (18.1%), scored slightly higher than national governments (11.5%) but less so than institutions of local government (26.8%). Trust remains at a low 20.5% for national parliaments. Trade unions (ca. 50%) are trusted much more than political parties (21.2%). The only political actors enjoying high levels of trust are NGOs (67%) and social movement organizations (SMOs - 86%). A critical view on the established ways of representative democracy at the large (national) scale prevailed also among the groups we studied using the technique of participant observation. The groups tend to view this kind of democracy as dominated by power games instead of substantive political goals such as intense participation, equality, solidarity and justice. In other words: These groups are extremely sensitive to the *forms* of politics, the way of discussing, organizing and decision-making at all levels.

Two main conceptions of democracy—alternative to the dominant definition of democracy—are central focus for our analysis regarding the new forms of democracy from below which the GJM advances: *participatory* and *deliberative* conceptions. Traditionally, social movements have emphasized a *participatory* conception of democracy, stressing the importance of increasing participation in direct forms. In recent theorisation and practice, the traditional conception of participatory and direct democracy has been linked with the emerging interest in *deliberative democracy*—concerned, in particular, with the quality of communication.

In their fundamental documents, half of the organizations in our sample support an *associational* conception of internal decision-making. This means that – at least formally – a model based upon delegation and the majority principle is quite widespread. The importance of the associational model is however only part of the picture. Many of these organizations, in fact, mention participation as an important internal value. In addition, 13.1% of the organizations were classified as *assembleary*, since the participatory elements are emphasized via the important role attributed to the assembly and its inclusiveness, rejecting delegation, but consensus is not mentioned as a principle, nor used as a decision-making method. In an additional one fourth (23%) of the organizations, the deliberative element comes to the fore. In particular, these organizations stress the importance of *deliberation* and/or *consensus* over majoritarian decision-making. We can distinguish between a 13% of the organizations which combine consensus with delegation (deliberative representation), and a 9% which apply consensus within an assembleary model (deliberative participation).

In parallel to our approach to formal documents, we dedicated a central part of our interviews with representatives of movement organizations to internal models of democracy. On this basis, 38.0% of the selected organizations fall in the deliberative representative category where the principle of consensus is mixed with the principle of delegation. 30.9% of the groups adopt an associational model that is based on the majority vote and delegation. 21.7% of the groups follow a deliberative-participative model combining consensual decision-making with the principle of direct participation and the refusal of the delegation of power, while 9.8% of the selected organizations mix the principle of direct participation with the majority vote (assembleary model).

Comparing the results of the interviews with those we had obtained analysing formal documents of the sampled organizations, few differences emerge for the dimension *participation*. However, interviewees tend to stress *deliberation* and *consensus* more than the organizational documents do. This can be explained in different ways: respondents might be more up to date and accurate in describing the actual decision-making in their groups, or they may want to give an image of their organization's procedures conforming to a fundamental innovation in decision-making accompanying the social forum process. Whatever the explanation, norms of consensus appear as very much supported by the organizations active in the GJM.

In order to shed light on the activists' ideal type conceptions of democracy, we asked them whether in political decision-making direct participation or delegation and consensus or majority voting should be employed. Comparing the results with the other parts of our project, we see that the activists' democratic ideal is far more participatory than the reality of SMOs emerging from formal documents or interviews with group representatives, whereas deliberation is valued by slightly less than half of our respondents. The associational model remains the ideal for only 19.1%, and with 8.2% the deliberative representative model finds even less support. The activists clearly favour participatory organizational forms, employing either the majority vote (assembleary model, 35.9%) or the consensus method (deliberative participative model, 36.7%). Participation and (to a lesser extent) deliberation are therefore considered as main values for another democracy.

If the differences between formal rules, the perception of group functioning relayed by the representatives interviewed, and democratic ideals of the activists have to be considered, there is no doubt that participatory and deliberative values and practices enjoy high support within the GJM. Above all, within the movement we find concrete attempts to construct participatory and deliberative arenas (e.g. in the social forum process) and to realize participation and deliberation in group life. In fact, in the groups we studied using the technique of participant observation, we found a significant degree of participation as well as good standards of communication. Participants tend to respect each other and welcome the full deployment of individual skills and propensity. In general, attitudes are inclusive and a strong sense of autonomy in the choices of actions prevails even within groups that are formally a chapter of a national or supranational organization. Consensus is a widely supported principle; taking a vote is rare. Additionally, various rules (facilitator and note-taker roles, distribution of information, anti-hierarchical settings) develop in order to improve communication and participation.

Notwithstanding their critique of global governance and representative democracy, GJM organizations interact with political institutions, albeit often in a critical and selective way. In the case of institutionally sponsored experiments of participatory democracy, activists and their organizations point out the shortcomings of top down models with uncertain citizen empowerment.

Notwithstanding their critical position, social movement organizations *interact with the institutions of representative democracy*. Our organizations are quite open to interactions with institutions—they are not just emphasizing a negative message, but also often accepting to collaborate on specific problems. At the same time, however, they tend to be critical of those institutions, and to perceive their own role as actively engaging in citizens' control of institutional politics and implementing channels of discursive accountability. In formal organizational documents, statements of open refusal of relationships with representative institutions are rare (11.5%), while an attitude of either collaboration or democratic control is more frequent (about one third each). Relations of collaboration are more often mentioned at the national than at the supranational level (where instead relations of democratic control prevail). Differences between institutions are however limited, indicating that attitudes tend to spread from one institution to the others.

The representatives of organizations we interviewed also indicated a willingness of their organizations to interact with political institutions. In this interaction, however, they tend to take on the role of critical collaborators or democratic controllers. Refusal of any collaboration is very rare: from a very low 4.4% for local institutions, to 11.8% for the national and 13.5 for the international level. If the refusal is the highest for IGOs, it remains nevertheless only slightly higher than for national institutions and in general terms low. The sampled organizations tend to collaborate especially with local (as many as 70%) and national (67%) institutions, but also with IGOs (almost half of our sample). Many groups declare to collaborate with different territorial levels at the same time, testifying to an adaptation to multilevel governance. These groups, however, often qualify their collaboration as critical or selective, with a less critical attitude towards local governments and growing criticism towards the national and the supranational levels.

These results were further confirmed by the in-depth studies of selected groups, using the technique of participant observation. In their activities most groups are outward-oriented, addressing institutions at different levels. In interactions with institutional politics—from student councils to the UN—the groups under study express a strong critique of organizations that follow a logic of delegation and majority rule. Interactions are framed within a strong criticism for what is perceived as a misfit between the way in which these institutions function, and the democratic ideals of the groups and are therefore only accepted to the extent that they are considered as necessary in order to make "another world possible".

The criticism of institutional politics emerges also from activists' attitudes towards experiments of participatory democracy, promoted institutionally especially at the local level. Actors associated with social movements intervened in the development of some of these processes, sometimes as critical participants, sometimes as external opponents. Various groups involved in the GJM have in particular sponsored participative budgeting that allows citizens to decide upon part of a city's expenditures. In fact, 34.2% of the activists surveyed at the Athens ESF strongly agree that the involvement of citizens in decision-making processes practiced in

experiments like Agenda 21 or participatory budgeting improves the quality of political decisions and a further 49.9% agrees, while only 13% disagree and 2.9% strongly disagree.

The interviews with representatives of GJM organizations also revealed a critical attitude towards existing experiments of participatory public decision-making, not precluding, however, active involvement. About 40% of the groups did not discuss this issue or have no clear stance on it. Over one third declared that these participative experiments improve the quality of political decisions; about one fifth was skeptical. When asked to qualify their judgment on experiments of public decision-making, almost one fifth of the groups spoke of both advantages and risks. About half underlined the positive aspects and almost one third pointed at the negative side of institution-driven experiments. Criticism concerns both the input and the output sides of the decision-making process. Such experiments are considered "top-down" (promoted and implemented from the top of the political system), elitist ("they involve mostly experts and not citizens"), lacking in empowerment ("no real changes occur"), or even dangerous ("serve for cooptation of critical engagement"). Other interviewees underlined however the positive effects of public decision-making based on citizens' participation on both the input side of the decision-making process ("they stimulate active citizens' participation") and on its output side: they attribute more responsibility to the people, foster transparency and publicity of the decision-making, produce a more consensual decision-making and allow for the emergence of new political styles and administrative practices.

Playing a role of "critical collaboration" or "democratic control" the organizations active in the GJM may be crucial for the emergence of a contested public sphere at the transnational and in particular the European level, fundamental for the creation of a supranational democracy.

Already at the first ESF in Florence in 2002, almost 70% of the activists had expressed a strong interest in the building of new institutions of world governance. Furthermore, in order to achieve the goals of the movement more than half of the activists saw a stronger UN as necessary and more than two fifth of them a stronger EU and/or other regional institutions (with higher support for the EU among Italian activists, and very low support among the British activists). At the Athens ESF in 2006, the belief in the need of building institutions to involve civil society both at the EU and at the global level became virtually unanimous (88.8% and 92.5%, respectively). The activists of the GJM therefore should not be defined as euro-sceptics, wanting a return to the nation state, but as "critical Europeanists" or "critical globalist", convinced that transnational institution of governance are necessary, but that they should be built from below.

GJM organizations and activists in fact converge on the necessity to build 'another Europe', advancing demands for social justice and 'democracy from below'. Since 2002, attention to the construction of 'another Europe' has developed at the European Social Forums, with the presentation of demands for democratization of European institutions and for a charter of social rights. Our activist survey conducted at the Athens ESF confirmed strong criticism of the existing European institutions, but also indicated a high affective identification with Europe and a medium level of support for a European level of governance. GJM organizations and activists therefore represent a 'social capital' of committed citizens that might provide an important source for the building of a European citizenship.

It has been pointed out that contestation is a crucial pre-condition for the emergence of a European public sphere, and a contested public sphere is the only path towards the creation of a supranational democracy. In this sense, the reaction of European institutions – which (in varying degrees as far as the Parliament, the Commission or the Council are concerned) show many of the aspects of closure typical for supranational institutions – is of crucial importance for the development of a democratic EU. Building legitimate authorities and democratic political processes to address global issues is a fundamental request of the GJM. These concerns can be shared by European Union policies.

Besides democratic legitimacy and effectiveness, the fundamental requests of the GJM have been rooted in the rejection of neoliberal globalisation and of market driven policies. In this regard, due to the EU's strong liberalisation policies on trade, investment, finance, intellectual property and other issues, the GJM has generally considered the European Union as part of the problem rather than part of the solution. In few other cases - such as human rights and the environment - the transnational networks and organisations associated to the GJM have found possibilities of convergence with EU policies, and in these cases major achievements (such as the creation of the ICC and environmental treaties) have been obtained. In the current European debate, there is a renewed discussion on the need to reconsider neoliberal policies and to address their negative distributional consequences in several fields; the extent of social mobilisations may have had an influence on such developments. The lessons of such conflicts and convergences between the GJM and EU policies suggest that social movement actors should be recognised as having a legitimate voice in the process of deliberation about European policies, and should be encouraged to participate in a more open and democratic process of policy making. This process is likely to lead to more effective and democratic outcomes for EU policies. If the demands advanced by the GJM for greater democracy and for policy alternatives are given serious consideration, new ideas and social actors could be integrated in the European political process; the state of European democracy would be strengthened.

The conceptions and practices of democracy that have developed in the GJM, with reference to both the internal organization of social movements and public decision-making, constitute important contributions to the experiments in creating transnational, national and local participatory and deliberative arenas.

In their search for participatory arenas involving citizens beyond the electoral moment, political institutions have a lot to learn from the conceptions and practices of democracy that developed in the GJM. First, most of the groups we analyzed are very sensitive to issues of power and democracy, showing an open and accessible style of communication, willingness to listen to different viewpoints, readiness to rotate leadership roles or to accept moderators or facilitators, and preference for interactive discussion. Second, in spite of often very informal organizational structures, these groups are not only able to manage their communication and activity at a small scale but also, though with much greater difficulties, at national and even transnational levels. Third, based on our research findings we can conclude that deliberation, at least at the level of small-scale groups, is not just a dream but happens, even to a greater extent than we expected when beginning our research, and in particular when decisions on actions had to be taken.

It is certainly true that in GJM groups, as probably in any social groups, one can observe informal hierarchies, struggles over and misuse of power, forms of incivility, and so forth. As the results of our survey at the Athens ESF show, the (self-reflective) activists of the GJM are critical about the degree to which participation and deliberation in decision-making are realized both in their own groups and in the movement as a whole. However, even though not completely conceptualized and realized by the groups we analyzed, the method of consensus reflects a conception of democracy as an instrument for developing mutual understanding. If total horizontality seems a utopia, a self reflective attitude and the search for instruments to keep the effects of inequality and hierarchy under control have a positive function. Our analysis of conceptions and practices of democracy that have developed in the GJM underlines that politics is not only the negotiation between actors with "hard power" and points to the importance of a conception of politics as dialogue.

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